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ABSTRACT 
 
The world’s freshwater supplies are squeezed by rapidly increasing demand, the 
impacts of global climate change and unsustainable management. Given the fact that 
water is the gossamer linking various other security issues – e.g., energy, food and 
environment – it seems obvious that ‘business as usual’ in transboundary water 
management will threaten future global stability and endanger the very foundation of 
international security. Yet, the much needed radical new approach is missing. This is 
mainly due to the fact that addressing water insecurity is a highly complex task where 
multilevel and polycentric forces must be balanced and coordinated. The absence of 
law in much of this emerging debate highlights the necessity for further understanding 
and elucidation, especially from the legal perspective. 
 
This PhD thesis aims to add to the discourse by providing a fresh conceptualisation of 
water security and developing an operational methodology for identifying the four core 
elements of water security – availability, access, adaptability and ambit – which must 
be addressed by international law. The analysis of the legal framework of 
transboundary freshwater management based on this contemporary understanding of 
water security reveals the challenges and shortcomings of the current legal regime. In 
order to address these shortcomings, the present mindset of prevailing rigidity and 
state-centrism is challenged by examining how international legal instruments could be 
crafted to advance a more flexible and common approach towards transboundary water 
interaction. Here, the concept of considering water security as a matter of ‘regional 
common concern’ is introduced to help international law play a more prominent role in 
addressing the challenges of global water insecurity. Ways for implementing such an 
approach are proposed and analysed by looking at international hydropolitics in 
Himalayan Asia. 
 
At a time when international environmental law is said to be losing relevance, the 
growing complexity and interdependence between states demands a break with the 
prevalence of thinking in silos and within national borders. This PhD thesis analyses 
transboundary water interaction – the fault line of international conflict in the 21st 
century – as a ‘case study’ for advancing public international law in order to fulfil its 
responsibility of promoting international peace and security. 
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1 
1 INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Life in the Anthropocene – The Disrespect for Planetary Boundaries  
We live in times of rapid change where the vigorous, and at times abrupt, shifts in 
societal and environmental realities demand a change in how we define the challenges 
we are facing as a global community and pursue the quest for finding solutions. Yet, 
the ability of the human race to react and understand the changes around us, cannot 
keep up with the pace in which we alter it; leaving us confronting a whole range of 
serious, intractable challenges of global importance. Recent trends, however, show no 
sign of a fundamental change in strategy. The current position of the dominant powers 
in global politics remains to preserve what they perceive as international security by 
securing their own national interests. With regards to the environment, this has led to 
the fact that the rapid and non-linear changes to life-supporting ecosystem services we 
currently observe are unprecedented in human history. The ‘international community’ 
has not succeeded in slowing down, let alone reversing, adverse environmental 
changes.1 According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the 
development progress in the world’s poorest states might even be reversed within the 
next decades unless bold steps are taken now to prevent further global environmental 
degradation and conquer the deep inequalities within and among nations.2 
 
According to the International Commission on Stratigraphy, we live in the Holocene – 
the era which began around 12,000 years ago after the end of the last Ice Age.3 The 
Holocene marks a period with unusually stable climatic conditions, which had (and 
still has) potent implications for the development of civilisations.4 However, some 
scientists believe that since the late 18th century we have been living in a new 
geological epoch marked by unprecedented human influences on the planet – matching 
major geological processes in their effect – the ‘Anthropocene.’5 Ever since we started 
burning fossil fuels, we have been modifying the whole climate system. There is no 
denial that humans have changed planet earth on a global scale. This in turn, some 
scholars argue, should trigger a new way of perceiving our environment, as we live in 
                                                 
1 United Nations Environment Programme, Global Environment Outlook 5 : Environment for the Future 
We Want (UNEP 2012) at 4. 
2 United Nations Development Programme, Human Development Report 2011 : Sustainability and 
Equity: A Better Future for All (Palgrave Macmillan 2011). 
3 See the most recent (September 2010) International Stratigraphic Chart at 
<http://www.stratigraphy.org/ics%20chart/09_2010/StratChart2010.pdf>. 
4 JT Houghton, Global Warming : The Complete Briefing (Cambridge University Press 2009) at 88. 
5 PJ Crutzen and EF Stoermer, 'The Antropocene' (2000) 41 Global Change Newsletter 17 at 17. 
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‘human systems, with natural ecosystems embedded within them.’6 The days of 
conquering nature are long gone. Today we, supposedly, decide ‘what nature is and 
what it will be.’7 
 
However, it seems we have not played the role of stewards of the earth that well so far. 
This is mainly due to the popular (mis)conception that natural resources are endlessly 
abundant, the ecosystems perpetually resilient, and thus limitless economic growth a 
reasonable goal. Over the last decades, several reports and studies have been published 
to counter this argument and warned of ‘limits to growth.’8 The resulting – and still 
ongoing – debate between the two camps, pro-development vis-à-vis pro-environment, 
brought forth the idea that we need to follow the course of sustainable development, 
ensuring that we ‘meet the needs of the present without compromising the ability of 
future generations to meet their own needs.’9 While this noble aim found a high degree 
of attraction among scholars, policy-makers and NGOs, it was not able to turn the boat 
around. Looking at the challenges we face from the local to the global level – e.g., 
famines,10 dramatic loss of biodiversity,11 widening gap between the rich and the 
‘bottom billion’12 and global climate change13 – the idea of the sustainable society still 
seems to be illusive. 
 
Recently, scientists have developed a framework of ‘planetary boundaries,’ trying to 
help humanity to navigate the Anthropocene. Transgressing one or even more of the 
identified nine interdependent planetary boundaries might trigger abrupt environmental 
change.14 The goal of the concept of ‘planetary boundaries’ is to ultimately shift the 
                                                 
6 EC Ellis and N Ramankutty, 'Putting People in the Map: Anthropogenic Biomes of the World' (2007) 6 
Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 439 at 445. 
7 PG Crutzen and C Schwägerl for Yale Environment 360, 'Living in the Anthropocene: Toward a New 
Global Ethos' (24 January 2011) 
<http://e360.yale.edu/feature/living_in_the_anthropocene_toward_a_new_global_ethos_/2363/>. 
8 DH Meadows and others, The Limits to Growth : A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the 
Predicament of Mankind (Universe Books 1972). 
9 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (Oxford University Press 
1987) at 43. 
10 HCJ Godfray and others, 'Food Security: The Challenge of Feeding 9 Billion People' (2010) 327 
Science 812. 
11 Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 3 (Secretariat of 
the Convention on Biological Diversity 2010). 
12 See P Collier, The Bottom Billion : Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done 
About It (Oxford University Press 2007). 
13 See, e.g., the detailed analysis of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 
2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability - Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth 
Assessment Report of the IPCC (Cambridge University Press 2007). 
14 The 9 identified boundaries are: climate change; ocean acidification; stratospheric ozone; 
biogeochemical nitrogen (N) cycle and phosphorus (P) cycle; global freshwater use; land system 
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environmental management approach away from the current sectoral analyses of 
‘limits to growth,’ which attempt to minimise negative externalities, towards a more 
complex roadmap of the safe operating space for sustainable development, in order to 
avoid major anthropogenic global environmental change.15 Since, according to the 
scientists, we have already transgressed three of the boundaries (nitrogen cycle, 
biodiversity loss and climate change),16 the proposed reforms call for far-reaching 
constitutional changes of the global governance system.17 
 
1.2 Water – The Gossamer Linking a Whole Web of Securities 
When looking at the challenges ahead and the planetary boundaries limiting our room 
for manoeuvre, it becomes clear that water plays an integral part in the future of our 
development. Today, it is being widely acknowledged that water is not exclusively a 
local, national or international issue which can be governed at any of those levels 
alone.18 Global interdependencies are being woven by the cross-cutting nature of water 
which makes addressing the global freshwater crisis cumbersome, as water interaction 
often cannot be isolated from global trends and drivers. The challenges of freshwater 
management at any governance level are expected to become more intense in the 
future, as accelerated change creates new threats and interconnected forces increase 
uncertainty and risk.19 
 
Water scarcity, droughts and floods, already affect many countries around the world, 
with some of these events triggering local armed conflicts.20 The resulting adverse 
impacts concern developed and developing states alike.21 Recent studies show the 
concerning trend of the increasing overexploitation of freshwater in various regions 
                                                                                                                                             
change; biodiversity loss; chemical pollution; and atmospheric aerosol loading. See J Rockström and 
others, 'A Safe Operating Space for Humanity' (2009) 461 Nature 472 at 473. 
15 J Rockström and others, 'Planetary Boundaries: Exploring the Safe Operating Space for Humanity' 
(2009) 14 Ecology and Society 1 at 1. 
16 Ibid at 22. 
17 F Biermann and others, 'Navigating the Anthropocene: Improving Earth System Governance' (2012) 
335 Science 1306 at 1306. 
18 United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, The United Nations World Water Development 
Report 4 : Managing Water under Uncertainty and Risk, vol 1 (UNESCO 2012) at 2. 
19 Ibid at 20. 
20 Integrated Regional Information Networks, 'Kenya: Drought Exacerbating Conflict among 
Pastoralists' (2 February 2009) <http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=82683>. 
21 Recently, England has been hit by the worst drought in 30 years; and the fear that the dry conditions 
might become the new norm has even revived the long written off plans to transport bulk water from 
Scotland down south via a Grand Contour Canal. See R Alderson for BBC News, 'Scots Offer to 
Send Water to Aid Drought-hit England' (9 March 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-scotland-
17314545>. 
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around the world.22 There is no doubt that a shortage of safe water would impede the 
socio-economic development of any society.23 Despite governments expressing 
political commitment, billions of people around the globe are denied access to clean 
drinking water and adequate sanitation.24 Within a couple of decades, some two-thirds 
of the world’s population will suffer directly from a lack of freshwater,25 and water 
scarcity could reduce the annual global crop yield significantly (some estimate this to 
be the equivalent of all of the grain crops of the United States and India combined), 
which could wreak havoc against the predicted 70-90 percent increase in global food 
demand.26 Furthermore, freshwater systems are both hotspots for biodiversity and 
species endangerment.27 Due to our remarkable ability to alter inland waterways – over 
60 percent of the world’s large river systems have become moderately or highly 
fragmented – we have dramatically changed the underlying ecosystems.28 Not only 
does this loss of natural habitat accelerate species extinction further, it also affects vital 
ecosystem services like purification of water, natural flood protection and provision of 
food.29 Given that current trends in unsustainable development, climate change and 
water use show no sign of relenting, freshwater ecosystems will remain under threat 
well into the future.30 
 
New challenges related to the use and distribution of the world’s water resources 
abound around the globe, affecting local, regional, and international dependent 
communities in a myriad of ways31 – threatening basic social, economic, political, and 
                                                 
22 I van der Molen and A Hildering, 'Water: Cause for Conflict or Co-Operation?' (2005) 1 Journal on 
Science and World Affairs 133 at 133. 
23 See E Kemp-Benedict and others, 'Connections between Poverty, Water and Agriculture: Evidence 
from 10 River Basins' (2011) 36 Water International 125. 
24 See United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, The Millennium Development Goals 
Report 2008 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs 2008) at 40. 
25 United Nations World Water Assessment Programme, The United Nations World Water Development 
Report 3: Water in a Changing World (UNESCO 2009) at 36. 
26 World Economic Forum Water Initiative, Managing Our Future Water Needs for Agriculture, 
Industry, Human Health and the Environment : The Bubble Is Close to Bursting: A Forecast of the 
Main Economic and Geopolitical Water Issues Likely to Arise in the World During the Next Two 
Decades (World Economic Forum 2009) at 10. 
27 DL Strayer and D Dudgeon, 'Freshwater Biodiversity Conservation: Recent Progress and Future 
Challenges' (2010) 29 Journal of the North American Benthological Society 344. 
28 Today, more than 40 percent of the global river discharge is being intercepted by large dams; blocking 
around one-third of sediments vital for the world’s coastal zones. Secretariat of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity, Global Biodiversity Outlook 3 at 43. 
29 United Nations Environment Programme, Water Security and Ecosystem Services : The Critical 
Connection (United Nations Environment Programme, 2009) at 10. 
30 CJ Vörösmarty and others, 'Global Threats to Human Water Security and River Biodiversity' (2010) 
467 Nature 555. 
31 JF Warner and R Meissner, 'The Politics of Security in the Okavango River Basin: From Civil War to 
Saving Wetlands (1975-2002) : A Preliminary Security Impact Assessment' in Jansky L, Nakayama 
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environmental ‘securities’ around the world. With the integral and finite nature of this 
particular resource, water has to be considered the key component of ‘ultimate 
security.’32 Increased competition over increasingly scarce natural resources – with 
water being the most critical – is evoking a bleak outlook for the future where 
historical observations may be of little or no relevance. In some areas with high levels 
of water stress (including northern China, northwest India and parts of Pakistan) one 
can also witness high variability of freshwater supply from year to year.33 It is obvious 
that the situation gets more risky in places where the demand for water is already 
relatively high (compared to availability), as well as the likelihood of low-water years. 
Rising demand and declining quality are being aggravated by climate change, 
population growth, urbanisation, and now a global economy lacking financial 
resources. These combined forces could lead to what John Beddington, the United 
Kingdom (UK) Government Chief Scientific Adviser, refers to as the ‘perfect storm’ 
of food, energy, and water shortages.34 How should we address this convergence of 
security concerns? The fact that the global water crisis is already reshaping foreign 
policy – and will do so even more extensively in the future – puts ‘water security’ high 
on the political agenda.35 
 
While elevating the concept of ‘water security’ into global agenda setting political 
circles has certainly helped raise awareness of the global water crisis, ‘water security’ 
still remains a concept that has been underexplored from an academic standpoint. This 
is mainly due to the various opposing definitions of the concept, depending on the 
motives of the actor (e.g., state official, NGO or industry), the realm it is being 
                                                                                                                                             
M and Pachova NI (eds), International Water Security: Domestic Threats and Opportunities (United 
Nations University Press 2008) at 260. 
32 See N Myers, Ultimate Security: The Environmental Basis of Political Stability (W.W. Norton 1993). 
See also E Burleson, 'Water Is Security' (2008) 31 Environs: Environmental Law and Policy Journal 
197. 
33 See the Aqueduct Water Risk Atlas by the World Resources Institute, available at 
<http://aqueduct.wri.org/>. 
34 According to John Beddington, the demand for energy and food will increase by 50 percent by 2030, 
while the demand for freshwater will increase by 30 percent; J Beddington, Food, Energy, Water 
and the Climate : A Perfect Storm of Global Events? (Government Office for Science 2009). 
35 See M Aydin and F Ereker, 'Water Scarcity and Political Wrangling: Security in the Euphrates and 
Tigris Basin' in Brauch HG and others (eds), Facing Global Environmental Change : Environmental, 
Human, Energy, Food, Health and Water Security Concepts (Springer 2009); P Bagla, 'Along the 
Indus River, Saber Rattling over Water Security' (2010) 328 Science 1226; AD Brouma, 'Water and 
Security in International Relations: A Co-Operative Debate' (Water Security in the 21st Century); 
KBS Rasheed, 'Water Security in Eastern Himalayan Region' (2008) 21 South Asian Journal 42; J 
Selby, ''New Security Thinking' in Israel-Palestinian Water Relations' in Brauch HG and others 
(eds), Facing Global Environmental Change : Environmental, Human, Energy, Food, Health and 
Water Security Concepts (Springer 2009); M Smith and others, 'The Big Question: Will Global 
Conflict Flow from the Quest for Water Security?' (2009) 26 World Policy Journal 5; M Zeitoun, 
'The Global Web of National Water Security' (2011) 2 Global Policy 286. 
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discussed in (e.g., international relations, development aid or economics) or the 
discipline in which the concept is being advanced (e.g., law, economics, political 
science or environmental sciences). This is why the academic debate around ‘water 
security’ is in dire need of more deliberate and extensive examination, in order to 
address the vagueness that currently surrounds the concept, and ultimately deepen 
knowledge and understanding of the contribution that a ‘water security’ paradigm can 
play in addressing the aforementioned global challenges. Not only is water a vital 
resource whose management deserves particular attention; it is also the main link 
between several other crises we are facing. Thus, by tackling water insecurity, we do 
not only alleviate the global water crisis; we automatically contribute to addressing 
various other pressing challenges – i.e. food, energy and the environment. 
 
1.3 The Relevance of International Law in Addressing Water Insecurity 
Acknowledging that we live in rapidly changing times facing social and environmental 
challenges of significant magnitude is a first step. While several scholars claim that 
humanity will always be able to count on its ingenuity and invent itself out of crisis, 
we still need a roadmap for navigating the rough times ahead. While the use of 
technology can turn nature into an asset, this asset only has a potential value to society. 
In order to actually become of real value, regulatory frameworks – laws – have to be in 
place. Only then can we prevent a ‘plundered planet.’36 Furthermore, security as such 
is an important human value; and its provision is one of the main purposes of any legal 
system.37 Law, then, has to be regarded as a major instrument for the pursuit of 
security. Hence, our understanding of (water) security determines what we expect from 
the legal system in this role – which kind of framework we want it to provide; and 
which goals we want it to achieve.38 
 
The difficulty in designing an effective legal framework for water security, however, 
becomes apparent when one realises that not only is water spilling into various other 
matters; it also touches all levels of governance, from the local to the international. 
Around one fifth of the world’s renewable freshwater resources are shared between 
countries, including more than 260 transboundary river basins – home to 40 percent of 
                                                 
36 See P Collier, The Plundered Planet : How to Reconcile Prosperity with Nature (Allen Lane 2010) at 
4. Collier has tried to illustrate this endeavour with the help of two simplified formulas: (1) Nature + 
Technology – Regulation = Plunder; (2) Nature + Technology + Regulation = Prosperity. 
37 N Duxbury, 'Human Security and the Basic Norm' (1990) 76 Archiv für Rechts- und 
Sozialphilosophie 184 at 184. 
38 See B von Tigerstrom, Human Security and International Law (Hart Publishing 2007) at 3. 
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the global population. These basins cover more than 45 percent of the Earth’s land 
surface, while accounting for around 60 percent of global river flow. Those figures hint 
at the high level of interdependence; making it easy to imagine the dilemmas faced by 
basins like the Danube or the Nile, which are shared by 17 and 11 states respectively. 
Yet, even countries which are not directly reliant on transboundary freshwater 
resources are affected by, and affecting, the management of transboundary basins 
around the world – due to linkages which are rather hidden. For instance, a recently 
published report found that the UK relies heavily on ‘virtual water’ (imported in 
goods) from drought-prone countries; and thus, water should be put at the centre of its 
international development policy to avoid surging water insecurity at home – as well 
as abroad.39 
 
International water law provides a framework for the interaction of states regarding 
their rights to, and responsibilities for, transboundary freshwater resources. By 
establishing the ‘rules of the game,’ it aims to avoid, manage and resolve water 
disputes.40 However, this foundation upon which transboundary waters should be 
managed peacefully has not yet accomplished a truly level playing field between states 
sharing the vital resource. While the cornerstone of international water law, the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, has the concept of ‘equity’ at heart, it 
seems to fall short in converting equity into a widespread approach towards 
transboundary freshwater management. In analysing how effective international law is 
in addressing water security concerns, the main shortcoming of the current legal 
regime can be exposed: state-centrism. Hence, in order to fulfil its responsibility – 
stabilising global peace and security – international law has to better address the 
complexities of water security. 
 
During the period of research for this study, the amount of literature on the concept of 
water security has grown substantially. Yet, despite the increasing depth of debate, the 
attempt to implement it into other disciplines (e.g., development studies) and the 
crucial role that law plays, water security has received sparse attention from legal 
                                                 
39 The Royal Academy of Engineering, Global Water Security : An Engineering Perspective (2010). 
40 See S Vinogradov, P Wouters and P Jones, Transforming Potential Conflict into Cooperation 
Potential: The Role of International Water Law (UNESCO 2003); P Wouters and A Rieu-Clarke, 
'The Role of International Water Law in Ensuring 'Good Water Governance': A Call for Renewed 
Focus and Action' (2004) 15 Journal of Water Law 89. 
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scholars.41 The few legal scholars who have taken on the complex task of analysing the 
implications that the concept of water security has for international water law, have 
usually done so by applying a rather narrow (orthodox) definition of water security; 
which in turn only allows for restricted analysis of the current legal framework and 
rather general proposals for the future development of international law.42 Hence, there 
is recognition that we need a ‘revolutionary re-think of the conceptual framework for 
water security, where the contribution of (water) law is more dynamically considered 
and integrated.’43 Water security is the prime example of a key issue dominating the 
21st century which cannot be solved by any single country acting alone. The realisation 
that states need to cooperate more closely on transboundary water management comes 
at a time where several tools for global policymaking have broken down.44 
 
One hot spot where this dilemma is readily apparent is the region of the Himalayas. In 
the Himalayas, the two hydro-hegemons (China and India) determine the rules of the 
game in order to secure their respective national (water) interests – without making 
huge efforts towards long-term stabilisation of regional security. In general, powerful 
riparians (such as India and China) are expected to be sensitive to relative gains by 
other states, since any gain can upset the status quo.45 Thus, international law has to 
work against this prevalent preference of powerful riparians to prefer bilateral treaties 
vis-à-vis a multilateral approach which would include all basin riparians. For the case 
of the Himalayas and in many other parts of the world, current international legal 
frameworks are struggling to meet contemporary challenges of the global water crisis 
and have often been seen as a hindrance rather than a part of the solution.46 In order to 
prevent transboundary water cooperation from failing, legal scholarship requires a 
                                                 
41 Notable exceptions include D Tarlock, 'Water Security, Fear Mitigation and International Water Law' 
(2008) 31 Hamline Law Review 704; P Wouters, 'Water Security: What Role for International Water 
Law?' in Doddle F (ed), Human and Environmental Security: An Agenda for Change (Earthscan 
2005). 
42 See, e.g., Tarlock, 'Water Security, Fear Mitigation and International Water Law' at 716. Here, 
Tarlock defines water security to include ‘the guarantee of sufficient water for a nation’s sustainable 
food production.’ 
43 D Tarlock and P Wouters, 'Reframing the Water Security Dialogue' (2009) 20 Journal of Water Law 
53 at 60. 
44 ‘The challenge of establishing a rules-based system for the production, consumption and trade of 
resources is immense, not least because it amounts to a comprehensive rewiring of the global 
economy. Despite the potential obstacles, it remains critical to seek pathways that will steer 
countries towards mutually advantageous models of cooperation, even though the appetite for 
enhanced global governance remains low.’ B Lee and others, Resources Futures (Chatham House 
2012) at 143. 
45 NA Zawahri and SM Mitchell, 'Fragmented Governance of International Rivers: Negotiating Bilateral 
Versus Multilateral Treaties' (2011) 55 International Studies Quarterly 835 at 843. 
46 One often quoted example is the Nile, where past treaties (from 1929 and 1959) made negotiations for 
a new basin-wide agreement difficult. 
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fresh approach able to analyse the complexities of the challenges revealed by the 
‘water security’ concept and develop international water law further. 
 
1.4 Purpose, Research Question and Outline of the Thesis 
This study examines the contemporary notion of ‘security’ within the rapidly changing 
international context of extra-military threats and will employ ‘water’ as the medium 
for critical discourse. The combined impact of increasing local, regional, and global 
tensions over access to the world’s diminishing natural resources – especially water – 
have created serious threats to global stability and have thus endangered the very 
foundation of modern legal order and international security.47 Despite the 
commitments set forth in the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter), which 
established the legal basis of the existing community of nations, serious problems 
challenge the UN Charter’s principal objective ‘to maintain international peace and 
security.’48 While the notion of security, and water security in particular, may have 
different meanings and acquire various forms (that is, at the individual, local, national, 
regional, and global levels), the primary focus of this study is on its international 
dimension and, more specifically, at the regional or international basin level. This is 
where the water security challenges have manifested themselves most visibly – yet the 
international legal response has been particularly weak. 
 
The PhD thesis addresses the question of whether a newly proposed conceptualisation 
of water security with a deeper connection to international water law opens up new 
pathways towards hydrosolidarity. The central hypothesis underlying the entire thesis 
is that an examination of international water law through a security lens brings forth an 
innovative legal architecture that can strengthen transboundary water cooperation; 
which in turn will enhance the role of international law in general. In order to verify 
this, the study follows a three step approach: (1) thoroughly examining how water 
security should be defined; (2) analysing the extent to which lex lata provides an 
enabling framework for achieving water security; and (3) giving impetus for lex 
ferenda, guided by the newly proposed understanding of water security. 
 
                                                 
47 For a detailed analysis of the evolving global security environmental problems, see IPPR Commission 
on National Security in the 21st Century, Shared Destinies: Security in a Globalised World : The 
Interim Report of the IPPR Commission on National Security in the 21st Century (Institute for Public 
Policy Research 2008). 
48 Article 1(1) of the Charter of the United Nations (26 June 1945; entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 
UNTS XVI [hereinafter UN Charter]. 
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Structurally, the study is divided into seven chapters. Following this introduction, 
Chapter 2 conceptualises ‘water security’ by reviewing existing perspectives and 
viewpoints from a range of disciplines on the concept. The study will then develop a 
definition of water security that enhances the accessibility of the concept within 
international legal scholarship. While the concept of ‘water security’ has been the 
subject of vigorous debate among social scientists and international relations scholars, 
it has yet to be clearly defined and influence legal discourse and practice. While this 
seems astonishing, given its relevance to central features of international law, the 
relatively little attention from international lawyers might be mainly due to the 
embryonic state of the concept in terms of its normative content, and the diverse 
interpretations in meaning across disciplines. 
 
After carving out a workable definition of water security that can be applied within the 
context of international law, Chapter 3 develops an operational methodology for 
identifying the core elements of water security which have to be addressed by 
international law – availability, access, adaptability and ambit. Then, in analysing the 
current legal framework governing transboundary freshwater resources, the main 
strengths, gaps and weaknesses within the current architecture are revealed. The first 
challenge is the (legal) tension between the task to provide for ‘security of 
expectations’ (status quo) and the innovation needed to meet fluctuating demands and 
supplies, i.e., the ability to respond to change. The second challenge is the 
(environmental / political) tension between the ecological unity of the water resource 
and the diverging sovereign interests of states. This in turn leads to friction between 
the aims of maximising the overall benefit of sustainable aquatic ecosystems and 
maximising the relative benefit of states.  
 
Having established the degree to which the existing legal framework of transboundary 
freshwater resources governance addresses water security, Chapters 4 and 5 of this 
study adopt a forward looking approach. Chapter 4 introduces the concept of 
hydrosolidarity, and explores the reasons why it has not been useful in turning 
transboundary water interaction around to date. Chapter 5, then, challenges the present 
mindset of prevailing state-centrism vis-à-vis hydrosolidarity by examining how 
international legal instruments might be crafted in a way that advances the concept of 
hydrosolidarity. This section therefore elaborates on the legal foundation needed to 
support the concept of hydrosolidarity, since the conceptualisation of water security, 
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which inevitably has a normative dimension, raises questions about international law 
in general. In order to be able to implement hydrosolidarity for the benefit of common 
water security, established paradigms need to be reviewed – including some of the 
most fundamental tenets of international law, such as state sovereignty. Here, the 
concept of considering water security as a matter of ‘regional common concern’ is 
introduced in order to help international law play a more prominent role in addressing 
the challenges of global water insecurity. The purpose of this notion is by no means to 
replace the acknowledged principle of international water law – equitable and 
reasonable utilisation. On the contrary, it aims to support it by providing a space for 
debate and further development. 
 
Chapter 6 of this study examines how the novel understanding of water security and its 
legal underpinnings could exploit gaps and provide opportunities for advancing an 
international water law agenda which can bring about hydrosolidarity in the region of 
Himalayan Asia, and considers the current state of affairs. The region serves as a 
perfect area of study, since several of the global challenges that transboundary water 
management is facing can be found here: i.e. climate change, population growth, 
urbanisation, economic development. In addition, political tensions between several of 
the states depending on the runoff of the ‘Third Pole’ (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand and 
Vietnam) hamper regional cooperation – e.g., conflicts in the volatile areas of Kashmir 
and Tibet. If it can be demonstrated that even within this highly pressurised region, 
looking at international water law through the lens of common security could break 
with the prevalence of zero-sum games, and thus lead to hydrosolidarity, it may serve 
as an inspiring model for other regions. 
 
Finally, Chapter 7 of this PhD thesis draws an overall conclusion and develops generic 
recommendations for international legal scholarship. Furthermore, it points towards 
prospects for the future of international water law by proposing a research agenda for 
the epistemic community. 
 
Civilisation simply cannot afford to ignore the increasingly sophisticated and 
interconnected social and environmental challenges, mainly driven by 
overexploitation, overconsumption and inequity. The growing complexity and 
interdependence between states and communities demands us to break with the 
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prevalence of thinking in silos and within national borders. What is required instead is 
a renewed effort to foster international cooperation on all issues shaping our common 
future. This study is looking at transboundary freshwater resources – the fault line of 
international conflict in the 21st century – as a ‘case study’ for advancing public 
international law in order to fulfil its responsibility of promoting international peace 
and security. As a result, this PhD thesis advances existing literature by analysing the 
implications that the concept of water security has for international water law, and vice 
versa. 
 
 
2 WATER SECURITY – CONCEPTUALISING A BUZZWORD 
The fact that the global water crisis is already reshaping foreign policy – and will do so 
even more extensively in the future – puts ‘water security’ high on the political agenda. 
One example is Kashmir, where the border between India and Pakistan, both nuclear-
armed, has been continually contested – a situation which has led to a perpetual state 
of instability in the region. Fears by Pakistan that its powerful neighbour could use 
water control as a weapon have been exploited by extremists to make a bogeyman out 
of India by claiming it is stealing Pakistan’s water.49 
 
Not only volatile Kashmir, but the whole region of the Himalayas has to be considered 
as a potential hot-spot of water insecurity. The glaciers of the Tibetan Plateau, also 
known as the ‘Third Pole,’ feed the headwaters of the mighty rivers Yangtze, Yellow, 
Mekong, Salween, Brahmaputra, Indus, among others. More than 1.5 billion people 
downstream directly depend upon these waters – not to mention the implications 
stemming from current and predicted future ‘virtual water’ trade.50 Since the outlook 
for this region is especially worrisome,51 it seems reasonable to expect that 
governments will try to secure as much water resources as possible, which may force 
them to look beyond their borders – leading to even more geo-political tensions. How 
China, for example, manages and dams its waters, will not only have a major impact 
on the water quality and quantity downstream, but also on the political stability of the 
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whole region; since most of the societies heavily depend on the seasonal river flows 
for their energy production, water and food security.52 This renders the question about 
the future status of Tibet more sensitive, as its plateau stores an abundant wealth of 
freshwater – the vital resource which will only become more valuable. Acknowledging 
the fact that water is a key component of ‘ultimate security,’ the securitisation of 
freshwater resources not only seems justified, but also inevitable.53 
 
2.1 The Changing Perception of Security 
The origins of the term ‘security’ derive from the Latin sine cura, meaning a state of 
living without care and concern.54 Wolfers suggests that ‘[s]ecurity […] in an objective 
sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, [and] in a subjective sense, 
[refers to] the absence of fear that such values might be attacked.’55 Thus, when taking 
a realist approach, objective security is achieved when the dangers posed by various 
risks, vulnerabilities and threats are being prevented or can be coped with; while from 
a social constructivist perspective, security is achieved once the perceptions of security 
risks, vulnerabilities and threats are overcome.56 This implies that although objective 
factors are essential for the conceptualisation of security, they clearly are not 
sufficient, as the subjective factors have a big impact in the perception of security. The 
perception of security, in turn, depends on the certain ‘value’ given by society 
(Wertidee) and a universally applied ‘normative concept.’57 Within the discipline, 
traditional approaches to security studies have tended to focus primarily on military 
threats to the integrity of nation states.58 This line of discourse changed with the end of 
the Cold War, when the distinction between internal and external security became 
increasingly obsolete, and conceptual approaches needed to take into account the 
security-related issues arising out of new global threats – economic, social, and 
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environmental. Especially the framing of environmental issues in terms of security 
appears to have gained currency rather quickly. In 1989, Eduard Shevardnadze, in his 
role as Soviet Foreign Minister, called for the establishment of an Environmental 
Security Council entrusted with issues of ecological security;59 while politicians in the 
West argued along the same line – e.g., the then Norwegian Defence Minister Johan 
Jørgen Holst, pointed out that ‘environment degradation may be viewed as a 
contribution to armed conflict in the sense of exacerbating conflicts or adding new 
dimensions.’60 
 
Thus, in realising that the various new threats to both national and international 
security simply could not be addressed by looking through the military lens alone, the 
perception of security changed considerably.61 The inclusion of non-military threats – 
the so called ‘widening’ process – was accompanied by efforts to also ‘deepen’ 
security studies. Here, the approach was to regard the individual, rather than the state, 
as the main referent object; introducing the concept of ‘human security.’62 In 1997, the 
UN Development Programme’s Human Development Report observed that ‘[s]ecurity 
is increasingly interpreted as the security of people, not just territory; security of 
individuals, not just of nations; security through development, not through arms; 
security of all people everywhere – in their homes, in their jobs, in their streets, in their 
communities, and in the environment.’63 
 
One of the consequences of the awakened political interest in this concept was an 
increase in research on ‘environmental security,’ arguing that environmental 
degradation poses a threat to international security which justifies the re-evaluation of 
the traditional notion of security.64 Interestingly, it was not environmental research 
which drove the development at the beginning; but rather two other disciplines which 
spearheaded early progress. Peace research used the concept of environmental security 
to overcome the classic notion of a military focused security of the individual state, 
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while researchers of international development incorporated environmental factors in 
their analysis of violent conflicts in the developing world to argue for restructuring the 
global economy.65 This process led to defining the environmental security of a state as 
the ‘absence of non-conventional threats against the environmental substratum 
essential to the well-being of its population and to the maintenance of its functional 
integrity.’66 Evidently, it reasserts the responsibilities of a state towards its citizens, 
which is the logical consequence of associating ‘national security’ with ‘quality of life’ 
(or human security).67 This is why other scholars put the individual in the centre of 
security research, arguing that ‘[i]n the field of international security, a focus on the 
individual as the nexus of concern enables us to understand both the broad spectrum of 
threats, and their interlocking nature, in any given context.’68 While this concept does 
not break with the notion of national security, since ‘the security of the state is 
necessary for human security,’ it nevertheless challenged the traditional thinking to 
become more human-centred.69 
 
From this focus on human-centred security, the ‘essential freedoms’ discourse evolved, 
which was embraced primarily by the United Nations, thereby placing the security 
paradigm within the following fundamental freedoms: the freedom from want, the 
freedom from fear, the freedom to live with human dignity, and the freedom from 
hazardous impact.70 Implementing these baskets of freedoms remains an obligation of 
states as the principal actors responsible for dealing with internal and external 
(international, regional and global) security challenges. In his report ‘In Larger 
Freedom,’ Kofi Annan, the former Secretary-General of the United Nations, identified 
the ‘imperative of collective action’ as essential for achieving the core purposes of the 
UN Charter:71 
‘In a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each country’s 
self-interest that all of them are addressed effectively. Hence, the cause of 
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larger freedom can only be advanced by broad, deep and sustained global 
cooperation among states. Such cooperation is possible if every country’s 
policies take into account not only the needs of its own citizens but also the 
needs of others. This kind of cooperation not only advances everyone’s 
interests but also recognizes our common humanity.’72 
Providing input to the UN Secretary-General’s report, the High-Level Panel on 
Threats, Challenges and Change offered interesting insights into the security discourse. 
The panel noted that 
‘[t]he threats to peace and security in the twenty-first century include not just 
international war and conflict but civil violence, organized crime, terrorism 
and weapons of mass destruction. They also include poverty, deadly 
infectious disease and environmental degradation since these can have equally 
catastrophic consequences. All of these threats can cause death or lessen life 
chances on a large scale. All of them can undermine states as the basic unit of 
the international system.’73 
The panel endorsed the central role of the United Nations in the context of a more 
broadly defined concept of security by insisting ‘that the Charter as a whole continues 
to provide a sound legal and policy basis for the organisation of collective security, 
enabling the Security Council to respond to threats to international peace and security, 
both old and new in a timely and effective manner.’74 It recommended that the United 
Nations be provided with ‘new expertise to deal with new threats – for example, the 
scientific advice necessary to address questions of environmental and biological 
security.’75 While recent efforts of Germany have put the threats of climate change on 
the agenda of the UN Security Council,76 some states – the most vocal being Russia – 
remain sceptic as to whether the Council actually is the right forum for discussing the 
security issues caused by the rapidly changing climate.77 In any case, one should not 
expect the UN to mobilise ‘green helmets’ as a response to climate change. This is 
evident not only due to the rather weak formulation in the Security Council’s statement 
that ‘possible adverse effects of climate change may, in the long run, aggravate certain 
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existing threats to international peace and security.’78 While an earlier version of the 
statement did provide for a much clearer connection between climate change and 
conflict (listing, e.g., drought, migration, food shortages),79 the recognition by the 
Security Council that the realities of the changing climate have repercussions on 
international peace and security is still a laudable step. 
 
Despite international policy developments, most governments have adopted a security 
paradigm which is based on the flawed premise that all kinds of insecurity can be 
controlled by using military force or containment. The underlying reason for states to 
follow this ‘control paradigm’ is their wish of being able to maintain the status quo.80 
Fuelled by the 9/11 attacks, many Western governments perceived terrorism to be the 
greatest threat. In doing so, however, valuable resources and time have been wasted by 
distracting from the much greater – and also much more fundamental – threats to 
international peace and security: global environmental change and competition over 
natural resources.81 
 
A new approach which addresses the drivers of insecurity by ‘curing the disease’ 
rather than ‘fighting the symptoms’ is urgently needed.82 Here, conjoint processes have 
recently led to the notions of collective and sustainable security,83 which try to pave 
the way towards a mutual understanding that security can no longer be regarded as a 
zero-sum game between states; since a contemporary take on the notion unveils its 
‘common’ characteristic. It has to be acknowledged that ‘security anywhere depends 
on sustainable development everywhere;’84 and hence on addressing the security 
challenges we are facing in a more holistic manner. The concept of sustainable 
development is being considered as a strategy of conflict prevention by addressing the 
root causes of insecurity and ensuring lasting peace and development.85 While it 
positions itself against the control paradigm, more research is needed to tease out how 
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exactly sustainable development as a security concept (sustainable security) can have 
an impact in the security discourse – otherwise it might be at risk of being 
overstretched due to its vagueness. However, in combining sustainable security 
thinking with the more advanced concept of collective security, which is being 
perceived as one of the core purposes of the UN Charter,86 a promising platform for 
discourse could emerge – one which might be capable of facilitating a meaningful 
debate about how to address the security issues the international community is facing. 
Although states are at the roots of the international system, and thus no collective 
security is possible unless it is based on the various perceptions of the security of 
states, collective security has always been expected to operate ‘above and beyond’ 
orthodox patterns of international relations – to add ‘universal moral obligations’ to the 
table of international negotiations.87 Given the complexity of the challenges ahead, 
adding the perspective of sustainability to this approach seems to be the most 
promising way of moving forward in the pursuit of common security. 
 
2.2 The Securitisation of Water 
While the concept of environmental security, notwithstanding its yet undefined 
normative meaning, has acquired some recognition and acceptance within current 
international legal discourse,88 the notion of water security is a relatively recent 
phenomenon. A number of interesting attempts to link environmental security with 
shared freshwater resources can be found in the literature,89 but these studies have 
considered water more as a premise for promoting the desirability of an ecosystem-
centred legal regime, rather than as a security issue in its own right. Unlike most other 
elements of the environment, water, however, is a multi-purpose resource of high 
economic and social significance, with diminishing availability and uneven 
distribution in space and time; and for which there is no alternative replacement. These 
special features make water resources open to conflicting claims of different users and 
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uses, both domestically and across international borders. The characteristics of the 
global water crisis (as briefly described in the previous chapter) justify the 
disengagement of water security from environmental, food, energy and other 
‘securities,’ and examining it as an own subject of an independent study.90 The 
conclusions drawn from this exercise, however, will certainly fertilise the general 
security discourse as well and demonstrate how water security can help bring about 
common security for all. 
 
2.2.1 Defusing the ‘Water War’ Scare 
The fear is that if efforts to mitigate and adapt to climate change fail, it might turn into 
a prime driver for conflict.91 This conclusion follows the reasoning that the changing 
climate is very likely to make poor states poorer, i.e. less able to absorb risk, and 
scarce natural resources, e.g., freshwater, even scarcer. This is why the ‘water war’ 
discourse mainly revolves around the debate whether scarcity of resources can trigger 
conflict; often drawing heavily from the rich literature on climate change and 
conflict.92 While the potential link between climate change and conflict has been 
investigated thoroughly, the conclusions which have been drawn by the various studies 
are rather contradictory. Some scientists, for instance, claim that the climatic 
phenomenon El Niño contributed to more than 20 percent of the world’s civil wars 
between 1950 and 2004;93 while others maintain the contrary and argue that ‘countries 
that are affected by climate-related natural disasters face a lower risk of civil war;’94 
and still others strongly refute any one-to-one causality between climatic changes and 
conflict, stating that it is impossible to isolate single factors as the sole trigger of 
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violence.95 This is why the prevailing opinion which has emerged is that 
environmental variables, including climate change, act as ‘threat multipliers,’ like in 
the recent case of Mali, where the State’s difficulty in providing basic resources for its 
people got exacerbated by droughts and led to a growing popularity of the militant 
group Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.96 
 
Analysing these studies makes clear that current research does not suggest that climate 
change alone can spark conflict between states, except perhaps where rapidly 
deteriorating water availability cuts across already existing tensions and weak 
institutions.97 It is this obvious link between climate and water which has drawn more 
and more researchers to look at water as a source of conflict.98 
 
On the one hand there are claims that we are currently going through a transition 
period from an era of oil conflicts to one of water wars, since water is now supposed to 
be a ‘commodity as important as oil.’99 This argument is often supported by listing 
various instances in the past, where water has already been used as a political tool or 
even a military target.100 Prominent examples are: the poisoning of enemy’s wells by 
the Assyrians as early as during the sixth century BC; the selection of dams and water 
supply infrastructure in Germany as a primary target of bombings by the British Royal 
Air Force in WWII; and the opening of dikes on the Yellow River by China during the 
Second Sino-Japanese War (1938) in order to slow the advance of the Japanese 
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army.101 Furthermore, some proponents of the ‘water war’ theory argue that Israel’s 
occupation of the Golan Heights after the Six-Days-War (June 5 to 10, 1967) was a 
historical conflict over land and water.102 Looking ahead, some scholars suggest that 
protecting a state’s national water security might even become a jus ad bellum criterion 
for a ‘just war’ in some particular cases.103 On the other hand, historical data is also 
employed to prove that there is no serious risk of a fully fledged war triggered by 
water scarcity, since the only known war solely fought specifically over water, 
occurred some 4,500 years ago between the ancient Mesopotamian city states of 
Lagash and Umma.104 In an attempt to examine the history of conflict over water 
resources more rigorously, a study analysing every reported international water-related 
interaction (conflict and cooperation) over the past five decades concluded that the 
record of cooperation overwhelmed that of conflict by far.105 
 
The problem with most studies analysing the possibility of water wars is their 
simplistic nature. It is difficult – if not impossible – to single out one factor in causing 
military action, since conflicts have to be understood as complex social systems.106 
Furthermore, the various steps leading towards a fully-fledged war are frequently 
being overlooked. In order to better understand the risks imposed by conflict, the 
Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research distinguishes between five 
levels of conflict with increasing intensity: dispute, non-violent crises, violent crises, 
limited war and war.107 The main weakness of the water wars discourse, however, is 
the fundamental misunderstanding of the political economy of water conflicts. While 
water scarcities are often portrayed as a Malthusian imbalance between supply and 
demand, they actually are the result of uneven patterns of economic development, and 
severe mismanagement of natural resources.108 Therefore, it is implausible to explain 
international water conflicts in state-centric terms and solely as provoked by unequally 
                                                 
101 DK Kreamer, 'The Past, Present, and Future of Water Conflict and International Security' (2012) 149 
Journal of Contemporary Water Research & Education 87 at 89. 
102 M Daoudy, 'A Missed Chance for Peace: Israel and Syria's Negotiations over the Golan Heights' 
(2008) 61 Journal of International Affairs 215 at 216. 
103 See C Waddington, 'Reconciling Just War Theory and Water-Related Conflict' (2012) 26 
International Journal of Applied Philosophy 197. 
104 SL Postel and AT Wolf, 'Dehydrating Conflict' (2001) Foreign Policy 60 at 60. 
105 See AT Wolf, SB Yoffe and M Giordano, International Waters: Indicators for Identifying Basins at 
Risk (UNESCO 2003). 
106 See, S Stetter and others, 'Conflicts About Water: Securitizations in a Global Context' (2011) 46 
Cooperation and Conflict 441 at 442. 
107 See J Deuter and others (eds), Conflict Barometer 2011 (Heidelberg Institute for International 
Conflict Research 2012). 
108 J Selby, 'Oil and Water: The Contrasting Anatomies of Resource Conflicts' (2005) 40 Government 
and Opposition 200 at 200. 
22 
powerful states competing for dwindling freshwater resources in order to secure their 
respective national interests. The starting point for analysing the likelihood of 
international conflicts over water should not be the availability of the resources as 
such, but the complex dynamics triggering both scarcity and conflict.109 Hence, it has 
to be concluded that the oil-water analogy is fundamentally flawed. 
 
It seems like the recent scaremongering about the potential of water wars has moved 
on from the Middle East and is now focusing on Asia.110 Given the regional 
preconditions and drivers, it might be apparent that the possibility conflict over water 
resources is growing – particularly along the borders of China, India and Pakistan. Yet 
again, it is not advisable ‘to cry wolf,’ as this will only give the floor to extremist 
forces within those countries who, by putting water on their agenda, benefit from the 
fears of the population. After all, hydropolitics is what societies make of it.111 Hence, 
the increasingly fierce rhetoric used by some officials comes as no real surprise: 
Pakistan’s General Ashfaq Kayani, citing water to justify his ‘India-centric’ military 
stance;112 Bashir Ahmad warning that India ‘will switch the Indus off to make Pakistan 
solely dependent on India. It’s going to be a water bomb;’113 or a Bangladeshi security 
expert Muniruzzaman stating that ‘if there ever were a localized conflict in South Asia 
it will be over water.’114 
 
However, despite the fact that the only true ‘water war’ has occurred more 4,500 years 
ago,115 the security implications of the global water crisis (see Chapter 1) suggest that 
the past may not be an adequate basis from which to make predictions about the 
potential for future water conflicts. While this may play into the reasoning of ‘Neo-
Malthusians,’ who believe that violent conflicts can erupt due to overexploitation of a 
specific resource116 – often driven by population growth, rapid economic development 
and inequitable distribution of resources – ‘Cornucopians’ draw a much brighter 
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picture of the future. They stress the argument that rather than being a crisis of 
absolute resource scarcity, the water challenge is one of management.117 This is why, 
in their view, it will be resolved through ‘virtual water’ (embedded in traded goods), 
economic development, and investment in infrastructure.118 Yet, the fear of inter-state 
or even regional conflicts related to water scarcity is rather persistent. This is mainly 
due to three observations. Firstly, many of the more than 260 transboundary rivers 
flow between countries with a long history of (sometimes military) conflicts.119 
Secondly, many countries are heavily reliant upon the flow of freshwater from their 
upstream neighbours.120 Finally, some states have already reached ‘peak water’ due to 
overexploitation, which will inevitably increase competition over the remaining (and 
often transboundary) freshwater resources.121 
 
While the academic debate has long been a rather bipolar one – discussing whether 
there is a clear link between scarcity of natural resources and violent conflict122 – 
several studies have moved away from this simplistic approach and have tried to 
explain how the most powerful actor in a basin can impose its own policies on the 
weaker riparians due to their respective power asymmetries by focusing on the concept 
of ‘hydro-hegemony.’123 
 
In any case, even if the future conflicts over water are not likely to lead to fully fledged 
wars between riparian countries, early interaction between the states will help alleviate 
the water crisis. A discourse solely revolving around whether we will face ‘water wars’ 
in the future is not only incapable of comprehending the manifold challenges of the 
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water crisis, but it also constitutes a ‘red herring’ – distracting from the real issues. The 
fact that more than 3.5 million people die every single year because of poor water, 
sanitation, and hygiene – far more than by all the ongoing wars – clearly suggests the 
need for a wider approach to water security than the narrow military one.124  
 
While often still applying violent conflict analogies, the human security imperative has 
been highlighted, among others, by the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP):  
‘The 1.8 million child deaths each year related to unclean water and poor 
sanitation dwarf the casualties associated with violent conflict. No act of 
terrorism generates economic devastation on the scale of the crisis in water 
and sanitation. Yet the issue barely registers on the international agenda.’125 
It has been estimated that by 2020, if the international community fails to effectively 
address global water insecurity, as many as 135 million preventable deaths could 
occur.126 The apparent lack of willpower in addressing this global crisis has prompted 
warnings that the world is slowly moving towards a ‘hydrocide,’127 – the ‘deliberate 
murder of our water bodies.’128 
 
In addition to stressing the human security implications of the water crisis, it has to be 
acknowledged that conflict and cooperation always coexist – in terms of water 
interaction.129 Not only does this observation limit the danger of alarmism; it also 
recognizes that, while dissent between riparian states regarding the (re)allocation of 
their shared waters may not always pose a direct military threat, the transboundary 
mismanagement caused by the dissonances nevertheless has the potential to destabilise 
nation states in an already highly unstable world. Furthermore, the debate about 
cooperation or conflict over freshwater usually ignores the quality of cooperation and 
the different shades of conflict. Just as not all cooperation is inherently good, not every 
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conflict is automatically bad. Too often, treaties manifest starkly inequitable situations 
(legalising the utilisation of freshwater which is inequitable); while at times it needs a 
situation of conflict (and thus renewed interest) for some important issues to actually 
be addressed. Hence, instead of focusing on the likelihood of military inter-state 
conflicts, more and more scholars appreciate the fact that sharing transboundary waters 
equitably is a ‘long war’ we all need to fight. 
 
While the role of the scaremonger is mainly played by the media,130 the continuous 
talk of future ‘water wars’ is also being nourished by various political circles – making 
the claim more powerful and widely accepted.131 It seems difficult to come to grips 
with the exact reasons for this apparent consensus, because each of the proponents of 
the water war hypothesis has its own selfish interest in keeping it alive. While for some 
ministries of defence, it may prove as a useful tool to safeguard a high level of 
financial resources (e.g., in the US),132 others may try to counter a general status of 
confusion and lack of direction within the context of overall geopolitical decline (e.g., 
the UK).133 
 
In any case, these heavily biased processes of ‘water security agenda setting’ are being 
driven by powerful interest groups. While it can be frustrating at times, it is 
worthwhile to engage in the debate and try to convince the establishments that water 
security means much more than just the absence of war. The development of the 
security concept in general, portrayed in the previous section, helps to understand why 
choosing a wider perspective for framing water security is not only appropriate, but 
also inevitable. 
 
2.2.2 The Potential Risks of the Water Security Discourse 
In recognising that the threat of ‘water wars’ is a political argument, mainly driven by 
the media, which often ignores the complexity of the issues involved in the 
transboundary water management, a different conceptual framework is needed to 
comprehend the global water crisis. Yet, this desperately needed change is difficult to 
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achieve. Simply put, securitisation is a strategy for managing risk perceptions of 
stakeholders which aims at moving an issue to the top of the agenda in order to 
generate the political will needed to address it. Thus, in theory, a matter becomes a 
security issue when the securitising actor convinces the relevant audience that it poses 
an existential threat and can only be handled with exceptional effort.134 While this 
would obviously support the political status of transboundary water issues, would it 
also automatically achieve a more peaceful management of the shared resource; or 
would it rather be a ‘regrettable detour to a virtual blind-alley?’135 
 
There are certainly risks involved in the securitisation of water. One is that in being at 
the core of a variety of other crises, and thus touching a myriad of issues on several 
policy levels, it might always be a highly ambiguous concept – one which will raise 
different expectations depending on who employs it. As a result, it could be 
condemned to be nothing more than an empty shell – largely meaningless, without 
triggering any useful debate. However, the main argument of opponents of the concept 
is that the ‘security’ component may bring up discursive absolutes which are perceived 
to be ‘non-negotiable’ between the parties; ultimately promoting disparities between 
riparians and enhancing ‘nationalistic feelings.’136 Egypt, for instance, appears to be 
following this path in the Nile basin by slowing down the negotiation process of the 
Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA);137 arguing that the provision on water 
security (Article 14) should focus on historical water rights and uses – which have 
been established under a legal framework based on the colonial legacy.138 It seems like 
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Egypt is trying to make this legacy indelible by reinforcing its right to 75 percent of 
the Nile’s waters under the cover of ‘water security.’ In doing so, it completely 
disregards that Ethiopia, which, due to the fact that it was never under any colonial 
rule, was not involved in either the 1992 or 1959 agreement, contributes nearly 85 
percent of the Nile waters.139 While this is no doubt an example of how the concept 
can be misinterpreted, it should not be used as an argument to disregard it in general. 
Not only is the bargaining tool employed by Egypt incompatible with the fundamental 
basis of international water law, it also is in conflict with the contemporary 
understanding of ‘security.’ Egypt has applied a whole arsenal of tactics not just to 
maintain the control over the freshwater resource, but also to be proactive in 
challenging the increase in power of its upstream riparians.140 Hence, the way in which 
Egypt tried to include the water security discussion was a rather poor attempt to sell 
old wine in new bottles. One has to be aware that, after all, water security can only be 
what states make of it – which is even truer in the case of a hydro-hegemon like 
Egypt.141 
 
Another interesting example of how states use the ‘water security’ paradigm to their 
national security advantage is US, where the need to integrated international water 
strategy to avert conflicts overseas and foster cooperation has long been identified.142 
The US Water Partnership, which has been launched on Word Water Day 2012, is 
trying to take up that challenge.143 Its declared aim is to bring together the private 
sector, NGOs, academia, civil society and the government to ‘unite and mobilize ‘best 
of U.S.’ expertise, resources and ingenuity to address water challenges around the 
globe, with a special focus on developing countries where needs are greatest.’144 The 
start of the initiative was complemented by the release of the (unclassified) National 
Intelligence Council report on ‘global water security,’ which, overall, is a positive 
contribution to understanding the complex and interrelated issues of the global water 
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crisis.145 The report involved consultations across government in addition to gathering 
expert opinions from scholars and practitioners from various sectors. It focused on 
seven basins which it considers to be posing potential risks to US security interests: 
Amu Darya, Brahmaputra, Indus, Jordan, Mekong, Nile and Tigris-Euphrates. 
 
According to the report, the competition for increasingly scarce freshwater resources 
will fuel instability in regions such as the Middle East and Asia, which are of particular 
importance to US national security. While a fully-fledged war on water is considered 
unlikely in the near future, ‘water in shared basins will increasingly be used as 
leverage; the use of water as a weapon or to further terrorist objectives also will 
become more likely beyond 10 years.’146 Thus, the report acknowledges that the future 
may not look like the past beyond the next decade, when the intense pressure on water 
resources will put institutional arrangements for transboundary water sharing and 
resolving disputes to the test. The report did not surprise with any revolutionary 
findings on the water crisis and its link to security issues: 
‘Water shortages, poor water quality, and floods by themselves are unlikely to 
result in state failure. However, water problems – when combined with 
poverty, social tensions, environmental degradation, ineffectual leadership, 
and weak political institutions – contribute to social disruptions that can result 
in state failure.’147 
The assessment also acknowledged the relevance of international water law, stating 
that 
‘many nations […] would benefit from new or updated international 
agreements. Effective water agreements encourage greater cooperation and 
lessen the risk of regional conflicts. Today, water basin agreements often do 
not exist or are inadequate. […] Shortcomings in water basin agreements 
often further enable stronger states to preserve their influence over weaker 
states.’148 
It goes on in acknowledging that the UN Watercourses Convention has been used as 
‘the foundation for most nations regarding the governance of international 
transboundary water resources;’ but then misinterprets the Convention by claiming that 
due to the fact that it only offers ‘general guidance’ to states sharing a river basin, its 
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‘largely ineffective practical enforcement mechanisms and a lack of international 
ratification limit its effectiveness.149 
 
The report also makes an attempt at evaluating the management capacity – defined as 
‘the strength and resilience of institutional factors, such as treaties and river basin 
organisations that can provide stability, increase cooperation, and mitigate political 
grievances over water’ – of the seven river basins. The assessment rates the 
management capacity in the Amu Darya and the Brahmaputra as ‘inadequate; in the 
Mekong, the Tigris-Euphrates and the Nile as ‘limited;’ and in the Indus and the 
Jordan as ‘moderate.’150 
 
It comes as no surprise that, by definition of the report, the authors adopt a US security 
perspective. ‘[M]any countries important to the United States will experience water 
problems—shortages, poor water quality, or floods—that will risk instability and state 
failure, increase regional tensions, and distract them from working with the United 
States on important US policy objectives.’151 Hillary R. Clinton, former US Secretary 
of State, called the study ‘a landmark document that puts water security in its rightful 
place as part of national security.’152 The National Intelligence Council does not try to 
hide the fact that one of the main reasons for the analysis and recommendations was to 
pave the way for the US to lead in water security issues around the globe and 
‘forestalling other actors from achieving the same influence at US expense.’153 Since 
this approach strictly follows US national security interests, the outcome of the 
engagement can be both a push for change in transboundary water interaction or the 
manifestation of the hegemonic structures in the respective basin – solely depending 
on US policy interests. Hence, the US Water Partnership is a perfect example of how 
states try to use the concept of water security to bolster their national influence – at 
times even overseas. While this is nothing new, as power games have been played 
under the guise of other concepts before, one has to closely watch the impact is has on 
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the transboundary water interactions of the river basins it regards as critical, since 
imported perceptions are not always compatible with the situations on the ground. 
 
Since the National Intelligence Council, by law, cannot make policy recommendations, 
it will be interesting to see what actions the US Water Partnership will take, and how 
the initiative will shape up operationally. This will be critical for the impact the US 
perception of ‘water security’ can have in the identified transboundary water hot spots. 
 
2.2.3 A Contemporary Definition of ‘Water Security’ 
Against this backdrop of a present day understanding of ‘security’ and with the global 
water crisis in mind, the task now is to define the term ‘water security.’ This truly is a 
challenging endeavour, given the fact that today the concept is ‘a more complex matter 
than it was when the term meant only a firm entitlement to a fixed allocation protected 
by the courts, other tribunals or diplomatic pressure.’154 Current literature from various 
backgrounds offers a broad range of definitions: 
 
‘Water security is the availability of freshwater in the right quantity and 
quality, at the right times, for dependent systems.’155 
 
‘Water security, at any level from the household to the global, means that 
every person has access to enough safe water at affordable cost to lead a 
clean, healthy and productive life, while ensuring that the natural environment 
is protected and enhanced.’156 
 
‘[Water security is] linked to a safe water supply and sanitation, water for 
food production, hydrosolidarity between those living upstream and those 
living downstream in a river basin and water pollution avoidance, so that the 
water in aquifers and rivers remains useable, i.e. not too polluted for use for 
water supply, industrial production, agricultural use or the protection of 
biodiversity, wetlands, and aquatic systems in rivers and coastal waters.’157 
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‘[Water security is] adequate protection from water-related disasters and 
diseases and access to sufficient quantity and quality of water, at affordable 
cost, to meet the basic food, energy and other needs essential for leading a 
healthy and productive life without compromising the sustainability of vital 
ecosystems.’158 
 
‘[Water security is] the reliable availability of an acceptable quantity and 
quality of water for health, livelihoods and production, coupled with an 
acceptable level of water-related risks.’159 
 
‘[T]he notion of water security can be understood as ‘the state of having 
secure access to water; the assured freedom from poverty of, or want for, 
water for life.’160 
 
‘[W]ater security is about ensuring that every person has reliable access to 
enough safe water at an affordable price to lead a healthy, dignified and 
productive life, while maintaining the ecological systems that provide water 
and also depend on water.’161 
 
In an attempt to capture these constantly evolving definitions, UN-Water recently 
defined water security as  
‘[t]he capacity of a population to safeguard sustainable access to adequate 
quantities of acceptable quality water for sustaining livelihoods, human well-
being, and socio-economic development, for ensuring protection against 
water-borne pollution and water-related disasters, and for preserving 
ecosystems in a climate of peace and political stability.’162 
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UN-Water is hopeful that this working definition can serve as a common framework 
and starting point for dialogue on water security within the vast system of the United 
Nations; and that it may help to better consolidate the work of UN-Water and its 
various partners. 
 
What becomes obvious when going through these definitions, and drawing upon the 
previous discussion in this chapter, is that several of them followed the lines of the 
general security debate and portrayed water security at the interface of human security 
and development. While this clearly points towards a convergence of the two agendas, 
it is unreasonable to believe that this is also evidence of a decline in importance in the 
arena of international relations.163 However, since none of these definitions fully 
comprehends the complex challenge water insecurity is posing on the international 
community, or they are too vague to carry any weight in deriving rules and policies 
from them, they play into the hands of critics of the concept. Here, lessons have to be 
drawn from the ‘human security’ discourse, which critics have always described as a 
superfluous exercise, since ‘everyone is for it, but few people have a clear idea of what 
it means.’164 
 
Considering the wide scope water security has to cover, is it even possible to phrase it 
in a way which is analytically useful? The key task is to find a definition which is 
broad enough to fully acknowledge the complexity of the water crisis, while at the 
same time providing useful avenues of approaches for effectively addressing water 
insecurity – making the whole exercise worthwhile. While a definition is generally 
regarded as most useful to policy-makers when it presents a single and precise 
interpretation, experts should avoid oversimplification in cases as complex and multi-
layered as water security.165 The interlinkages between different layers and other crises 
are consistently being overlooked. Sustainable freshwater management is 
strengthening a whole web of securities. For instance, a situation of acute water 
scarcity (caused by drought or mismanagement) in a developing country which is 
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highly dependent on agriculture would certainly compromise human security 
(increasing poverty and affecting health), food security (domestic and, potentially, of 
food importing countries), economic security (decrease in (not only agricultural) 
output), energy security (diminishing availability of water for production of 
electricity), and environmental security (putting ecosystems under stress and causing 
biodiversity loss) – at the local, regional and international level. Hence, an 
unambiguous definition, applicable to each and every instance of water insecurity, is 
simply elusive; and thus cannot be a prerequisite for tackling the world water crisis. 
 
What is needed, however, is a common understanding of what water security means 
and, even more importantly, how we should move ahead in order to prevent the crisis 
getting out of hand. This is why the following definition of water security is proposed 
here: 
 
A community is water secure when it has sustainable access to freshwater of 
sufficient quantity and quality, or to the benefits derived therefrom; and the 
ability to minimise water-related risk and its various repercussions to an 
acceptable level – without compromising the supporting ecosystems. 
 
This definition draws from both the widening and deepening process of the general 
security debate; while, at the same time, acknowledging the complexity of the water 
crisis. Accordingly, the definition has several advantages over previous ones. 
 
Firstly, by looking at ‘communities’ it is perfectly scalable to the level one wants to 
look at water security – local, regional, national, international or even global. It also 
does justice to the fact that several levels might overlap, which in water resources 
management is the rule rather than the exception. 
 
Secondly, by including the benefits derived from the access to freshwater and the 
repercussions of water-related risks, the true complexity of the water crisis is being 
pulled into play. Not only are we looking at access to and threats from the resource 
‘water,’ but also the opportunities and issues linked (directly or indirectly) to it. Here, 
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concepts like virtual water, water footprint and challenges like coping with rapid 
urbanisation, changing migration patterns and ‘land grabs’166 come to mind. 
 
Finally, by containing undetermined parameters like ‘sufficient quantity and quality of 
freshwater’ and ‘acceptable level of water-related risk and repercussions’ the definition 
is giving the respective community the freedom of how to actually implement the 
concept of water security – geared to its own needs, capacities and social preferences. 
The open questions are important in transforming theory into action and help steering 
the debate within community as to which water security is being envisioned. The 
concept has to be perceived as a dynamic one, which will certainly be interpreted 
differently in different parts of the world – since it mirrors geographic, social, 
economic and political factors – and might change over time as several of these factors 
tend to change as well.167 While opponents of the conceptualisation of water security 
might argue that a rather imprecise definition blurs the clear boundaries of security 
studies and opens it up to rather difficult questions about the security concept in 
general, it has to be stressed that the conceptual complexity has always been inherent 
to the debate about security; and thus renders multifariousness not only unavoidable, 
but even useful.168 Rather than as a mere (constricting) explanation of the term ‘water 
security’ it aims at providing a platform for stimulating discourse. 
 
2.3 Water Security through a Legal Lens 
The previous analysis has demonstrated that following a contemporary path of 
security, rather than applying the orthodox state-centred and military-focused 
approach, is the only way to overcome the concerns about securitising water. As 
discussed previously, the perception of the concept has changed dramatically since it is 
no longer perceived as necessary for there to be a violent conflict over scarce resources 
or a military threat to the sovereignty of a state to affect the security and development 
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of nations.169 Yet, this perception has to be supported by a system of values which 
direct societies; and law must play a central role in supporting those values. During a 
recent High-Level Meeting, the UN General Assembly reminded us that ‘our collective 
response to the challenges and opportunities arising from the many complex political, 
social and economic transformations before us must be guided by the rule of law.’170 
 
International law is a particularly useful tool in promoting water security, as it: (1) 
defines and identifies the legal rights and obligations regarding the use of water and 
provides the prescriptive parameters for the management of the resource; (2) provides 
tools for ensuring the continuous integrity of the regime (including dispute prevention 
and settlement); and (3) allows for modifications of the existing regime, in order to be 
able to accommodate change.171 By establishing the substantive and procedural ‘rules 
of the game,’ international law aims to fulfil its primary function to promote peaceful 
relations between states and thus helps to prevent conflicts over transboundary 
watercourses.172 While law should not be considered the only possible tool for 
addressing issues of water security, since science and policy play important roles,173 
because the management of freshwater is largely an issue of allocation and 
(re)distribution, the importance of a transparent and credible legal framework cannot 
be overlooked.174 Only through international law can ‘water security’ move away from 
being merely employed as political rhetoric and obtain some normative impact. 
 
Yet, the water security concept can only be of use in addressing the global water crisis 
if it is backed by a legal framework which supports the transformation of society 
towards the contemporary perception of security. The calls for ‘de-securitising’ water 
are being met with approval mainly because of the fear that it allows issues of 
freshwater interaction to be detached from any legal process trying to level the playing 
field. Yet, as this study will show, this does not have to be the case. International water 
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law can be used and developed further in order to fully comprehend the advanced 
conception of security, which has emerged in recent years. Water insecurity is already 
the reality in many places of the world. While some states abuse the desperate 
situations they are in for pushing nationalistic agendas forward – defining water 
security as national security issue – international law can counter this movement. If 
guided by a framework which can bring about a more equitable way of transboundary 
water resources management, the concept of water security – as defined above – can 
play the important role of the long-yearned-for ‘change agent.’ By considering 
securitisation as a reflexive, ‘rule-altering’ process, it might even provide relevant 
insights into the transformation and development of international law.175 
 
The next chapter will deal with this issue by analysing international water law through 
the security lens. Not only will it show that the concept of water security actually has 
something new to offer in terms of legal analysis, it will also indicate that using it as a 
framework for issues of transboundary water interaction is beneficial. The two main 
questions arising in this exercise are: (1) What are the key components of water 
security relevant to international water law? (2) What are the shortcomings of the 
current legal system?  
 
Whether water security does actually add value to the analysis of transboundary water 
interaction can only be proved by applying it to both theoretical and practical 
challenges. The concept, if it wants to be more than new wine in old bottles, has to 
bear this examination. 
 
 
3 INTERNATIONAL WATER LAW IN THE WATER SECURITY DISCOURSE 
3.1 The Core Elements of Water Security 
After having conceptualised ‘water security’ in the previous chapter, the task now is to 
operationalise it. Since it is an interstitial concept, it has to be disaggregated to allow 
for thorough analysis from a legal perspective. In order to do so, a methodology has to 
be designed which teases out the core elements of water security which have to be 
addressed by international law. Recalling that a new definition of water security as 
proposed by this thesis is as follows: 
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A community is water secure when it has sustainable access to freshwater of 
sufficient quantity and quality, or to the benefits derived therefrom; and the 
ability to minimise water-related risk and its various repercussions to an 
acceptable level – without compromising the supporting ecosystems. 
 
A framework for operationalising water security consisting of the following four 
parameters (1) availability, (2) access, (3) adaptability and (4) ambit is being proposed 
here. This structure will provide the means for revealing the strengths and weaknesses 
of the current legal architecture and serve as a basis for recommendations for the future 
development of international water law. Ultimately, this exercise will also unfold the 
fundamental conceptual challenges of linking the notion of water security with public 
international law. 
 
3.1.1 Availability 
‘Availability’ relates to issues of water quantity as well as quality. Primarily, this 
element deals with the actual management of the resource as such – including its 
control and protection. While the total usable water existing on the planet is – in theory 
– more than enough to satisfy all human and environmental requirements,176 the 
problem, however, is that water is not always available in sufficient amounts and 
quality at the right time and location needed. 
 
Over the last two centuries, population grew by a factor of four, while the amount of 
freshwater withdrawal increased fifteenfold.177 Between 1960 and 2000 alone, global 
freshwater use increased at a rate of about 20 percent per decade; with significant 
regional differences due to diverse ranges of socio-economic development.178 
Acknowledging that the world population is predicted to grow from 7 billion to more 
than 9 billion in 2050,179 the magnitude of the future pressure on the world’s 
freshwater resources becomes obvious. In terms of water quantity, the production of 
food is by far the biggest challenge for freshwater management, as agriculture accounts 
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for around 70 percent of global freshwater withdrawals and more than 90 percent of its 
consumptive use.180 Driven by the demand for irrigation, overall withdrawals across 
the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region for instance constitute around 120 
percent of renewable accessible supplies; which means that here food production 
already relies on non-renewable water resources.181 The changing diets in emerging 
economies add even more pressure to the availability of freshwater by moving towards 
livestock and horticultural products at the expense of staples.182  
 
Another factor determining our water future is the increasing demand for energy, as 
water needs for the production of energy are set to grow at twice the rate of energy 
demand.183 The reason for energy becoming an even thirstier resource is that water is 
key to its production – starting already with the extraction of fossil fuels. The 
International Energy Agency (IEA) projects a rise in energy related water consumption 
of 85 percent over the period to 2035; mainly reflecting the shift towards more water-
intensive power generation (e.g., shale gas) and the expanding production of 
biofuels.184 In addition, water management – from the withdrawal (especially for 
lifting groundwater and desalination), over the transport, to the treatment of 
wastewater – is also a highly energy intensive business.185 The need to meet a 60 
percent increase in demand for energy over the next 30 years, combined with the goals 
set forth in many states’ climate change policy, is already making the expanding 
production of biofuels and increasing hydropower critical parts of the ‘green economy’ 
puzzle.186 Since almost all of these uses not only have an effect on quantity but also 
quality, the need to maintain the natural integrity of the water body – by requiring 
environmental flows or toughen pollution control mechanisms – is being addressed 
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under ‘availability’ as well.187 Of particular concern here is, again, the water-food-
energy nexus. Since water is used in various ways along the stages of fossil-fuel 
extraction and processing, there are also several ways in which water is regularly being 
contaminated with a wide variety of toxic pollutants.188 Further, agriculture is not only 
a major user of water resources worldwide; it is also one of their biggest polluters due 
to the amounts of pesticides and fertilisers used in the production of food.189 
 
Finally, the role of demand management should not be overlooked at the international 
level. Only with an approach addressing both demand and supply management, will 
we be able to achieve water security. The impacts of global population growth, 
industrialisation and climate change have already caused us to exceed the limit of 
ecological sustainable abstraction of water for about one-third of the global population; 
and this number will very likely rise to about half by 2030.190 While the economic side 
often takes centre stage in the debate about future development paths, neglecting the 
pressing concerns of freshwater availability (sufficient quantity and quality) will 
backfire sooner rather than later. 
 
3.1.2 Access 
At the centre of the water security debate is the element of ‘access,’ which describes 
the right to make use of the shared resource. It covers a broad spectrum of concerns 
across the increasing diversity and growing number of users and uses with regard to 
matters of (re)allocation. While the availability of water is of concern for some 
regions, physical scarcity is only one aspect of the water crisis. At the heart of the 
challenge are issues of political power and inequality.191 Already, due to the uneven 
distribution of safe freshwater in space and time, only 15 percent of the world’s 
population lives with relative water abundance, while the majority has to cope with at 
least moderate water stress.192 
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The (in places) rapid economic development and global population growth causes the 
water footprint of some regions to soar; which turns the competition for the vital but 
limited water resources into a serious security concern. It is the component ‘access’ 
which links the ‘water security’ concept to resource conflicts scholarship, as it is 
argued that disagreements over the allocation of water resources are causing fears over 
military conflicts to rise.193 While often contradictory in their conclusions (see 
previous chapter), several studies emphasised the important role of frameworks which 
are capable of establishing a system of determining the rules of the game.194 The 
discrepancy between the surging increase in demand for freshwater with sufficient 
quality and its declining availability, the uneven distribution of resources and unilateral 
development of water projects regularly cause disruptions in co-riparian relations.195 
One example is the fact that many potential hydropower sites are situated on 
transboundary watercourses – and thus provide important opportunities for increased 
cooperation on issues of shared freshwater management between the riparian states.196 
 
Hence, legal and institutional responses to the allocation of transboundary waters are 
essential to ensuring long-term water security.197 In order to achieve this, the rules 
governing the (re)allocation of water have to be perceived as fair by all parties 
involved. Only if the playing field is truly levelled, will transboundary water 
interaction be able to contribute towards a more sustainable common water security. 
  
3.1.3 Adaptability 
Considering that, in the majority of cases, the most important variable to the successful 
sharing of freshwater resources is the resilience of the legal and policy frameworks 
(including institutions) that govern water management, rather than absolute water 
scarcity,198 a future-proof framework for transboundary watercourses has to include a 
fair amount of flexibility. This is vital for ensuring adaptability in order to be able to 
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address changing conditions in supply and demand, but still provide for some level of 
predictability. 
 
Since many states depend on the waters from shared basins, they need certainty of the 
quantities and qualities of the water they are entitled to use and required to provide – 
and this must take into account the reality of the ever changing interplay between 
supply and demand.199 Understanding the temporal and spatial distribution and flux of 
water is key for managing the resource efficiently; distinguishing it considerably from 
the management of any other natural resource. Hence, water resource management 
plans and policies must take this variability into account in order to be viable.200 At the 
same time, law has to provide for ‘security of expectations’ – which can be considered 
as one of its main functions, and proves to be crucial within transboundary water 
management and the constantly changing societal, political, and environmental 
needs.201 
 
What makes this ‘legal challenge’ even more difficult to address is the fact that the 
impacts of climate change, population growth, and economic development are all 
uncertain variables which have a considerable impact on transboundary water 
interaction. Just looking at climate change makes this dilemma quite clear, as it is an 
extremely complex issue with several dimensions, dynamic feedbacks and interactions 
between different impacts.202 
 
Further, drawing a universally valid picture about the impacts of climate change is 
problematic, since some of them only occur indirectly, different ecosystems and 
communities may not be equally affected by the changing climate and their respective 
degree of adaptability may vary as well. In theory, global warming leads to increased 
evaporation over oceans coupled to an increase in continental precipitation, which 
finally leads to an increase of the global continental river runoff.203 Yet, in most 
regions of the world, the climatic changes will actually increase the demand for 
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irrigation, due to a combination of a decrease in rainfall and an increase of evaporation 
caused by the warmer temperatures.204  
 
Besides the actual changes in water availability, the magnitude of uncertainty and the 
complexity of the science of global climate change pose unique challenges for resource 
allocation and risk management.205 Uncertainty refers to ‘a situation in which there is 
not a unique and complete understanding of the system to be managed’ and includes 
epistemic uncertainty (the imperfect knowledge), ontological uncertainty (variability 
and unpredictability inherent in a system) and ambiguity (resulting from ‘the 
simultaneous presence of multiple frames of reference about a certain phenomenon’) – 
all increasing the potential of leading to multiple interpretations of a specific issue.206 
Since the ultimate aim of (transboundary) water management is to allocate the resource 
in a way which allows for maximising the benefits for all users, the affected 
stakeholders must be able to predict the future supply of and demand for freshwater – 
ideally on a seasonal basis. In the past, this has been accomplished by using historical 
records, which have become more and more unreliable as the uncertainties of global 
warming emerged.207 Projections on future climate depend on various speculative 
factors like the trend of GHG emissions and the precise effects of these emissions in 
the atmosphere. Hence, climate forecasts and their implied impacts are highly 
scenario-dependent.208 Sustainable freshwater yields may or may not be reduced in the 
long-term average, but they will definitely be less reliable in the future.209 This 
development will result in higher costs for water infrastructure, intensified competition 
between water users, and in some cases – primarily in developing countries – it may 
also slow down economic development.210 
 
In addition to the direct effect global climatic change has on exacerbating the 
uncertainty over freshwater availability, it also affects the demand side of water 
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management, e.g., through its impact on energy security,211 food security212 and 
human migration patterns.213 However, the interconnections between climate change 
and water demands remain heavily understudied – compared to the research on the 
impacts on availability. This is crucial, as water demands for some users are highly 
sensitive to the climate – for instance agriculture.214 Since this sector accounts for 
around 70 percent of global water use, picking a particular scenario of changes in 
demand will have major implications. 
 
In negotiating transboundary water agreements, the issue of uncertainty is a 
determining factor. Here, the additional component of ‘strategic uncertainty’ comes 
into play, which describes the limited knowledge of the preferences and characteristics 
of the other negotiating states.215 This in turn can affect the actual distribution of 
benefits from a water agreement; which by implication has an effect on the willingness 
of states to enter into an agreement in the first place, as well as on the stability of the 
framework created by such an agreement.216 In practice, an atmosphere of uncertainty 
usually decreases the size of coalitions adopting international environmental 
agreements,217 and thus hampers both the formation of coalitions and credible 
commitments.218 
 
All these pressures will make the already highly complex hydrological variability an 
even bigger challenge in the struggle for water security.219 Further, the notion of 
‘security’ as such is a moving target rather than an end in itself. Not only does the 
evolving perception of the concept correspond with the ever changing requirements of 
the various stakeholders – it also depends on the international relations between the 
respective countries. Thus, in order to be able to continuously adapt to the emerging 
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challenges which are becoming more and more complex, any framework governing a 
transboundary watercourse has to be reasonably flexible.220 
 
3.1.4 Ambit 
The final element of the ‘4As’ analytical framework is ambit, which delimits the scope 
of water security – i.e., the sphere of influence of the notion.221 In addition to the 
orthodox concept of ‘scope,’222 the approach here is to better mirror the common 
character of the global water crisis. So far, the main shortcoming of transboundary 
water interaction has been the inability to link the diverse influencing factors in an 
encompassing fashion – a serious flaw which has led to widespread ‘water 
blindness.’223 
 
The scope of a transboundary water agreement usually determines (1) the waters 
covered by the regime;224 (2) the range of stakeholders that are eligible to participate in 
the utilisation of those waters;225 and (3) the breadth of objectives addressed.226 
However, in addition to this traditional perception of scope, the concept of ‘ambit’ also 
does justice to the fact that water security has to be regarded as a common security 
issue.227 For instance, unilateral large-scale water management of one state might not 
only have a negative domestic impact (e.g., through forced resettlement), but will most 
certainly affect other riparians as well (e.g., through reducing the flow of the 
watercourse). Hence, the ambit of the notion of water security has to cut across borders 
in a way which not only brings all affected stakeholders to the negotiation table to 
discuss their respective concerns, but also accepts that the complexity of the issues at 
hand can only be resolved by looking at the bigger picture. Due to the role water plays 
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in linking the various emerging crises – i.e. food, energy and environment – in this 
more and more interconnected world, negative repercussions may even impact 
apparently remote countries beyond the river basin. The times when water could be 
considered solely as a national security issue are long past, since the global water crisis 
is seriously threatening one of our most fundamental common values – international 
peace and security. Since water is at the heart of the interlinkages of various risks, 
transboundary water interaction usually also touches several areas and levels of policy, 
law and management. 
 
Although water management is, in principle, a local challenge, several of its aspects, 
e.g., the ‘right to water,’ are debated in the global arena. This indicates that the 
linkages between the different scales of water interaction have become more fluid; 
calling for international water law to act as an interface between the various levels.228 
Not only does the effectiveness of the international rules depend on a strong support of 
domestic norms (and vice versa); the impact of political and legal developments 
outside the ‘water box’ (e.g., Biodiversity Convention; Ramsar Convention; 
UNFCCC) have to be factored into the analysis as well.229 
 
Remembering that the concept of water security not only encompasses ‘water,’ but 
also the benefits derived from its usage, the concept of ‘benefit sharing’ seems to be 
relevant here.230 While it has been praised as a new and promising approach in 
transboundary water negotiations, it does not go far enough. The ‘mutual gains 
approach’ towards negotiating agreements for transboundary watercourses is supposed 
to facilitate better outcomes by allowing parties to improve their chances of creating an 
agreement which is superior to any existing alternative.231 A central tenet of the 
approach is that parties usually have more than one goal or concern when negotiating 
freshwater agreements; and thus more than one issue can and should be addressed in 
the treaty they agree on.232 Fully exploring the mutual gains through cooperation – 
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rather than solely analysing options of unilateral development – can arguably provide a 
powerful incentive to cooperate in many cases. However, while focusing on the 
benefits derived from utilising water, rather than on the resource as such, is surely a 
step into the right direction, it still does not manage to fully eliminate the perception of 
water interaction as a zero-sum game, since states still quarrel over their national 
interests – now only in form of broader benefits, rather than the resource as such. 
Adding ‘more’ to the table alone will not change the general approach to negotiations. 
Going a step further would be to link shared waters (more obviously) with national 
freshwater resources – and thus widening the ambit of the water security concept. How 
states manage their national groundwater resources, rivers and lakes will ultimately 
affect how they manage their respective transboundary ones. Should a state not be 
expected to decrease its dependencies on a highly contested international source and 
instead manage its domestic sources more wisely?233 This could ultimately lead to 
shifting the focus from the water resource itself, to the benefits we want to gain from 
its utilisation – irrespective of whether the source is ‘national’ groundwater or a 
transboundary river. 
 
Finally, the notion of water security has to be open to novel approaches addressing the 
global water crisis; and thus it has to be able to integrate concepts like ‘peak ecological 
water’ or ‘virtual water;’ reflecting the interconnectedness of the global crises of water, 
food, and energy.234 This is why its aim should be to accommodate a fruitful discourse 
on how to strengthen transboundary water management with input from all relevant 
disciplines. The element of ambit, then, has to ensure that international water law 
keeps exploring new opportunities for achieving common water security – beyond 
merely meeting international legal rights and obligations. Hence, it comprises much 
more than the traditional notion of scope. It represents a new mindset of how 
international water law should address the water crisis: by moving away from the 
management of the resource as such towards a holistic approach which addresses the 
challenges at the root.  
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3.2 The Current Framework of International Freshwater Regimes 
The previous chapters elaborated on the importance of water in our rapidly changing 
world, and the security challenges that come along with the increasing 
interconnectedness of sectors and societies. Considering the integral role water plays in 
the international social, economic, and environmental interweaving, it is astonishing 
how long it has been overlooked as one of the primary causes of global uncertainty and 
insecurity. While realising we have now reached a state of global water crisis, which 
already affects the security of societies in various ways and will only get more difficult 
to tackle in the future, it seems helpful to recall the ultimate goal of international law: 
to ‘maintain international peace and security.’235 The following section will look at 
what role international water law can actually play in achieving this fundamental goal. 
 
3.2.1 The Role of International (Water) Law 
Throughout history, water has widely been regarded as a national security issue. While 
this led to the, still prevalent, overemphasis on self-interest, the development of 
international law tried to counter this kind of ‘protectionism.’ Especially the relatively 
young area of international environmental law, which emerged as a distinct academic 
discipline in the 1980s, not only helped to ‘green’ international law;236 it also allowed 
for the recognition of new security threats in the international legal system.237 Here, 
international law tries to achieve two goals: (1) flesh out the notion of security by 
providing the normative content; and (2) lead the way towards a more common 
understanding of security – away from the purely ‘national security’ debate. 
 
With the emergence of contemporary security threats (e.g., human security, 
environmental security, food security, energy security and economic security), 
international law underwent a process of specialisation which progressed from general 
rules to specialised rules of international environmental law; and recently to the 
distinct field of international water law.238 Furthermore, it steadily shifted from the 
traditional ‘media control’ approach (e.g., rivers, oceans, air and wildlife) to a 
‘problem control’ approach (e.g., population, desertification and climate change) – 
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trying to reflect the environment’s global interconnections, long-term dimensions and 
the emergence of the concept of ‘sustainable development.’239 The impact of this 
evolution on general international law is evident: More and more states are now 
appreciating the necessity to support the long-term benefits of maintaining the 
international legal regime.240 While there is still widespread opinion that international 
law remains wholly dependent upon the will of states, the fact that an international 
society was created based on the rule of law by the UN Charter, and that this very 
society has identified new issues of concern to be dealt with at an international level, 
points to a different understanding.241 
 
While, clearly, law cannot be considered apart from other aspects of social 
organisation; due to its relationship to social control, behavioural change of states and 
dispute avoidance strategies, it is key to achieving common (water) security. There is a 
strong correlation between a state’s ability to ensure its own water security and the 
existence of a legal regime guiding the management of its shared freshwater resources. 
This is due to the fact that water law serves three key functions: (1) defining and 
identifying the legal rights and obligations regarding the use of water and providing 
the prescriptive parameters for the management of the resource; (2) providing tools for 
ensuring the continuous integrity of the regime (including dispute prevention and 
settlement); and (3) allowing for modifications of the existing regime, in order to be 
able to accommodate change.242 While different views may exist on the nature of 
international water law and its actual role in preventing conflicts and ensuring the fair 
use of transboundary water resources,243 the mere existence of an agreed legal regime 
already contributes (at least to some extent) to water security by establishing an 
operational system for addressing the complex issues of transboundary water 
interaction. The question then arises: Do the integral elements of water security – 
availability, access, adaptability and ambit – find expression and normative meaning in 
international water law? 
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3.2.2 Evolution and Current Status of International Water Law 
Certainly, the development of international water law has helped to prevent disputes 
over shared watercourses,244 as its primary role is to determine a state’s entitlement to 
the benefits of the watercourse and to provide for basic behavioural requirements for 
the development of the resource. 245 This has mainly been achieved by the application 
of universally agreed ‘rules of the game,’ which have evolved through state practice 
and doctrine. These basic principles have served as a basis for the development of 
further substantive and procedural rules, both of which help to accommodate the 
various characteristics of each case; and create particular regimes that determine each 
state’s legal entitlement to the benefits of the use of the shared freshwater resource.246 
 
While societies’ interests have always been linked with the development of shared 
freshwater resources, it was not until the 1950s that customary international water law 
emerged.247 Before then, two converse approaches determined the claims and 
counterclaims of states over their share of the resource – the theories of ‘absolute 
territorial sovereignty’ (also called the Harmon Doctrine)248 and of ‘absolute territorial 
integrity.’ While the former favours upstream riparians, allowing the unlimited use of 
the waters of a transboundary watercourse located within national borders (regardless 
of any consequences that may occur downstream in other countries), the latter 
approach favours downstream states who wish to prohibit any development in an 
upstream state that would interfere with the natural flow of such watercourse.249 
Obviously, neither of these quite extreme positions received universal support for a 
number of reasons. First, watercourse states cannot be easily divided into upstream or 
downstream states; as states may also be midstream states, in the case of an 
international river which flows through three or more countries. Furthermore, some 
rivers may end in the state’s territory, while others may originate from it.250 History 
has shown that the theories of absolute territorial sovereignty and absolute territorial 
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integrity have been merely used as strong bargaining positions – a negotiation 
technique known as the ‘zero-sum game’ – before reaching a compromise 
agreement.251 
 
Today, the more balanced concept of ‘limited territorial sovereignty’ is widely 
accepted as the foundation upon which the rules of international water law have 
evolved.252 It states that all watercourse states enjoy an equal right to the utilisation of 
a shared water resource, and each watercourse state has to respect the correlative rights 
of other watercourse states.253 This approach serves as the framework for the two main 
substantive principles of present international water law: The first principle being that 
of ‘equitable and reasonable utilisation,’ entitling and obliging watercourse states to an 
equitable and reasonable share of the benefits of the uses of the transboundary 
resource; and the second principle being the obligation of states ‘not to cause 
significant (transboundary) harm.’ 
 
The relationship between these rules has been cause for extensive debates.254 
Downstream states tend to favour the no harm rule, as it protects their existing uses 
from adverse effects caused by upstream developments; while upstream states tend to 
favour the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation, as it allows for a broader 
use of the shared resource for developments that may impact co-riparians.255 Today, 
the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation can be considered as predominant 
over the rule not to cause significant harm, due to the fact that the latter determines 
harm as a ‘legal’ injury rather than ‘factual’ harm.256 Thus, the no harm rule cannot be 
applied as some kind of ‘veto right’ against later development of a watercourse state, 
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which would basically mean that all uses that caused significant ‘factual’ harm would 
be prohibited, regardless of other factors and circumstances.257 States are merely 
obliged not to utilise a transboundary watercourse in a manner that is inequitable; i.e. 
causing ‘legal’ injury. What constitutes an equitable and reasonable use depends on 
each case. The competing interests of states have to be balanced and weighted; taking 
into account all relevant factors and circumstances (e.g., population, social and 
economic uses, environmental issues and alternative sources).258  
 
The evolution of international water law, in general, was heavily influenced by several 
international bodies, including the UN International Law Commission (ILC),259 the 
International Law Association (ILA),260 and l’Institut de droit international.261 As a 
result of these efforts to codify and progressively develop customary international 
water law further, and following some 30 years of rigorous study by the ILC, in 1997 
the UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Non-Navigational Uses of International Watercourses (UN Watercourses 
Convention),262 which is the most important multilateral legal instrument in this area. 
This document codifies and progressively develops the substantive and procedural 
rules that govern transboundary waters and is reviewed in more detail later in this 
thesis. While not yet in force, the UN Watercourses Convention has always had 
considerable influence on state practice and is now the subject of an international 
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ratification campaign – both facts demonstrating the continued relevance of this global 
instrument.263 
 
This leads us to the role of treaties in transboundary water management, which is, 
arguably, the most important source of international water law. As of today, more than 
3,600 have been concluded between co-riparian states.264 Although most of them relate 
to navigation, the number of regimes governing non-navigational issues of water 
management – including flood control, hydropower production, water quality or 
allocations – has increased steadily. In the area of water resources, they regulate the 
quantity and quality of water between basin states, often by fixing the amount of water 
the upstream state has to deliver downstream.265 As the subject matter of these treaties 
varies, so do their scope and their procedural obligations. Nevertheless, they all aim for 
one goal: giving relevant content to the rather vague principles of international water 
law, by creating a basin-specific framework for cooperation and interpretation; 
ultimately leading to improved exploitation of the watercourse and stable 
hydropolitics.266 Water treaties are often capable of stabilising international relations, 
by adding an element of predictability and certainty to the general principles of 
international water law.267 Another advantage is that they put pressure on the 
contracting parties to comply with their obligations, and thus, in theory, improve the 
resource management in times of increasing water stress.268 Yet, they can also be used 
by hydro-hegemons to determine their own rules of the game.269 One should not forget 
that treaties have the ability to ‘hide’ issues by pretending cooperation. Thus, 
cooperation is not always as positive as it is perceived, since research on the actual 
quality of cooperation is sparse. 
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3.2.3 Applying the 4A Analytical Framework 
The primary role of international water law is to determine a state’s entitlement to the 
benefits of the watercourse (substantive rules) and to establish certain requirements for 
states’ behaviour while jointly developing the resource (procedural rules).270 Since 
cooperation in transboundary freshwater management is not merely an option but an 
imperative necessity, the question arises: How well does international water law 
actually address the challenges thrown up by the global water crisis? The following 
section will address this question by examining how the core elements of water 
security – availability, access, adaptability and ambit – are translated into the regime of 
international water law. 
 
3.2.3.1 Availability 
This facet of water security primarily deals with the resource as such – its quantity and 
quality. International law offers a broad spectrum of rules and concepts that may be 
used in addressing the issue of hydrological and physical aspects, including the control 
and protection (sustainability) of the resource. Human interference with transboundary 
waters is regulated primarily through the body of substantive rules (i.e. rules setting 
out requirements for specific uses, quantities, or quality of water), through procedural 
rules (e.g., the requirements for prior notification of new or increased uses,271 
consulting on changes to the regime,272 and exchanging information in the event of 
planned measures)273 and, through the remit and activities of institutional 
mechanisms,274 such as river basin organisations or basin commissions.275 
 
Legal rules regarding the quantitative aspects are numerous and can be found in 
various treaties where states aim to specify the basic principles of international water 
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law.276 In trying to spread the risk of water stress among all riparians, states often 
allocate water corresponding to percentage and time of flow, rather than a fixed 
amount.277 Furthermore, states often negotiate so-called ‘escape clauses,’ which allow 
countries suffering from water scarcity to deliver less water than they would have to 
under normal circumstances.278 
 
However, examples in transboundary water treaties for obligations regarding pollution 
control and prevention are rather few. Examples can be found in both framework 
instruments, such as EC Directive 2000/60 Establishing a Framework for Community 
Action in the Field of Water Policy (EC Water Framework Directive)279 and the UN 
Economic Commission for Europe’s (UNECE) Convention on the Protection and Use 
of Transboundary Watercourses and International Lakes (UNECE Helsinki 
Convention),280 and in basin-specific documents such as the Convention on the 
Protection of the Rhine (Rhine Convention)281 and the 1909 Treaty between Great 
Britain and the United States Relating to Boundary Waters, and Questions Arising 
between the United States and Canada (Boundary Waters Treaty).282 Together, these 
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rules identify the duties and obligations of riparian states on water quality issues, an 
integral element of the ‘availability of water’ security concern. Yet, in many cases, 
water for the environment has still no priority in water management practices, which 
has caused tremendous environmental pressures in numerous places around the 
world.283 In China, for instance, 70 percent of the rivers and lakes are significantly 
contaminated, while 50 percent of its cities only have access to polluted groundwater 
resources – not only affecting businesses and communities in China, but also other 
countries further downstream.284 However, state practice shows that new thinking on 
the sustainable management of water resources is slowly emerging; and international 
water law can provide the tools for addressing the environmental protection and 
sustainable management of transboundary watercourses effectively.285 
 
Another aspect of ‘availability’ is the mitigation of the destructive force of water-
related natural disasters (i.e., floods and droughts); which is, above all, stipulated by 
rules of emergency preparedness and response.286 Furthermore, the need to maintain 
the natural integrity of the freshwater resource – by calling for environmental flows or 
introducing terms like ‘peak ecological water’ – is being addressed in the sphere of 
‘availability’ as well.287 International water law provides a framework to ensure the 
protection and sustainability of shared water resources. Under the UN Watercourses 
Convention, for example, watercourse states are required to use and develop their 
shared waters ‘with a view to attaining optimal and sustainable utilization […] 
consistent with adequate protection of the watercourse’ and to ‘protect and preserve 
the ecosystems of international watercourses.’288 The UNECE Helsinki Convention is 
more specific, requiring state parties to ‘take all appropriate measures: […] [t]o ensure 
that transboundary waters are used with the aim of ecologically sound and rational 
water management, conservation of water resources and environmental protection; 
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[…] [t]o ensure conservation and, where necessary, restoration of ecosystems.’289 The 
EU Water Framework Directive is aimed at achieving good quality status of surface 
and ground waters through early action and stable long-term planning of protective 
measures.290 Other examples of international water law rules to protect and sustain the 
resource can be found in, inter alia, the Convention on Cooperation for the Protection 
and Sustainable Use of the Danube River,291 the Rhine Convention292 and numerous 
other river basin agreements. State practice shows that new thinking in the sustainable 
management of water resources has recently emerged; and international water law 
provides the basic tools for effectively addressing the environmental protection and 
sustainability of transboundary watercourses. 
 
3.2.3.2 Access 
The issue of ‘access,’ which describes the right to use the shared freshwater resource, 
is at the centre of the water security discourse and covers a wide spectrum of concerns 
across an ever expanding range of users and uses. The matter of ‘access’ is addressed 
by international law in a number of ways, but, essentially, through the legal rules 
related to the (re)allocation of the resource and is linked to the cornerstone principle of 
‘equitable and reasonable utilisation.’ 
 
The principle determines the right of a state to use the transboundary water resources 
in two distinct ways. First, it lays out the objective to be achieved (an equitable and 
reasonable use), which then specifies the legitimacy of the new or increased utilisation. 
Second, it entails an important operational function, since it requires all relevant 
factors and circumstances to be considered when determining what exactly qualifies as 
an equitable and reasonable use.293 This obligation to balance all the interests of the 
various stakeholders is essential to the notion of ‘access.’294 In order to assist in the 
implementation of this relatively vague principle, the UN Watercourses Convention 
provides a (non-exhaustive) list of factors to be considered in each specific case – all 
the factors being principally equal in weight; although there might be a priority of use 
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with respect to vital ‘human’ and ‘environmental’ needs.295 Issues of (re)allocation, 
then, are determined through identifying and considering all relevant factors and 
reaching a conclusion arrived at on the basis of the whole. 
 
From the water security perspective, the issue of ‘access’ must be considered within 
this flexible and broadly inclusive and evolving process, inherent to the rule of 
equitable and reasonable use; it is designed to address and respond to the changing 
circumstances in the development, use and management of transboundary waters.296 
The rule has been codified in a number of international agreements, including, inter 
alia, the South African Development Community’s Revised Protocol on Shared 
International Watercourses (which seeks to ‘advance the sustainable, equitable and 
reasonable utilization of the shared watercourses’)297 and the 1992 UNECE Helsinki 
Convention (‘to ensure that transboundary waters are used in a reasonable and 
equitable way, taking into account their transboundary character’),298 to cite but a few 
examples. 
 
Despite the fact that the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation has been 
widely accepted as the basic principle of international water law, the issue of fairness 
of access continues to divide riparian states in a number of international river basins, 
such as, for example, the Nile River. Here, despite more than a decade of negotiations 
on the Nile, which has resulted in a draft legal framework instrument,299 a basin-wide 
agreement remains elusive. The Nile Basin states are divided over the draft’s 
cornerstone, and most controversial, substantive provision (Article 14) on water 
security.300 All efforts to overcome this impasse, including a proposed 
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recommendation that the meaning of the contested provision be determined by the 
institutional body established under the agreement, failed when Egypt objected with a 
proposed reservation to the provision.301 
 
This shows that the complex issue of ‘access’ will continue to be one of the most 
difficult challenges for achieving water security. International water law addresses this 
through an identifiable body of substantive and procedural rules, founded essentially 
upon the notions of equity and reasonableness. However, questions still remain about 
the relationship between law and equity, which can be seen as a counterpoint to the 
classical insistence on the formal equality of states and as providing a compromise 
between permanent sovereignty over natural resources and a common security issue – 
like water.302 
 
Hence, despite the fact that the last war over water occurred some 4,500 years ago,303 
disputes over international waters are both common304 and current.305 Thus, one of the 
most important functions of international law is to prevent, manage and peacefully 
resolve actual conflicts, including conflicts-of-use scenarios,306 through the use of 
available dispute settlement mechanisms and techniques. International law deals with 
this problem in a number of ways – from using procedures aimed at conflict avoidance, 
to formal mechanisms designed to resolve international disputes. In cases where 
disputes nevertheless arise, international water law offers a framework for the peaceful 
resolution of the differences, which is fully embraced by the UN Watercourses 
                                                                                                                                             
work together to ensure that all States achieve and sustain water security; (b) not to significantly 
affect the water security of any other Nile Basin State.’ 
301 The Nile Basin Initiative reported that ‘Egypt registered a reservation to this adoption. Egypt‘s 
position remained that, Article 14(b) which relates to historical water rights and uses should be 
formulated with a Committee of Ministers from the Eastern Nile, the Equatorial Lakes region, Egypt 
and Sudan and one or two experts from international organizations to formulate an acceptable text 
within six months and present it to the NILE-COM members.’ see Nile Basin Initiative, 'Positive 
Steps towards Establishing a Permanent River Basin Commission' (2011) 
<http://www.nilebasin.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=131&Itemid=102>. 
302 D Shelton, 'Equity' in Bodansky D, Brunnée J and Hey E (eds), The Oxford Handbook of 
International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press 2007) at 653. 
303 A treaty ended the water war between the ancient Mesopotamian city states of Lagash and Umma. 
See S.L. Postel and A.T. Wolf, Dehydrating Conflict 126 Foreign Policy 60 at 60 (2001). 
304 See PH Gleick, Water Conflict Chronology (Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, 
Environment, and Security 2008). The most recent version is available at 
<http://worldwater.org/conflictchronology.pdf>. 
305 See Wouters, 'The Legal Response to International Water Conflicts: The UN Watercourses 
Convention and Beyond'.  
306 Conflict-of-use scenarios have been defined as situations where there may not be sufficient amounts 
of water of adequate quality to satisfy competing needs. B Schreiner, 'Issues of Balancing 
International, Environmental and Equity Needs in a Situation of Water Scarcity' in Dinar A and 
Albiac J (eds), Policy and Strategic Behaviour in Water Resource Management (Earthscan 2009). 
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Convention.307 This is consistent with the UN Charter requirements that its members 
resolve their disputes peacefully,308 through ‘negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements, or other peaceful means.’309 
 
In addition, the UN Watercourses Convention introduced an innovative approach to 
dispute settlement – compulsory fact-finding310 – which deserves more broad attention, 
especially in regions without agreements governing shared watercourses. The UN 
Watercourses Convention, as a framework instrument, also promotes consultation and 
the creation of joint water commissions as cooperative activities, which support 
preventive diplomacy and leaves it to the watercourse states to devise their own 
mechanisms for managing shared waters.311 
 
The extensive range of treaties and state practice demonstrate the benefits of including 
mechanisms for compliance verification (an important element of dispute avoidance) 
and dispute settlement within international agreements.312 A number of water-related 
cases have been contested between riparian states by means of international arbitration 
and adjudication, including the Territorial Jurisdiction of the International Commission 
of the River Oder (United Kingdom, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, France, Germany, 
Sweden v. Poland) (River Oder Case),313 the Lake Lanoux Arbitration (France v. 
Spain),314 the Case Concerning the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary v. 
Slovakia),315 and the recently decided Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River 
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Watercourses Convention : User's Guide at 234. 
308 Art 2(3) of the UN Charter. 
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Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay).316 International water law has developed a range of 
options in addressing issues related to conflict avoidance under the sphere of ‘access’ 
and it offers numerous mechanisms for resolving these disputes peacefully. However, 
the rulings of the ICJ often leave much to be desired when it comes to applying a 
certain degree of determinacy to a customary norm. For example, in the famous 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case, the Court held that the former Czechoslovakia’s 
unilateral decision to proceed with its part of the project, which in effect diverted 
between 80 and 90 percent of the river’s flow, deprived ‘Hungary of its right to an 
equitable and reasonable share of the natural resources of the Danube’ – though, 
without specifying what should be considered an equitable and reasonable share 
here.317 Further, since both states where found to have violated international law, they 
were send back to the negotiation table where the issue still lies – 15 years after the 
judgment. In the recent Pulp Mills Case between Argentina and Uruguay, the ICJ held 
that Uruguay had breached duties to notify and negotiate in both the relevant treaty 
between the two states and customary international environmental law.318 Due to its 
recognition of the customary status of the requirement to undertake an Environmental 
Impact Assessment (EIA) whenever there is risk of transboundary pollution it will 
certainly win ‘jurisprudential fame.’319 Yet, the Court did not dare to specify the 
minimum scope and content of such an EIA.320 This issue of indeterminacy is not 
limited to ICJ cases dealing with water or other natural resources and has triggered a 
general debate about the effectiveness, role and relevance of the Court, which cannot 
be discussed here.321 
 
3.2.3.3 Adaptability 
Undisputedly, the likelihood of conflict increases in scenarios where an enormous 
and/or rapid change occurs in demand or supply; and where the institutional settings 
                                                 
316 Case Concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment of 20 April 
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321 See, e.g., ABILA Committee on Intergovernmental Settlement of Disputes, 'Reforming the United 
Nations: What About the International Court of Justice?' (2006) 5 Chinese Journal of International 
Law 39; J Kammerhofer, 'Uncertainty in the Formal Sources of International Law: Customary 
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are not capable of dealing with this change.322 Hence, the question now arises, whether 
the cornerstone of international water law, the customary principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation, is capable of dealing with the security challenge of adaptability? 
In theory, equitable and reasonable utilisation is flexible enough to cope with future 
factual hydrological changes,323 because it is able to implement an adaptive 
management approach relatively smoothly in order to deal with constant change.324 
However, it may even be too flexible to provide for the predictability and certainty 
needed by the states sharing a watercourse under stress. In the case of a dispute, both 
sides are trying to justify their opposing claims by referring to the principle of 
equitable utilisation.325 This is evident regarding the non-exhausting variety of non-
prioritised circumstances of each case, which have to be weighted and balanced to 
reach an equitable solution. As one author described it: ‘[t]he absence of constraining 
rules (or 'criteria') transforms settlement into ad hoc legislation.’326 Although 
flexibility and future readjustment may be implicit in the principle of equitable and 
reasonable utilisation, the lack of specific guidance about how to actually apply such 
readjustment minimises its potential.327 
 
This is why states have entered into freshwater agreements, trying to limit the 
flexibility of the legal regime to a more useful level. However, water treaties have one 
shortcoming: they are often perceived as rather rigid instruments. This is due to the 
fact that these regimes can only be modified according to their terms, within the 
boundaries of progressive interpretation,328 or by mutual agreement.329 Hence, if a 
treaty lacks flexible tools and a situation of water stress occurs, one party to the 
agreement may have to reduce its water consumption in order to be able to comply 
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with its international obligations. If it fails to do so, disputes over the shared 
watercourse are likely to ensue.330 In the case that water stress causes asymmetric 
harm, the more severely harmed state may want to terminate the agreement, while the 
co-riparian may want to stick to it, as it still benefits from the treaty.331 In its judgment 
in the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case, the ICJ concluded that ‘[...] the stability of treaty 
relations requires that the plea of fundamental change of circumstances be applied only 
in exceptional cases.’332 The Court further stated that new developments or changing 
conditions should be dealt with on the level of implementation of the treaty; not by 
terminating it.333 Hence, a treaty is only as static as its specific terms require. 
Nonetheless, even if the parties agree to renegotiate their water agreement, this 
sensible diplomatic process may be too lengthy to effectively adapt to rapid climate 
change.334 
 
The question arises whether this more rigid form of international water law can still be 
adapted to changing circumstances imposed by global warming. Several studies have 
been conducted, and all come to the same conclusion: the majority of freshwater 
treaties will have to be modified or even renegotiated in order to include more flexible 
climate-uncertainty mechanisms.335 They either completely lack those mechanisms, or 
the implemented provisions are weak in actual substance. The most prominent ‘failure’ 
of allocating freshwater is the assumption of a fixed (sometimes even too optimistic), 
perpetual water supply and flow allocation regime.336 In a case where no provisions 
are made for future changes in circumstances, the contracting parties are likely to lose 
sight of the fact that aquatic ecosystems and the dependencies on them are constantly 
changing, and that this matter of fact is becoming even more challenging with the 
uncertainty added by global climate change. 
 
There are several ways for the incorporation of more flexibility into freshwater 
agreements. Depending on their purposes and political relations, negotiating or 
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contracting parties should choose the method most appropriate for them.337 First of all, 
the allocation of water according to percentage and time of flow, rather than a fixed 
amount, is a way to enhance treaty flexibility.338 While spreading the risk of water 
stress among all parties, this mechanism still puts downstream users at particular risk if 
developmental changes occur upstream, as their share in the water they receive will 
almost certainly diminish.339 
 
Another method of designing a flexible watercourse regime is to enter into a general 
framework agreement that requires the parties to conclude more specific periodic 
agreements regarding water use and management.340 Obviously, a high level of 
cooperation between the basin states and good political relations are the preconditions 
for this kind of technique.341 
Special treaty provisions can also introduce flexibility. The most popular among policy 
makers is the ‘escape clause.’ It allows countries suffering from water stress to deliver 
less water than they would have to under normal conditions, thereby, allowing them to 
respond to unpredicted circumstances while not infringing the treaty itself.342 Since 
downstream states often oppose the use of such a clause, as it implies that they will 
receive less water during times of drought, it is often accompanied by a deficit 
mechanism, compelling the upstream state to return the amount of water shortfall once 
the drought ends.343 In order to prevent disputes regarding its application, it is essential 
that this provision is drafted unambiguously.344 
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Two other formal methods proposed by McCaffrey are rather suboptimal. He suggests 
a provision allowing for termination of the agreement upon a given period of notice; or 
giving the water treaty a short life while providing for its automatic renewal unless one 
party objects.345 Although both certainly provide for more flexibility, they cannot be 
considered as serious options, since consistent long-term management is needed to 
anticipate and adapt to the dynamic and changing conditions of transboundary 
watercourses. The two main advantages of an international water treaty – increased 
stability and predictability – would be lost. 
 
Although the rules of customary international law do not (yet) require watercourse 
states to establish joint institutions,346 state practice demonstrates that the majority of 
international freshwater regimes provide for such mechanisms, varying vastly in terms 
of purpose, size and responsibilities.347 The overall aim of a joint institution is to foster 
the implementation of the water treaty, promote basin-wide cooperation and prevent 
disputes.348 To achieve this goal they deal with operational matters, provide for 
monitoring and reviewing, establish information pools, and may also serve as a dispute 
resolution forum. Although in most of the cases decisions are merely advisory in the 
form of recommendations, they are generally adopted in practice.349 
 
It seems like joint institutions offer the greatest potential of all the flexibility 
mechanisms. However, in order to effectively meet the challenges of global climate 
change, they must be able to respond in an appropriate way.350 The needed flexibility 
can be incorporated when the joint body has a broad functional and geographic 
framework, is independent from governmental structures, and is authorised by the 
treaty creating it to amend the basic freshwater regime in order to keep it up-to-date.351 
Only if the joint institution holds these qualities, will the watercourse states be able to 
respond to the future challenges of water insecurity. 
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3.2.3.4 Ambit 
The make-or-break issue with regard to international water security is the concept of 
‘ambit,’ which, in this context, describes and delimits the scope of water security – i.e. 
the sphere of influence of the notion. 
 
Regarding the hydrological extent of the waters covered by a regime, various terms 
have been employed; such as ‘watercourse,’352 ‘international watercourse,’353 ‘shared 
watercourse,’354 ‘international drainage basin,’355 ‘aquifer,’356 ‘water resources,’357 
‘tributary,’358 and so forth. International practice has demonstrated increasing support 
for adopting a basin-wide approach to managing transboundary waters,359 which has 
important implications related to ‘ambit.’ For example, if the ‘international 
watercourse’ under consideration is determined to be the territorial scope of the 
applicable legal regime, all states that ‘share’ this particular system of surface and 
groundwaters should have identifiable and enforceable legal entitlements and 
obligations related to the development and management of the entire watercourse – a 
situation that might affect river basins where there are no international watercourse 
agreements or where such agreements do not include all watercourse states.360 The 
issue of scope also determines the range of legal actors eligible to participate in the 
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watercourse utilisation (for example, the definitions of ‘watercourse state,’ 
‘watercourse agreement,’ and ‘parties to a watercourse agreement’ from the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention). Another issue which falls under the matter of ‘ambit’ is the 
breadth of objectives covered by a regime. Here, the extent ranges from merely 
quantitative agreements to highly sophisticated institutions (e.g., the Rhine 
Convention) which also govern aspects of water quality and emergency situations. The 
most effective management of transboundary watercourses, for the benefit of the 
whole basin, can only be achieved through a truly joint strategy involving all sectors 
and disciplines across borders.361 
 
Recently, there has been a chance to strengthen international water law considerably – 
with the adoption of the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary Aquifers by the 
International Law Commission (ILC).362 While it was an opportunity to bring the 
global frameworks governing transboundary groundwaters and surface waters closer 
together, instead they go separate ways on very fundamental issues. The UN 
Watercourses Convention can be seen as a framework for at least trying to level the 
playing field and overcome state-centrism, whereas Article 3 of 2008 Draft Articles 
speaks a different language, stating that ‘[e]ach aquifer State has sovereignty over the 
portion of a transboundary aquifer or aquifer system located within its territory.’ This 
perception of sovereignty is inconsistent with the doctrine of ‘limited territorial 
sovereignty’ and its outflow – the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation. 
Furthermore, by focusing primarily on the geological formation, the aquifer, the draft 
‘invites confusion as to whether the geological formation (rock) or its content (water) 
is the primary subject of legal regulation.’363 Hence, the question must be asked, 
whether the 2008 Draft Articles have actually added anything new to the area of 
international water law; or whether they may have actually made a negative 
contribution to the development of international water law? It seems like the 2008 
Draft Articles have moved away from the concept of distributive equity, which 
traditionally has been used to translate the uniqueness of the resource water into 
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international law, towards a narrow approach based on national and absolute 
sovereignty.364 
 
Thus, water governance at the international level is still missing the fact that water is 
not merely a resource which has to be well managed to avoid conflicts – it is a means 
to an end as well. Users generally do not care where the water comes from (confined 
aquifer, connected groundwater or surface water) as long as it is of sufficient quality 
and quantity to satisfy their needs. Here, international water law is lacking in tools to 
conceptualise this understanding. When analysing the scattered approaches to 
transboundary water management, with many treaties merely focusing on quantitative 
issues, it becomes clear that most legal frameworks lack full support of the notion of 
‘ambit.’ This political short-sighted behaviour – focusing on one’s own national 
interests and security at the cost of international security will inevitably backfire. 
Water interaction is still seen as zero-sum conflict with a ‘fixed-pie’ outcome – rather 
than a perpetual process to achieve the more sustainable ‘common security.’ With the 
help of international law, the concept of water security has to create a ‘space’ which 
transcends national boundaries (real and imaginary) and put water high on the 
agenda.365 International water law, then, has to provide a legal environment that fully 
comprehends the ambit of water security. 
 
3.3 Water Security as a Challenge to International Law 
International water law has often been interpreted as focusing merely on the 
(re)allocation of water, which strengthens the argument that riparian disputes should be 
perceived as zero-sum games.366 While it is true that law governing transboundary 
waters does not provide a clear hierarchy for the competing claims of riparian 
countries, it does introduce important principles for developing a sound framework for 
international cooperation. The previous section has shown that international water law 
does – at least to some extent – provide guidance on the four core issues of water 
security: availability, access, adaptability and ambit. The ‘4A’ analytical framework 
offers the necessary methodological breakthrough for the further development of 
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international water law, by pinpointing the main flaws of the current legal regime. 
Challenged by the water security concept, the shortcomings of international water law 
become clearly visible. 
 
While the recognition of the principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation as a 
customary rule of international law is indeed a great achievement; it is often ignored in 
practice.367 The problem is that the principle as such does little in overcoming state-
centrism and truly levelling the playing field of transboundary water interaction. The 
hydro-hegemon still holds all the cards in the transboundary water game. The powerful 
riparians are often willing to take unilateral action as the risk that their action will be 
subsequently found inequitable and unreasonable, is rather low. In most cases, the 
hegemon has the incentive to utilise the water first and worry little about the (unlikely) 
consequences they might face in the future – especially in basins where no treaty 
exists. This is why we still see countless examples of states not sharing their 
transboundary watercourses equitably; e.g., in the Nile basin, Central Asia and the 
Tigris-Euphrates. Here, hydropolitics based on power still determine the rules of the 
game. 
 
In addition, concepts like ‘benefit sharing’ have not been able to soothe the tension 
between maximising the overall benefit and the ‘relative’ benefits of states. Since 
water is the source of growth, it is often considered as a strategic resource. This is why 
states are constantly worried about the relative gains of their co-riparians. They are 
very cautious about the impacts any freshwater interaction might have with regard to 
the power interplay of the respective actors. This usually leads to the pursuit of 
‘maximised individual benefits’ rather than looking at how to gain the most from the 
management of the shared resource in absolute terms. It is correct that states are 
obliged to protect their national interests – and will always be. However, many of the 
interests that have previously been perceived as national interests are no longer merely 
‘national.’ As we have seen in the previous chapters, the intertwinement of water 
security issues with other crises (i.e. food, energy and environment) is changing the 
dynamics of international relations on a global scale. 
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It is surprising that despite the need to increase both the adaptability and ambit of 
water agreements in order to cope with water stress; riparian states find it difficult to 
do so. The number of flexible and multilateral frameworks initially negotiated shows 
that the current inability of water sharing regimes to address water insecurity is not an 
issue of awareness – it is rather due to political obstacles.368 States are often reluctant 
to implement rules that limit their sovereignty. Thus, many international water treaties 
remain ‘dead letter regimes;’ in some cases negotiated with good intentions, but 
ineffective in reality. This dilemma is getting even worse, as the more difficult the 
policy decisions get, the less ‘harmonious’ the political relations are between the 
parties.369 
 
The perceived threat of losing national sovereignty is increasing the political costs of 
implementing flexible mechanisms.370 However, when excluding these measures, 
policy makers must necessarily also consider the potential benefits their 
implementation would have had. In basing decisions on optimistic water-availability 
scenarios and low resource sensitivity forecasts, the reasons for including flexible 
mechanisms are reduced, and the non-implementation is justified.371 The bottom line is 
that by stressing the immediate political costs instead of the future social and 
environmental benefits, the implementation of climate-uncertainty mechanisms seems 
unreasonable, and thus they are often excluded. The level of flexibility of water 
sharing regimes hugely depends on the political will of the co-riparians. 
 
There is a growing need for international freshwater regimes to meet the challenges of 
constantly changing demands and environmental settings. At its current stage, 
customary international water law is providing the needed flexibility, but lacks in 
predictability and stability. Watercourse states try to address these shortcomings by 
concluding freshwater treaty regimes, which are more precise, but also much more 
rigid tools of resource management. In addition to some formal options, the 
establishment of a joint institution can be considered the most effective approach for 
providing the crucial flexibility required in freshwater agreements. Although these 
joint bodies are desperately needed, their implementation often founders on political 
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hurdles. It might be helpful to raise the awareness of policy makers that freshwater 
treaties should be seen as a long-term process of involving stakeholders in water 
resources management, rather than an ultimate outcome.372 Only then can the 
immediate political costs and the future social and environmental benefits be properly 
weighted. 
 
The prevailing ‘react-and-correct’ approach of international water law is not adequate 
anymore. What we desperately need is one of ’foresee-and-prevent.’373 Such an 
approach would fully comprehend the concept of ‘common’ water security, which is 
inherently preventative compared to the conservative understanding of security as a 
reactive control paradigm. Hence, international water law has to strive for addressing 
the potential causes of instability and international conflict well before their effects are 
being felt. While not being without flaws, the current legal framework governing 
transboundary freshwater resources cannot be described as ‘poorly developed, 
contradictory, and unenforceable.’374 Yes, international water law has to be developed 
further based on a more ‘common’ and ‘regional’ normative basis – and ‘water 
security’ serves as a perfect concept to study the progressive development of the legal 
framework. 
 
With the help of international law, the notion of water security can create a ‘space’ 
which transcends national boundaries (real and imaginary) and puts water high on the 
political agenda.375 However, in order to be able to do so, international law has to 
accept the challenge posed by the concept of water security. Here, the momentum 
created by the water security discourse could assist with the further development of 
international water law. It kick-starts a process which otherwise would not exist; one 
looking beyond water – and beyond nation states. How this process can come about 
and upon what normative foundation such an approach should be based, is examined in 
the next two chapters. 
 
 
4 HYDROSOLIDARITY – THE ANSWER TO STATE-CENTRISM? 
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In realising that the current legal framework governing transboundary watercourses is 
not able to overcome state-centrism, the question arises which conceptual change is 
needed in order to help international water law move towards this aim? Is it possible to 
carve out an alternative approach to challenge the orthodox strategy in transboundary 
water interaction? Would such an approach have to follow a rather radical path of 
recognising our freshwater resources as ‘hydro-commons’376 or even consider the duty 
to ensure ‘water for all’ as an obligation erga omnes shared by all states?377 
 
While it is certainly not sensible to expect states’ willingness to break with the current 
system overnight, there are signs that new – and less sovereignty-invasive – concepts 
are emerging, which can at least alter traditional orthodoxy in such a way as to 
overcome the challenges state-centrism is posing to the management of transboundary 
watercourses. With regard to water, the notion of ‘hydrosolidarity’ seems promising; 
since its overall aim is to shift the focus from competing national interests to common 
benefits. This chapter will trace the origins of the concept of hydrosolidarity, outline 
its changing perceptions and discuss why it still lacks implementation at a wider scale 
– despite the fact that its relevance to the water crisis is evident. This analysis 
contributes to one of the key debates of transboundary water interaction by focusing on 
the role and relevance of international law in promoting solidarity and simultaneously 
providing specific guidance on the parameters of hydrosolidarity. The value-driven 
principle with its strong ethical underpinning might just be the key ingredient to 
successfully support water security in creating a forum for discussing freshwater 
interaction which transcends national boundaries and leads towards a truly joint 
approach.378 
 
4.1 Hydrosolidarity 
Following from the discussion in the previous chapter, it is unrealistic to expect that 
the existing legal order will easily allow for a move fully away from the ‘state-
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oriented’ transboundary freshwater management. Thus, a sensible path would be to 
follow less sovereignty-invasive concepts, which can at least modify traditional 
orthodoxy in such a way as to make it more responsive to the complex challenges of 
water security. Here, the concept of ‘hydrosolidarity’ offers a fresh perspective, and 
maybe an operational platform for implementing the notion of water security. The 
chief objective of ‘hydrosolidarity’ is to inject a common understanding, based on the 
ideas of collective action, interdependence and ethics, into (transboundary) water 
interaction, which for too long has been focused on technical variables and engineering 
solutions to the challenge of managing freshwater resources sustainably.379 Ultimately, 
following an approach of solidarity in transboundary water interaction implies that 
reconciliation of conflicts over water have to be based on solidarity among all water 
users. In concert with an evolving understanding of sovereignty, it could do justice to 
the ‘ambit’ of water security – bringing together a community of states and ensuring a 
truly joint management of shared water resources. 
 
4.1.1 The History of ‘Hydrosolidarity’ 
The concept of hydrosolidarity arose as a countermove to the notion of ‘hydroegoism,’ 
which describes the state-centred approach prevalent in the management of 
transboundary watercourses. The argument which ‘hydroegoism’ follows is that 
satisfying geopolitical self-interests (e.g., national, sectoral and political) should be the 
underlying principle guiding water allocation between riparian countries. This view, of 
course, proves to be incompatible with the aim of a holistic and socially responsible 
development and management of water resources. Malin Falkenmark, a strong 
proponent of integrated water resources management (IWRM), devised a new 
conceptual framework in the attempt to challenge the predominant approach.380 In 
1996, she presented her initial ideas at the World Conservation Congress.381 Two years 
later, she first introduced the term in her Volvo Prize Lecture in Brussels. Falkenmark 
described the process of drawing away from what she calls ‘water blindness’ by 
addressing the need for ‘water solidarity;’382 and ultimately rising above our inherited 
ways of addressing the global water challenge, which are heavily based on 
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sectorisation and fragmentation.383 According to her, this attempt should be paired 
with the concepts ‘green water’384 and ‘virtual water,’ in order to be most effective. 
Virtual water, i.e. the water involved in the production of goods, is being transferred 
from one region (usually water rich) to another region (usually more water scarce) with 
a demand in the respective goods.385 The idea of virtual water is especially relevant for 
equity related issues in water-short areas, since it tries to reveal hidden or unintended 
transfers of water.386 Here, ‘water solidarity’ would open the eyes of the ‘water world’ 
to novel ideas of management; in calling for: (1) human water obligations to deserve 
the same respect as other human rights to safe household water; (2) the recognition that 
‘upstream/downstream issues related to sharing water’ must take precedence; and (3) 
the support from ethical and philosophical circles to incorporate water ethics.387 
 
The term originally coined ‘water solidarity’ by Falkenmark subsequently underwent a 
process of evolution as scholars and water managers adopted and refined the concept, 
shaping it into what today is known as ‘hydrosolidarity.’388 The concept now entails 
five key elements: (1) motivating stakeholders and decision-makers to use broad 
information; (2) designing organisational structures for finding compromises; (3) 
making public participation socially acceptable; (4) addressing social implications of 
resource use; and (5) redressing the use of resources that damages the interest of other 
uses.389 Dukhovny argues for the inclusion of four additional elements: (1) including 
state governance in the principle of national hydrosolidarity; (2) public involvement in 
the promotion of moral awareness; (3) creation of a regulating system of laws and 
provisions; and (4) forecasting.390 These should be applied directly to negotiations 
involving transboundary watercourses and their sustainable management. Here, high 
regard should be given to the fact that water has to be understood as a component of 
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vital importance to society and the environment, rather than merely a technical 
issue.391 
 
Ultimately, in Falkenmark’s view, it remains vital to institutionalise the existing 
interdependencies in each river basin in order to achieve hydrosolidarity.392 She states 
that ‘[t]he basis should be general solidarity with focus on beneficial sharing of the 
joint water resource – that is, the rainfall caught within the water divide. Solidarity 
means the willingness to restrain one’s freedom. Adaptation to the hydro-climatic 
constraints of a catchment will demand that all the interested parties are prepared to 
compromise. Principles and rules for sharing will have to be found for the unavoidable 
compromises between incompatible water interests in a certain catchment.’393 While 
the focus of this work is on the international level, the concept of hydrosolidarity (just 
like water security), can be applied to different scales as well – i.e. the (sub)catchment 
level or the national scale.394 
 
It becomes clear that the notion of hydrosolidarity intends to serve as an ethical basis 
for wiser water governance and provides the backdrop for balancing upstream and 
downstream claims for water utilisation, as well as human and ecosystems needs. 
Philosophically, it can be described to be the opposite of ‘hydroegoism,’ the ‘all-too-
prevalent fragmented and sectoral approach to water management, where the strongest 
lobbyists tend to win.’395 This paints a picture of an increasingly integrated approach 
to water resources management, heavily relying on public participation and 
coordination among various stakeholders. The ultimate aim of hydrosolidarity then is 
the truly cooperative, unified management of shared freshwater resources, whether at 
the local, national or transboundary level. While hydrosolidarity ‘originated as a 
deliberate attempt to inject mutual understanding, common good and ethics in relation 
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to shared waters,’396 the question arises, how the key elements of the concept – 
including law, governance, stakeholder involvement and resource protection – can play 
a more concerted role?397 
 
 
4.1.2 A New Consensus in the Water Community? 
Despite the somewhat enthusiastic reception of the notion of hydrosolidarity, some 
scholars and practitioners are rather pessimistic when it comes to the applicability of 
the concept. To be useful, they argue, hydrosolidarity needs a set of metrics which can 
serve as a benchmark for its effectiveness.398 Necessary for the development of such 
metrics, however, is having set boundaries and mutually agreed guidelines which can 
then be used to apply the concept of hydrosolidarity at the various levels of water 
management.399 
 
Thus, in order for hydrosolidarity to become the ethical underpinning of transboundary 
water interaction, it has to be based on a mutual understanding of how to translate the 
concept into practice. The following section will tease out traces of hydrosolidarity in 
recent developments in the water arena and analyse whether the global water 
community has reached common ground. The processes picked here all flow into the 
UN Conference on Sustainable Development (UNCSD) which was held in Rio de 
Janeiro in June 2012. The main goal of the summit, also known as ‘Rio+20,’ was the 
evaluation of the achievements of the landmark UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro 20 years ago.400 The importance of the 
UNCSD process for getting water on the global political agenda becomes even more 
evident when realising the disappointing inclusion of water issues in global climate 
change negotiations. While freshwater resources clearly play a central role in climate 
change mitigation and adaptation efforts,401 the UNFCCC Conferences of the Parties 
(COPs) and Conferences and Meetings of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol (CMPs) 
constantly fail to acknowledge this fact and rather merely focus on the, not 
unimportant, issue of greenhouse gas emissions targets. This is why the best hope for 
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the global water community to push water up the political agenda and arrive at a 
common understanding of hydrosolidarity is through the UNCSD process. 
 
4.1.2.1 Mechanisms for galvanising the global water community 
Several governmental and non-governmental processes are aimed at promoting the 
peaceful management of transboundary freshwater resources. In this section the most 
prominent ones contributing to the UNCSD are being analysed as to how they interpret 
‘hydrosolidarity’ and whether they elevate the concept to finally become the ethical 
underpinning of transboundary water interaction – like the creators of the notion 
envisioned. 
 
One of the most important gatherings of water experts, the annual World Water Week 
(which began as the Stockholm Water Symposium in 1991), is organised by the 
Stockholm International Water Institute (SIWI). Its mission is to generate knowledge 
and inform policy-makers towards water wise decisions – focusing on five thematic 
areas: (1) water governance; (2) transboundary water management; (3) water and 
climate change; (4) the water-energy-food nexus; and (5) water economics.402 Each 
year, the World Water Week attracts over 2,500 participants and around 200 
collaborating institutions from all over the world.403 During the event in 2011 (21-27 
August), the World Water Week Statement to the Rio+20 Summit was published with 
the aim to get water on the global political agenda.404 
 
The document contains some interesting statements relevant for this analysis. In 
recognising that ‘water, energy, and food are interlinked and interdependent’ it stresses 
the fact that water is more than just a resource at risk of being overexploited; it is at the 
heart of several other resource security risks. This clearly calls for cross-fertilisation 
between water governance and other policy sectors – confirming the need for an ambit 
of water security which is significantly wider than the prevalent ‘water box.’ While 
falling short of demonstrating ways of how to put such an approach into practice, the 
statement argues that the integration of water, energy and food security issues in a 
holistic manner has to recognise ‘the carrying capacity of the planet’ (i.e., the planetary 
boundaries), which resonates with the definition of water security proposed in Chapter 
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2 of this study. In calling for ‘a universal provisioning of safe drinking water, adequate 
sanitation and modern energy services by 2030’ to achieve the Millennium 
Development Goals,405 the focus of the Stockholm Statement clearly lies in the realm 
of human security. Interestingly, the document also recommends the creation of an 
institutional framework for sustainable development. However, in being rather poor in 
content, it merely reiterates vague and widely agreed on suggestions – e.g., ‘policy and 
institutional reforms that create an enabling environment for the coherent and 
integrated management of water, energy and food;’ ‘national legislation that 
guarantees access to water and sanitation for all and protect freshwater ecosystems;’ 
and ‘cross-cutting frameworks that bridge ministries and sectors, leading the way to 
water, energy and food security in a green economy.’ Finally, the Statement calls on 
the participants of the Rio+20 Summit to commit to achieving five main targets by 
2020: 
- 20% increase in total food supply-chain efficiency 
- 20% increase in water efficiency in agriculture 
- 20% increase in water use efficiency in energy production 
- 20% increase in the quantity of water reused 
- 20% decrease in water pollution 
While these goals surely are noble ones, they read more like a marketing campaign 
than serious policy recommendations based on empirical analysis. Despite having been 
supported by UN-Water, the German Federal Ministry for the Environment and 
endorsed by several international organisations (e.g., Conservation International, 
International Water Management Institute, Wateraid and Worldwide Fund for 
Nature),406 both the language and content of the document remind us of what it 
actually is: a policy statement. The positive aspects of such policy language are that it 
is accessible to a broad audience and concepts are, generally, easy to grasp. The 
negative aspect of such broad language and seemingly randomly selected goals is that 
they are problematic for the practical, legal and institutional realities of implementing 
such goals. Even so, considering Falkenmark’s role as Senior Scientific Advisor to 
SIWI, it seems astonishing that the statement did not mention the notion of 
hydrosolidarity even once in order to promote it at the global level. Given the fact that 
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the concept is neither referred to in the post-event documentation of the most recent 
World Water Week,407 nor in the call for papers and events for this year’s event,408 the 
question arises whether SIWI still has the intention to promote hydrosolidarity, or 
whether it has given up due to the lack of significant uptake? 
 
Organised by the World Water Council (WWC) since 1997, the triennial World Water 
Forum is the largest gathering of water professionals. The WWC is an international 
multi-stakeholder platform which was founded in 1996 in response to increasing 
concerns from water experts and international organisations about the world water 
crisis. According to its mission statement, its goal is to ‘promote awareness, build 
political commitment and trigger action on critical water issues at all levels, including 
the highest decision-making level, to facilitate the efficient conservation, protection, 
development, planning, management and use of water in all its dimensions on an 
environmentally sustainable basis for the benefit of all life on earth.’409 One of the 
main tools to achieve this is the provision of a debating and knowledge exchange 
platform in order to ‘reach a common strategic vision on water resources and water 
services management amongst all stakeholders in the water community.’410 In 
supporting this process, the World Water Forum can be considered the main catalyst. 
The most recent Forum (12-17 March 2012) was held in Marseille and attracted around 
35,000 participants from more than 145 countries.411 The goal of the meeting – billed 
as ‘Time for Solutions’ – was to make ‘progress on the cause of water and sanitation 
through concrete solutions and commitments.’412 Endorsed by 84 government 
ministers from around the world, the Ministerial Declaration calls for a ‘new approach’ 
to water policy ahead of Rio+20.413 With its 32 articles, the Declaration tries to explain 
what this new approach is and how it should be implemented. 
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Regarding the debate revolving around water security and hydrosolidarity, a few points 
seem to be of particular relevance. It acknowledges the interlinkages of water, food 
and energy by calling for a new approach to better understand their interaction in 
decision-making and planning processes, since this would release new potential in 
improving the ‘production and sustainable management of these scarce resources.’414 
Further, it argues that since there will be no food security without water ‘[…] water 
and food security policies need to be integrated.’415 While these recommendations 
point towards a wider ambit of water security, as proposed in this study, the 
Declaration falls short in proposing feasible pathways of implementing such an 
endeavour. 
 
Article 24, then, acknowledges the principles of the 1992 Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development and the fact that 2013 has been declared the 
International Year of Water Cooperation by the UN General Assembly. Hence, with 
regard to transboundary water interaction, the Declaration stressed the commitment to 
‘enhance cooperation across and beyond water, taking into account the 
interests of all riparian States concerned, to foster peace and stability. We 
appreciate cooperative efforts in the field of transboundary waters. We intend 
to further promote and encourage coordinated, equitable, reasonable and 
optimal water utilisation in transboundary basins, with a view to deepening 
mutual trust among riparian countries and achieve sound cooperation.’416 
This is a step back from customary international law, which requires, rather than 
encourages, equitable and reasonable water utilisation. Furthermore, this section does 
not mention the global framework treaty on water management, the UN Watercourses 
Convention, directly (let alone call for its ratification), nor does it promote any legal 
principles in particular. Furthermore, the provision on human right to water has been 
criticised by activists as well, since it steps short in formally defining water and 
sanitation as human rights.417 The declaration’s focus on investment and technology 
comes as no surprise, given the World Water Council has always been seen as having 
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close links with multilateral water corporations and financial institutions.418 However, 
fears that the Declaration is actively promoting privatisation policies could have been 
addressed by including guiding principles of ethics, equity and justice – like the 
concept of hydrosolidarity, but this opportunity was not taken. 
 
The whole Declaration is rather bland with vague statements and references to 
undisputed facts, owing to the fact that the hosts are usually rather keen to avoid 
controversy.419 There are only few points (like the (non-)reference to the human right 
to water) which could be contested. Who, for instance, would argue against the 
statement that ‘[a]ccounting for water use in energy production and for energy use in 
the water and sanitation sector can improve water and energy efficiency;’ or that 
[i]nvestment in sustainable multi-purpose water storage, the utilisation of wastewater 
as a source of renewable energy as well as the use of renewable energy, such as solar 
and wind, in water supply and sanitation, need to be promoted’?420 
 
Given the lack of content-related substance, the question arises as to what the impact 
of the Declaration is? While it clearly does not have any direct legal effect, as the 
World Water Council is devoid of any legitimacy under international law, the results 
of the World Water Forum are still sending out signals as to where discussions around 
water management are heading. However, the Ministerial Declaration should not be 
mistaken for a serious multilateral statement on the future global water policy. 
 
International organisations and research institutes were not the only actors in drafting 
policy recommendations ahead of the UNCSD and putting water security high on the 
global political agenda. The Bonn2011 Conference, for example, convened by the 
German Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and Nuclear 
Safety (BMU) and the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (BMZ) in November 2011, was organised as a ‘stepping stone’ for the 
discussions around the specific contribution Germany can make towards Rio+20. 
Dedicating the whole conference to the water-energy-food security nexus is definitely 
an important step in the recognition of the water security concept. The underlying 
objective of the international event was to develop policy recommendations based on a 
                                                 
418 M Barlow and T Clarke, Blue Gold : The Fight to Stop the Corporate Theft of the World's Water 
(W.W. Norton 2002) at 157. 
419 J Lane, 'Global Water Conferences: A Personal Reflection' in Biswas AK and Tortajada C (eds), 
Impacts of Megaconferences on the Water Sector (Springer 2009) at 107. 
420 Art 15 of the Ministerial Declaration. 
81 
multi-stakeholder consultation process while promoting the water-energy-food ‘nexus 
perspective’ as an important dimension within the Rio+20 process. In addition, the aim 
was to also launch concrete initiatives to address the water-energy-food security 
challenges in a coherent manner.421 
 
The policy recommendations aim to illuminate how the approach can help achieve 
sustainable development.422 The document starts off with a detailed description of why 
‘failing to recognize the consequences of one sector on another can lead to notable 
inefficiencies in the system.’423 According to the Bonn Recommendations, the main 
challenges to achieving water, energy and food security are ‘weak governance systems, 
limited awareness, distortions from perverse subsidies and unsustainable investments’ 
which can worsen unintended consequences.424 It claims that only a new nexus 
oriented approach can effectively address impending resource constraints and thus 
promote common security.425 This clearly takes the notion of ‘ambit,’ which is an 
integral part of the water security paradigm proposed in this study, to heart. Only by 
taking a wider perspective at the complex challenges ahead can we identify policy 
responses which are mutually beneficial and provide an informed framework for 
determining the paths for meeting demands ‘without compromising sustainability and 
exceeding environmental tipping points.’426 The following section assesses the most 
interesting recommendations discussed during Bonn2011 with regard to international 
water law and policy. 
 
One of the main goals of the conference was to find ways to increase policy coherence, 
in order to ensure that development pathways explicitly account for the inter-
dependency between water, energy and food. With regard to international freshwater 
management, it was seen as important to promote collaborative transboundary and 
basin-wide approaches.427 Taking into account that decisions on resource management 
in one part of the world may affect resource (re)allocation in another, the Bonn 
Recommendation see ‘opportunities of regional integration to enhance markets, trade 
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and financing to promote optimal resource use, more equitable distribution and 
sustainable outcomes,’ while also warning that unilateral development of shared rivers 
and aquifers can have a negative effect on a whole region.428 Here, the role of 
international water agreements is being stressed as being of paramount importance for 
the nexus, which can only be addressed genuinely when the legal framework is being 
expanded to also ‘influence responses to food and energy drivers and the wider 
political economy.’429 This, again, strengthens the argument for striving for an ambit 
of water security which is as comprehensive as possible. 
 
In supporting this argument, the document calls for considering the ‘trans-national 
consequences and externalities of trade policy on water, energy and food security’430 – 
the concept of virtual water. While this notion is nothing new,431 the Bonn 
Recommendations also propose collecting data which helps in better understanding the 
effect trade in food and other products has on the management of natural resources; for 
instance with the help of water, energy and land use footprints.432 Furthermore, it calls 
for the ratification of the UN Watercourses Convention (where appropriate); moving 
from the concept of water sharing to also include benefit sharing; and establishing a 
coordinated approach to implementation of multilateral environmental agreements and 
other treaties related to the water-energy-food nexus.433 
 
In terms of a contemporary understanding of water security, the most interesting point 
in the document is the proposal to promote transboundary cooperation beyond the 
boundaries of a river basin.434 On this suggestion, however, the Bonn 
Recommendations only elaborate slightly as to how this could be achieved. While the 
document does not mention the concept of hydrosolidarity explicitly, it nevertheless 
touches upon several important elements of it – mainly in the form of widening the 
ambit of the security approach and fostering cooperation which goes beyond the basin. 
Hence, the Recommendations have to be considered as an important contribution to the 
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UNCSD in terms of putting hydrosolidarity high on the political agenda and proposing 
steps to actually achieve water, energy and food security. 
 
4.1.2.2 New opportunities through the Rio+20 Process? 
Despite the recent disappointing experiences with large events trying to alter the 
course of our relationship with the environment, for instance the 15th session of the 
Conference of the Parties (COP 15) to the UNFCCC on climate change negotiations 
held in Copenhagen,435 the Rio+20 Conference had awakened the hope for 
fundamental change. ‘The stakes are rising […]. One hundred days to a once-in-a-
generation opportunity. We must agree on sustainable solutions to build the future we 
want.’436 Hence, one of the main objectives of Rio+20 was to renew the political 
commitment of states to sustainable development to be forearmed against the emerging 
challenges. In doing so, it was hoped to be able to give key principles, decided on in 
Rio in 1992, more substance – such as the principle not to cause transboundary 
harm,437 the right to development,438 common but differentiated responsibilities,439 
public participation,440 the precautionary principle441 and the polluter pays principle.442 
With regard to the concept of water security – and the underlying ethical principle of 
hydrosolidarity – expectations were that Rio+20 would acknowledge the complexities 
of the global water crisis and reflect them in its declaration.443 Since water security is 
being seen as a major political issue in the quest for sustainable development, for the 
summit to be called a success it had to fully acknowledge the nexus approach and the 
central role water plays in linking various other securities. 
 
In the process of leading up to the gathering, UNEP published a report with the aim to 
provide an update on how the world has changed – geopolitically, economically and 
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environmentally – over the last twenty years since the Earth Summit. In terms of 
freshwater management, it again mentions effective water sharing agreements between 
riparian states as a determining factor in the sustainable protection of freshwater 
ecosystems.444 The report also notices the increase in states signing Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (e.g., the Convention on Biological Diversity, the Ramsar 
Convention and the Kyoto Protocol) and argues that this trend is proof of a rising 
political awareness of global environmental challenges.445 However, the vagueness of 
many international treaties, together with the general lack of guidance on 
implementation and compliance, reveals a gap between legal scholarship and 
developments on the ground.446 This is why, despite the numerous agreements 
negotiated since the 1972 Stockholm Conference and the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, 
the UNEP report has to conclude that ‘with limited progress on environmental issues 
achieved, and few real ‘success stories’ to be told, all components of the environment 
– land, water, biodiversity, oceans and atmosphere – continue to degrade.’447 This 
raises the question of whether the new deal struck in Rio during UNCSD in 2012 will 
be able to put the community of states on track to develop the desperately needed 
cooperative frameworks based on solidarity which are flexible enough to deal with the 
persistent environmental challenges which are only getting more complex in the future. 
 
In a move to include the public in the process, major non-governmental organisations 
and other stakeholders were invited to contribute to a compilation document used by 
the Secretariat of the UNCSD to prepare the Zero Draft of the outcome document.448 
This draft was supposed to be preliminary and transitional when it had been released in 
January 2012. It comes as no surprise that its language is rather vague and preambular, 
since the aim of the Zero Draft was to provide a point of departure for the debate on a 
common vision of how to implement sustainable development. The final statement 
from Rio, ‘The Future We Want,’ is a 283 paragraphs long document which 
‘reaffirms,’ ‘recognizes’ and ‘acknowledges’ apparently every green initiative and 
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environmental problem.449 The wide spread of issues raised, as well as the type of 
language employed, prevents incorporating any substance as to how the global 
community should tackle the emerging crises. Hence, it is up to the governments to 
adapt and embed the vague language of ‘The Future We Want’ in their respective 
national legal frameworks. The ambiguity does not break with the patchwork 
approach, and thus will not help to establish the global sustainable standards 
desperately needed for strengthening cooperative action. 
 
With regard to the management of freshwater resources, the document reserves one 
section especially for the issues of ‘water and sanitation.’450 In paragraph 119 it 
‘recognises’ that ‘water is at the core of sustainable development as it is closely linked 
to a number of key global challenges. We therefore reiterate the importance of 
integrating water in sustainable development and underline the critical importance of 
water and sanitation within the three dimensions of sustainable development.’ The 
Future We Want then addresses the human security dimension of water by reaffirming 
‘the commitments made in the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation and the 
Millennium Declaration regarding halving by 2015 the proportion of people without 
access to safe drinking water and basic sanitation and the development of integrated 
water resource management and water efficiency plans, ensuring sustainable water use. 
We commit to the progressive realization of access to safe and affordable drinking 
water and basic sanitation for all, as necessary for poverty eradication, the 
empowerment of women and to protect human health, and to significantly improve the 
implementation of integrated water resource management at all levels as appropriate. 
In this regard, we reiterate the commitments to support these efforts, in particular for 
developing countries, through the mobilization of resources from all sources, capacity-
building and technology transfer.’451 Regarding the human right to safe drinking water 
and sanitation, the document reaffirms earlier commitments made by states, without 
proposing actual steps as to its realisation.452 Interesting here from an international law 
perspective is the mentioning of giving ‘full respect for national sovereignty’ in the 
process of achieving this goal. Paragraph 122 mentions the ‘key role that ecosystems 
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play in maintaining water quantity and quality.’ Again, rather than committing to 
concrete actions or agreeing on minimum standards and rules with respect to 
maintaining healthy aquatic ecosystems – e.g., by fleshing out the obligation to 
conduct environmental and social impact assessments in a transboundary setting – it 
even limits its support to actions within ‘respective national boundaries.’453 The last 
two paragraphs of the section on water and sanitation underline the need to address 
issues of water quality (e.g., pollution and wastewater) and quantity (floods and 
droughts) with the help of mobilising financial resources, private investment in 
infrastructure, as well as through international assistance and cooperation.454 
 
While some of the aims of Rio+20 were to push for the implementation of the original 
Rio Principles and to add detail to the Zero Draft in terms of content, rather than 
providing concrete goals and timelines, The Future We Want merely provides 
commitments to discuss further, hold more conferences and evaluate potential future 
commitments.455 According to the final document of the UNCSD, sustainable 
development should be designed at the local and national levels. While there is nothing 
wrong with idea of ‘act locally,’ marginalising the critical need to ‘think globally’ is 
counterproductive given that the majority of local and national policies will certainly 
have an impact on transboundary ecosystems. While hopes were high the summit 
could counteract the prevailing nationalism in addressing environmental problems, it 
did little in challenging the orthodox system and failed to promote the change needed 
to implement sustainable development practices across national borders. This is 
particularly obvious in the small section on water and sanitation, with the mentioning 
of ‘full respect for national sovereignty’ and ‘national boundaries.’456 Hence, the 
Rio+20 summit, at least in terms of promoting an understanding of international water 
law which comprehends the complexities of water security and the need for 
hydrosolidarity, has to be called a disappointment and a step backwards compared to 
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development and the Agenda 21. 
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This raises the question of the implications of The Future We Want for international 
law in general. Many NGOs have a purely negative impression of the overall outcome 
of UNCSD, with WWF calling it a process ‘without content,’ bringing about a 
‘squandered opportunity’ by producing an agreement which misses the chance to set 
the international community on a ‘path toward sustainable development;’457 and 
Greenpeace labelling it a ‘failure of epic proportions.’458 However, it is important to 
put Rio+20 into perspective, as the expectations of many were based on the (relative) 
success of the Rio Earth Summit (UNCED) in 1992. Back then, the political and 
economic atmosphere was completely different to the one we experience right now. 
Rather than being heavily influenced by an environment where the global economic 
crisis is determining the agenda of international politics, UNCED happened at a time 
which looked much more promising for the future development of international 
environmental law.459 
 
In analysing the legal impact of the document, one must not forget that, just like its 
predecessors (the 1972 Stockholm Declaration,460 the 1992 Rio Declaration461 and the 
2002 Johannesburg Declaration462), The Future We Want is not a legally binding 
document. It does make reference to conventions and other international agreements 
touching the realm of sustainable development; but only with the objective of 
reaffirming existing commitments – rather than making new law.463 For instance, it 
urges parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
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(UNFCCC),464 the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)465 and the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (UNCCD)466 to fully implement their 
commitments under those legal instruments.467 Furthermore, The Future We Want 
underlines the importance of the rule of law at both national and international levels,468 
and reaffirms that the states ‘continue to be guided by the purposes and principles of 
the Charter of the United Nations, with full respect for international law and its 
principles.’469 However, there is little in the declaration which urges new binding 
obligations; nor are there any clues of a bigger vision for the future development of 
international environmental law – which differentiates Rio+20 from the vision that 
inspired the 1992 Rio Principles.470 Ultimately, no major legal shifts were triggered by 
UNCSD; no significant impetus for the further development of international 
environmental law. Again, the role of the UN summits is not to produce new legal 
agreements or principles; rather to communicate a universal declaration of intention on 
a wide range of issues concerning sustainable development. It remains to be seen 
whether The Future We Want, like the 1992 Rio Declaration and Agenda 21, will 
become a soft law basis for legal arguments on various issues of international 
environmental law.471 While it may have promoted the concept of sustainable 
development by, at least, agreeing on the lowest common denominator of international 
norms and by strengthening the increasingly important role of non-state actors 
(business and civil society),472 it did not create a real sense of urgency about the need 
for a radical transformation in the way we manage our shared water resources. 
 
Despite the fact that Rio+20 as such can only be called a disappointment regarding 
legal commitments concerning water security and hydrosolidarity, the Post-2015 
Development Agenda Consultation on Water might be a useful platform for future 
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debates on how the global community should tackle the water crisis.473 The UN started 
this open consultation process after UNCSD in order to identify priorities from citizens 
around the world for the post-2015 development agenda, since the Millennium 
Development Goals will reach their target date in 2015. However, while this process is 
an important one, it lacks any legitimacy and legal impact – a chance missed at 
Rio+20. 
 
4.1.2.3 Observations 
As already mentioned earlier, for hydrosolidarity to be useful as an ethical 
underpinning of water security, it has to establish boundaries through mutually agreed 
guidelines. The analysis of recent developments in the water arena raises the question 
whether the ‘global water community’ has a clear and common vision of the ‘future it 
wants’?  
 
There are good reasons for negating the question. First of all, one has to be aware of 
the diversity within the ‘water community.’ While it may have a common goal – the 
sustainable and peaceful management of the world’s freshwater resources – each 
discipline has its own list of issues and its very own manner of debating the concepts 
and methodologies it deems useful in addressing them. This in turn means that each 
forum has its own agenda as well, since they are being influenced by different 
disciplines in very different ways. While the fact that no single discipline can offer an 
effective answer to the water crisis on its own seems to be widely acknowledged, the 
question of which discipline is allowed at the negotiation table and at what stage still 
seems to divide the various camps. The evolution of transboundary freshwater 
management has revolved around some key themes, including integrated water 
resources management (IWRM),474 good water governance475 and stakeholder 
involvement to name a few.476 Common to these is the need for adequate legal 
frameworks which support the peaceful utilisation and development of shared water 
resources and which promote regional cooperative approaches recognising the 
interdependencies and common interests. Over the past decade alone, the world 
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community has elevated ‘water’ as a global political issue,477 through various streams, 
like the World Water Forums, the World Water Week and others. However, it seems 
like those initiatives do not necessarily attach the same level of importance to the 
development of hydrosolidarity, since they all follow their own agendas. 
 
The focus on how to solve the global freshwater crisis has for too long been on 
technical solutions – fuelled by the hope of being able to innovate ourselves out of 
water insecurity. While science and technology are of prime importance to an effective 
solution, one has to remember that they have to be ‘grounded in the equitable and 
efficient allocation of water.’478 The prevalent piecemeal approach in the global water 
arena is costly – both in resources and time. We have an unprecedented opportunity to 
make hydrosolidarity reality by working across boundaries and tearing down silo 
thinking. While striving towards hydrosolidarity is a noble task, the concept can only 
be of any benefit if it is being supported by an effective legal framework.479 The issue 
here is that there is no guiding principle in international water law which provides a 
framework for the concept to thrive. This disconnectedness between aspiration and the 
legal system is immense; which is even more distressing given the fact that the 
international community needs to work together across boundaries to address the 
complex water challenges. Here, global and regional hydrosolidarity should be the 
guiding concept at the policy level and a driver in the future evolution of international 
legal regimes. 
 
Collective action, based upon cooperative mechanisms (reaching and implementing 
agreements; establishing and supporting transboundary institutional mechanisms; 
collecting and sharing scientific data and information; engaging with civil society and 
ensuring public participation), is the prerequisite for achieving regional water security, 
addressing both the imperative to maintain the integrity of the resource and the need to 
meet social and economic development objectives.480 The hydrosolidarity paradigm 
spans the spectrum of actors and uses and calls for a new understanding of collective 
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action, including the benefits of global cooperation481 and enhanced water 
governance,482 especially within the context of transboundary watercourses. 
Unfortunately, the views on, and interpretations of, hydrosolidarity within the highly 
diverse group of water experts varies tremendously – the main reason being the lack of 
legal force behind the notion. This is why the substitution of one concept with a new 
one, which seems to have gathered traction in the global water arena, is becoming 
commonplace. The issue with such an approach is that paradigms which are promising 
in adding something new to the discussion on sustainable freshwater management will 
not always be examined and acknowledged in the way they should. Instead of 
thorough analysis and implementation of paradigms, like hydrosolidarity, we are 
witnessing the emergence and disappearance of buzzwords at an increasing pace. 
 
In order to achieve hydrosolidarity, ‘[p]rinciples and rules for sharing will have to be 
found for the unavoidable compromises between incompatible water interests.’483 This 
endeavour seems unattainable to many; especially given the increasingly short-sighted 
transboundary water policies, which have become more frequent with the changing 
role business plays in the thematic discussions in the various global water initiatives. 
Does this ultimately label hydrosolidarity as a utopian paradigm – or is it useful 
concept which has merely been neglected temporarily? The next section will address 
this question by looking at the relationship between other fields of international law 
and solidarity. 
 
 
4.2 The Role of International Law in Overcoming ‘(Hydro)Egoism’ 
Since solidarity is a value laden notion and its definition is highly subjective, the 
implementation of the concept often proves elusive – especially in a regime based on 
consent like international law. In social sciences, the concept of solidarity is by no 
means a novel one, as it is inseparably linked with the development of ‘societies.’ If 
law is perceived as the ‘formal instrument of orderly change in society,’484 it has to 
address questions of solidarity as well. In a national setting this can be observed quite 
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frequently – especially in countries following the ‘social state principle.’485 How is the 
concept brought into play in a more complex and multi-faceted global environment? 
As Insensee stated correctly, solidarity requires specific commonalities in order to 
emerge; e.g., correlating interests and spatial proximity.486 It would seem natural, then, 
that with an increase in distance between the subjects, the strength of their ‘solidarity’ 
would decrease. This reasoning is even more plausible considering the horizontal 
relationship between sovereign states. Yet, the following section will demonstrate that 
the concept of solidarity did indeed find its way into public international law and will 
show how it materialised. 
 
Just as the structure of international law has been changing over time,487 so has the role 
solidarity is playing here. This evolution has led to the realisation that international law 
has moved from a mere ‘law of coexistence’ to a ‘law of cooperation.’488 However, 
this rather simplified view ignores that most areas of international law are still ruled by 
the regime of coexistence; while in some specific fields cooperation has grown into 
something even bigger – institutionalised solidarity. These distinct realities have been 
described as ‘islands of cooperation’489 in an ocean of coexistence and ‘islands of 
solidarity’490 in an ocean of cooperation. Where, then, can we find ‘islands of 
solidarity;’ how did they evolve; and is solidarity in international law actually more 
than just a catchword in need of concretisation? 
Law is supposed to be applied to all of its subjects without discrimination – ultimately 
treating like cases alike and enabling dissimilar cases to be distinguished from each 
other. While governments constantly disagree on what exactly constitutes relevant 
differences, differentiation is a widely accepted practice in international negotiations – 
i.e. with contextual and differential obligations.491 
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Norms are ‘contextual’ when they provide for obligations which are on their face 
identical for all states, yet their application takes into account varying characteristics of 
the countries.492 The most prominent example here may be the notion of ‘equitable and 
reasonable utilisation’ discussed in the previous chapter. By allowing for weighing and 
balancing, contextual norms seem to be easier to agree on, but lack any certainty in the 
outcome. The vagueness of the provisions regularly leads to intense arguments about 
compliance and noncompliance. 
 
In contrast, ‘differential’ norms provide for apparently different, in most of the cases 
also more beneficial, standards for one group of states compared to the others.493 One 
example is the allowance for delayed compliance in the Montreal Protocol, where 
developing countries are entitled to postpone the phasing-out of certain ozone 
depleting substances for ten years.494 The following sections provide an overview of 
how international law is trying to implement the concept of solidarity. 
 
4.2.1 Linking Solidarity with Principles of International Law 
The concept of solidarity finds expression in erga omnes obligations, which have been 
established through an orbiter dictum by the ICJ in 1970 in the Barcelona Traction 
case.495 Here, the Court made clear that a ‘[…] an essential distinction should be 
drawn between the obligations of a state towards the international community as a 
whole, and those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. 
By their very nature the former are the concern of all states. In view of the importance 
of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection; 
they are obligations erga omnes.’496 Examples of this category include the outlawing 
of acts of aggression and of genocide, and the protection from slavery and racial 
discrimination,497 and the concept is now claimed to be solidly grounded in modern 
international law.498 
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While both erga omnes and solidarity are often being challenged due to their content-
related vagueness, their link may shine a light on their significance in international 
law.499 It is periodically stated that violations of obligations erga omnes can be 
sanctioned or brought before the ICJ by any other state. This in turn would tie a strong 
bond of solidarity around the international community – transforming it into an 
inseparable ‘community of fate.’500 In the realm of common interests, every state 
would be obliged to remind the wrongdoing member of society of its going astray and, 
if necessary, call on the ICJ – without the requirement of any individual interest of the 
plaintiff in the matter; and giving no effect to the argument of state sovereignty of the 
defendant. While this seems to be an appealing theoretical construct, it does not 
describe the actual reality of enforcement under international law. As Bruno Simma 
stated correctly, ‘[v]iewed realistically, the world of obligations erga omnes is still the 
world of the ‘ought’ than of the ‘is;’ the concept marks the direction in which 
international law will have to move rather than a clear course already steered today.’501 
However, given the pace at which not only the international society, but also 
international law is evolving, we should not close our minds to further research on how 
this concept can play a role in achieving water security. One prominent example is the 
quite forward looking reasoning by Judge Weeramantry in his separate opinion in the 
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Case, where he argues that ‘sustainable development’ has to be 
regarded as an obligation erga omnes.502 
 
While the acceptance of the concept can be regarded as universal, most scholars tend 
to water down their examination of obligations erga omnes by merely referring to 
linked concepts which are more straightforward to analyse.503 In addition, one can 
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observe the tendency to minimise the debate about the concept to the, beyond doubt 
important, element of solidarity; without showing the same attention for another 
feature of erga omnes obligations – universality, i.e. all states, without exception, are 
bound by them. This shortcoming is all the more unfortunate, since universality seems 
to be incompatible with the our current structure of ‘international society’ – comprised 
of sovereign states on a consensual basis – which in turn raises a fundamental 
theoretical dilemma.504 The result of the rather incomplete discourse is that the concept 
of erga omnes remains for the most part ‘very mysterious indeed.’505 For the purpose 
of this section, however, it may suffice to conclude that obligations erga omnes have a 
moral foundation – one which is based on solidarity. 
 
The most apparent manifestation of solidarity between nations can be found in the 
realm of development assistance. Here, in recent decades a process of concretisation 
took place by which the formerly spontaneously expressed demonstrations of solidarity 
initiated the formation of some legal principles.506 While there is (still) no legal right to 
development aid, the UN General Assembly set a standard that – at least indirectly – 
applies pressure on those states that are better off. Already back in 1970, the target was 
set to spend 0.7 percent of GDP on aid for developing countries. However, only few 
states kept their promise. Most countries are far away from reaching this goal anytime 
soon, with an average rate of 0.23 percent in 2002, while still endorsing it.507 This does 
not speak for the effectiveness of ‘solidarity’ in the area of development assistance. In 
fact, the international law of development aid did fail not least because here the 
concept of solidarity has been exploited and strained.508 It has been stretched beyond 
its limit because one-way foreign aid only reinforced the dependencies of the past, 
which in turn caused a demanding attitude which became unquenchable. Further, it has 
been misused in the way that it promoted financial aid instead of a much more 
sustainable approach of pushing for true integration of developing countries into the 
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global economy.509 It is this disregard for one of the fundamental principles of public 
international law – the sovereign equality of states – which caused the failure of 
effective incorporation of solidarity into development aid law. In this sense, measures 
of solidarity should not create or reinforce dependencies; instead they have to 
overcome the hierarchy prevalent in the international community, and promote a future 
of political independence and economic self-sufficiency.510 
 
In the realm of international humanitarian law, solidarity has to be considered a 
mainstay. Again, the principle of reciprocity only takes limited effect. Contrary to the 
law of war, which focuses on imposing mutual restrictions, here the main goal is to 
further develop a humanitarian standard;511 which has been recognised as a legal 
principle by the ICJ in the Nicaragua Case.512 It is this realisation which explains that 
the principles of humanitarian law have been applied in cases of civil war as well, 
despite the fact that they are primarily directed at international armed conflicts.513 
From an ethical point of view this surely is a welcome development; its dogmatic 
derivation and reasoning are, however, questionable.514 
 
Another sub-discipline of international law conceptually close to humanitarian law is 
refugee law, which came into being in the face of the humanitarian disaster following 
World War II and the subsequent flows of refugees caused by mass expulsions. While 
the 1951 UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees515 did not live up to the 
expectations in addressing this catastrophe, since it merely includes the principle of 
non-refoulement, several enactments of national legislation go beyond this standard by 
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including an actual right of asylum.516 During the last decades, the set of problems 
surrounding refugees has changed dramatically. The international community is now 
also confronted with high numbers of economic migrants,517 internally displaced 
persons518 and environmental migrants.519 Refugees and internally displaced persons 
(IDPs) have tripled in the last 30 years.520 The United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) reported a total of 42 million forcibly displaced people at the end 
of 2008 – this includes 15.2 million refugees, 827,000 asylum-seekers (pending cases) 
and 26 million internally displaced people.521 
 
The latter category has found special treatment in the African Union Convention for 
the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa.522 While the 
Convention has not yet entered into force and is only a regional framework, its 
implications for the concept of solidarity in international law are nevertheless 
noteworthy, as it calls upon states – for the first time – to recognise the rights of 
internally displaced persons to humanitarian assistance, and defines the obligations 
states as well as armed groups have towards the protection of uprooted citizens.523 
Remarkable furthermore is that the Convention not only applies to those put in danger 
by armed conflict, but also natural disasters.524 However, given the magnitude of 
humanitarian disaster caused by the recent uprising in various North African states, 
questions about the level of solidarity in the international society and its effective 
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implementation of international legal frameworks remain – not only in this particular 
region. Whose responsibility is it to protect displaced people when their home country 
no longer wants to? What is the role of the broader international community in 
assuring such migrants protection when their respective home nation refuses to do so? 
How to overcome the ‘shield of sovereignty’ in order to pursue the greater good of 
solidarity? 
 
While the definition of a refugee according to the UN High Commissioner on 
Refugees does not include the environment as a reason to flee,525 the issues linked to 
environmental migrants will only grow in complexity and significance. The number of 
such ‘refugees’ has been estimated to be 25 million people,526 with the UN projecting 
the numbers to increase to 50 million by 2020.527 These massive figures alone deserve 
a debate about broadening the UNHCR’s mandate to ‘persons of concern’ and the 
nature and scope of the international refugee regime in general.528 The term 
‘environmental refugees’ was first popularised by Lester Brown,529 founder of the 
Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute, and has been defined as ‘persons 
who no longer gain a secure livelihood in their traditional homelands because of what 
are primarily environmental factors of unusual scope.’530 While the concept as such 
has been heavily criticised for being vaguely defined, legally irrelevant and rather 
confusing,531 migration due to factors like water scarcity, land and water by toxic 
wastes, flooding, over pumping of depleted aquifers and rising sea levels is already a 
widespread phenomenon which demonstrates quite vividly that the changes in the 
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earth’s physical conditions are heavily impacting regional peace and security.532 This 
is why more and more scholars are calling on the international community to properly 
address what they consider to be one of today’s most crucial governance needs – the 
issue of so-called ‘climate refugees.’ Global environmental change will affect the lives 
of millions of people all over the world, forcing them to leave their homes and to seek 
refuge elsewhere – a crisis which will most likely surpass all previously known 
refugee crises.533 It is this area which will test how seriously the international 
community is taking the cry for greater solidarity and which concrete steps it will 
implement in order to make the international refugee regime future-proof.534 
 
4.2.2 Solidarity in International Environmental Law 
The concept of solidarity shares a close link with international environmental law – in 
particular with the notion of sustainable development.535 This paradigm evolved 
through efforts to simultaneously factor in concerns regarding socio-economic 
development and the protection of the environment – as an attempt to address the 
constantly changing perception of the environment vs. economic activity dilemma.536 
While there is general agreement about the value of ‘sustainable development’ as an 
overarching framework, there is still strong disagreement about its specifics and 
implications. Policy-makers have long tried to overcome the environment/development 
conundrum by treating the parties differently. The underlying expectation of such a 
differentiation is that it will lead to equity; which is vital for any international 
agreement in order to be perceived as fair, and thus, ultimately, become self-enforcing. 
The international community has attempted to solve this puzzle with the concept of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (CBDR) – which arose during the New 
International Economic Order (NIEO) period in the area of international economic law 
and is increasingly being recognised in international law.537 
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The main objective of CBDR is to differentiate (mostly) between developed and 
developing countries in defining the degree of each state's responsibility to address a 
certain environmental problem; i.e. the management of a risk related public good (e.g., 
climate, ozone layer, peace, public health).538 Therefore, it has become a touchstone 
for the equity debate in international environmental law.539 Since the various 
competing perceptions of equity are the main obstacle to progress in international 
climate change negotiations, it is necessary to know exactly what the concept of 
CBDR implies. Although the term CBDR is quite recent, implementing differentiated 
responsibilities in international treaties is not. The Treaty of Versailles (1919) was the 
first one recognising that differences make uniformity difficult. Another prominent 
example is the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) which allows for 
‘differential and more favourable’ treatment.540 However, it is the area of international 
environmental law which has been proved the most fruitful for the adaption of non-
uniform obligations. The so-called modern era of international environmental law can 
be traced back to the UN Conference on the Human Environment held in 1972 at 
Stockholm. Here, one could witness a deep divide between developing and 
industrialised countries. While developing states focused on the developmental needs 
of their countries, the already industrialised nations were urged to develop some kind 
of global environmental ethic.541 This dissonance was apparently resolved with a 
compromise enshrined in the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on the Human 
Environment.542 
 
On the one hand, the preamble acknowledged that environmental protection was a 
‘major issue’ and the ‘urgent desire of the peoples of the whole world and the duty of 
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all governments.’543 It further states that ‘[t]he environment should be handled in a 
cooperative spirit by all countries on an equal footing.’544 On the other hand, in 
keeping with the developing countries' focus on development, a distinction was made 
between the ‘pollution of poverty’ (caused by lack of financial resources) and the 
‘pollution of affluence’ (originating from rapid industrialisation).545 This is why the 
Preamble of the Stockholm Declaration reads: ‘[I]n the developing countries most of 
the environmental problems are caused by underdevelopment [...] [t]he developing 
countries must direct their efforts to development, bearing in mind their priorities and 
the need to safeguard and improve the environment [...] [and] the industrialized 
countries should make efforts to reduce the gap between themselves and the 
developing countries.’ 
 
Further, the ‘state sovereignty over natural resources’ principle also strikes a balance 
between national sovereignty and environmental responsibility: ‘States have, in 
accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of international 
law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources pursuant to their own 
environmental policies, and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of 
areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’546 These wordings point out that the 
link between environment and development supported by the developing countries was 
increasingly being recognised. Consequently, the next environmental conference was 
entitled the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), held in 1992 
at the Rio Earth Summit. Twenty years after Stockholm, the dissonance between 
developing and industrialised countries was no weaker. The developed nations tried to 
emphasise the threat of global environmental issues, seen as a result of affluence, 
whereas the developing countries focused on local issues, thought to be caused by 
poverty.547 While the industrialised world traced the degradation of the global 
environment back to population growth in the developing world, developing countries 
blamed it on the consumption levels of industrialised states.548 The resulting Rio 
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Declaration again tried to balance between these competing claims.549 Whilst some of 
the adopted key principles are in favour of the developed countries' position (e.g., 
polluter pays principle and precautionary approach), others tried to meet the 
requirements of developing countries (e.g., right to development, poverty alleviation 
and the recognition of common but differentiated responsibilities).550 
 
Although both conferences, Stockholm and Rio, tried to resolve the quandary between 
environment and development, the approach of Rio is somehow novel, as a shift from 
international environmental law to the international law of sustainable development 
can be noticed.551 The most notable indicator of change is the slightly different 
wording of the principle regarding a state's sovereignty over natural resources. 
Recalling that the Stockholm Declaration recognised the sovereign right of states ‘to 
exploit their own resources pursuant to their own environmental policies,’552 the Rio 
Declaration grants the sovereign right of states ‘to exploit their own resources pursuant 
to their own environmental and developmental policies.’553 This demonstrates quite 
clearly that the boundaries between environmental and developmental law are floating; 
and that both areas are now enclosed in the sphere of international law of sustainable 
development.554 Further, Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration stipulates the ‘right to 
development’ which has to take into account the developmental and environmental 
needs of present and future generations; while Principle 7 points out that industrialised 
countries bear a responsibility in the international pursuit of sustainable development, 
and that ‘in view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, 
states have common but differentiated responsibilities.’ It was the first time the notion 
of CBDR found its way into an international document. But what exactly is meant by 
‘common but differentiated’ responsibilities? 
 
It has been stated earlier that global environmental problems need common actions to 
address them. It is beyond debate that an international agreement aimed at addressing a 
common concern of humankind fails to accomplish its goal if it does not involve the 
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whole international community.555 Just like solidarity is a basic moral pillar of 
peaceful relations among states, states are also expected to cooperate on issues of 
common concern.556 This is even more the case since formerly domestic concerns 
(e.g., forestry) became international ones (function as carbon sinks). 
 
Yet, universal participation faces a major handicap: lack of resources of developing 
countries. Due to the fact that they need to channel all of their resources towards the 
alleviation of poverty, developing states do not have the same ability to address 
environmental problems as their industrialised counterparts.557 This rationale was also 
implemented in the Rio Declaration which states that ‘[t]he special situation and needs 
of developing countries [...] shall be given special priority.’558 Thus, their lower 
financial and institutional capabilities justify differentiation within the area of 
international environmental law. Another argument for differentiation is the different 
level of culpability, since not all countries contributed equally to global environmental 
degradation.559 Acknowledging that industrialised nations have done most of the 
polluting, developing countries should be given leeway in environmental policies. 
These three domains of CBDR – need, capability and responsibility – can be directly 
traced back to the three principles of equity. 
 
4.2.2.1 Differential treatment under the climate regime 
For the first time in international environmental law, the concept of CBDR was made 
the explicit basis for the different commitments of developed and developing states in 
the UNFCCC.560 Here, the already established concept was implemented with the new 
term of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities.’ Based on its notion, the 
UNFCCC entails a balance of commitments between states by stating that ‘[t]he 
parties should protect the climate system [...] on the basis of equity and in accordance 
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities.’561 CBDR as 
codified by the UNFCCC is backed by the so-called ‘leadership principle,’ implying 
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that developed nations must lead the way in tackling global warming by subjecting 
themselves to stringent emission cuts; and transferring technology and financial 
resources to the needy developing countries allowing them to also address the issue.562 
 
Although the UNFCCC also includes other concepts and principles – like 
intergenerational equity, the precautionary principle and the right to sustainable 
development – these principles only have a guiding role; yet with some legal effect, as 
they are relevant for interpreting, implementing and developing the Convention 
further.563 Hence, CBDR can be regarded as the prime concept the UNFCCC follows. 
This is why under the Convention, developing countries assumed no obligations to 
stabilise their emissions, only reporting obligations, and they should receive financial 
assistance and technology transfers from the industrialised world.564 The first 
Conference of Parties concluded with the Berlin Mandate stating that the negotiation 
process for a future protocol shall be guided by, inter alia, Article 3(1) UNFCCC – i.e. 
the concept of CBDR.565 This process lead to the Kyoto Protocol which contains 
CBDR in its most rigid form. Article 10 reaffirms the concept ‘without introducing any 
new commitments for parties not included in Annex I.’566 Developing countries have 
again successfully hesitated to limit aspects of their contribution to climate change, 
because they feared that binding emission targets would infringe on their state 
sovereignty.567 They also succeeded in arguing that any limitations on their greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emissions would irrevocably damage their economies.568 Consequently, 
only the industrialised countries were bound by strict GHG limitations. The concept of 
CBDR was implemented within the climate change regime through differential norms 
of two categories. First, under the ‘leadership principle,’ industrialised nations must 
lead the way in fighting climate change. In order to set an example, developed states 
are obliged to agree on GHG stabilisation in the atmosphere before developing states 
are asked to do so.569 The same reasoning is true for providing funds. That is why the 
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leadership principle constitutes a differential norm of contribution.570 Since developing 
countries do not face any binding emissions reduction obligations while developed 
states do, this can be described as differential norms of compliance. Hence, the 
international effort to tackle climate change is based on norms that are differentiated in 
both compliance and contribution. 
 
4.2.2.2 The boundaries of common but differentiated responsibilities 
The reasoning behind the concept of CBDR it is the ‘tragedy of the climate.’ 
Proponents argue that equal treatment is neither equitable nor politically feasible, since 
developing countries would never enter into international environmental agreements 
that do not bear in mind the differences between states.571 However, the fruitlessness 
of the current climate regime calls for a critical assessment of CBDR, because until 
today, it has not produced the results hoped for. The question arises whether the 
morally noble idea of differentiation in obligations to mitigate emissions really helps to 
achieve the goal of the UNFCCC? 
 
The main flaw of CBDR is the entailed ‘downgrading’ of environmental issues in the 
legal discourse.572 The underlying goal of UNFCCC is to prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system.573 Yet, instead of pushing the 
development of a low carbon world economy forward, it squanders away time by 
continuously discussing what exactly is meant by ‘common but differentiated,’ and 
who should take what action in order to fulfil his obligations. The heavy focus on 
economic distinctions completely ignores the severity of the threat of climate 
change.574 This demotion of the environment has been made visible by the change of 
wording of the principle regarding a state’s sovereignty over natural resources, as 
noted above. The added developmental domain takes account of the emerging 
principle of ‘sustainable development;’ however, this concept has yet to prove its 
effectiveness in international environmental law. The resulting downgrading, however, 
is jeopardising the protection of the global climate system since developing countries 
are already outpacing the developed ones in terms of growth. 
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Thus, CBDR can be regarded as a perfect distraction from the real issue that needs to 
be addressed – climate change. It seems like many governments somehow ‘hide’ 
behind the concept of CBDR to delay meaningful policies. Instead of demanding bold 
and timely action, negotiations focus on the various perceptions of equity and what 
exactly is meant by ‘differentiated responsibilities.’ Hence, governments are able to 
play for time and hang on to their specific national interests and the derived notions of 
equity.575  
 
The absence of binding uniform obligations to reduce GHG emissions will encourage 
the economies of developing countries to proceed on their path of unsustainable 
development. Hence, the precedence of national economic development issues over 
(inter)national measures to tackle climate change will certainly cause the global 
community to miss the goal of the UNFCCC.576 
 
Another shortcoming of CBDR within the climate change arena is the fixing of 
negotiation blocs. Until the grouping of states is based on objective criteria, it will 
remain purely political.577 What is the sense in treating countries as different as Mali 
and Brazil equally? Although bargaining as one united group, the fixing of the ‘Annex 
I’ / ‘non-Annex I’ classification of the UNFCCC obscures the real differences between 
the various countries.578 The result is that international negotiations lead to suboptimal 
results, and thus are more costly than necessary. 
 
Furthermore, CBDR’s notion on intergenerational equity is contradictory. The 
differentiation between developed and developing countries is quite questionable, 
since here ‘late-developers’ are actually compensated by the forerunners for the 
foregone developmental opportunities.579 Obviously, this makes sense on the basis of 
the equitable principle of responsibility, since industrialised states enjoyed free access 
to the global commons ‘atmosphere.’ However, this historical responsibility is not 
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straightforward. Developing countries today have to operate in a climate constrained 
world, leaving the forerunners indeed better off. Yet, developing countries also benefit 
from the achievements attained by the forerunners – e.g., the higher level of 
technological and scientific development. It is impossible to make an accurate 
comparison between the benefits of developing and industrialised countries; 
discussions about the extent of historical responsibilities will be endless.580 Further, if 
developing countries are allowed to pursue an unrestricted development path, the 
whole reasoning of historical responsibilities would be reduced to absurdity, since 
today’s developing countries would become tomorrow’s irresponsible polluters. 
 
An efficient long-term framework on climate change cannot be built upon differential 
obligations, since they are bound to be problematic in future. Just like the global 
environment is by no means static, the international economic order, and thus the 
balance of power in international politics, is also changing. Consequently, 
differentiated obligations have to be renegotiated again and again once the formerly 
agreed framework appears ‘unfair.’ The costs of such an approach will be immense.581 
Since the differentiated emission targets for developed countries were not based on a 
specific formula but rather on political ‘power games,’ it can be assumed that 
negotiations among developed and developing countries on the issue of distributing the 
burdens of mitigating climate change risk will be even more complex.582 
 
4.2.2.3 The legal status of the ‘principle’ 
In order to be in a position to rethink the concept of CBDR, it is essential to identify its 
legal status, and thus its flexibility. If it can be recognised as a principle of customary 
international law, its further development might be much more constrained than in the 
case of less stringent legal implications. Principle 7 of the 1992 Rio Declaration 
enshrines that 
‘[s]tates shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect 
and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem. In view of the 
different contributions to global environmental degradation, states have 
common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries 
acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit to 
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sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the 
global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they 
command.’583 
The first sentence has to be analysed separately to the rest of the provision, since it 
merely points to the principle of cooperation.584 The core of Principle 7 can be found 
in the following two sentences. While the notion of ‘common responsibilities’ actually 
coincides with the principle of cooperation, ‘differentiated responsibilities’ takes into 
account the varying levels of contribution to the particular environmental problem and 
each state's ability to prevent or mitigate the threat.585 The result is: environmental 
policies that differ in the obligations of individual states. In consequence, CBDR does 
not qualify as a rule of international law but rather as a principle acting as a base from 
which subsequent rules can emerge.586 This is due to the fact that only rules are 
applicable in an ‘all-or-nothing’ fashion; whereas principles contain a dimension of 
‘weight or importance.’587 
 
So, does CBDR then qualify as a legal principle? Although the notion of CBDR has 
been adopted in various conventions and declarations, it is difficult to argue that it has 
acquired customary law status.588 The reason for that is the rather ambiguous term of 
‘responsibility.’ It can hardly be argued that it entails an unconditional obligation to 
take action.589 Further, CBDR does not provide for the needed opinio juris to qualify 
as customary international law; since there exist numerous contrary definitions of its 
content and its legal obligations.590  
 
However, the concept of CBDR still has a certain ‘legal gravitas’ which can be 
assigned to that of ‘twilight norms;’ it is more authoritative than soft law but also 
definitely less authoritative than customary international law.591 Even soft law, which 
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contains non-legal concepts such as policies, has a normative quality in political and 
moral domains.592 This is why ideas like CBDR (another example would be 
‘sustainable development’) should be evaluated in the light of their normative potential 
rather than focusing on their current legal status.593 However, the fact that it has not 
achieved the status of customary international law provides the flexibility to critically 
assess, rethink, and develop the concept further.594 
 
4.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has demonstrated in which ways the concept of solidarity has already 
been integrated into norms of international law. The disciplines of development law, 
international humanitarian law and refugee law represent the natural turf for the 
‘substantive’ development of solidarity rules – even though they are, at times, far from 
being perfect. In the realm of international environmental law, the concept of common 
but differentiated responsibilities has tried to prove itself as a powerful tool towards 
the clarification and future development of the principle of solidarity – yet, it falls 
short on various grounds. 
 
The indisputably highest degree of juridification of ‘solidarity’ can be found in the UN 
Charter, where the purpose of the United Nations is described to include the 
maintenance of international peace and security.595 This, however, leaves much to be 
discussed regarding the actual procedures which should flow from such a high aim. In 
its ‘procedural’ sense, solidarity focuses on secondary rules. Differentiated 
responsibilities can be found in both international environmental and trade law. The 
chapter also examined relevant legal frameworks linking state responsibility with the 
concept of solidarity – e.g., the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 
GATT, UNFCCC. Since the principle of solidarity is operating across several fields of 
international law and strives to protect fundamental values of the international 
community by penetrating both primary and secondary rules, it has even been claimed 
to have reached ‘constitutional status.’596 
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Due to its nature, solidarity is often referred to as a value-driven principle with a strong 
ethical underpinning.597 This foundation ensures that hydrosolidarity can help frame 
the negotiations between riparians of a transboundary watercourse and challenge 
inequity in the form of abusive hydro-hegemony. However, this can only be achieved 
if states are willing to follow this path. Hence, if hydroegoism continues to define 
hydropolitics in a particular region, the idea of hydrosolidarity might be a noble one; 
but one without vigorous effect. The moral principle of (hydro)solidarity can only 
facilitate such a required change, and thus challenge the self-interests of states, by 
allowing international law to play a more prominent role. As argued above, 
international law contains several examples of instances where solidarity already 
heavily influences actions of states pursuant to a common interest. International law 
can induce the orderly change the international society needs to effectively address the 
world water crisis – and ultimately sustain peace and security. In order to do so, 
however, the legal regime itself needs to undergo a process of refinement. International 
(water) law is often being seen as counterproductive when it comes to solving 
transboundary problems, as it is being said to be re-active rather than setting a path 
towards peaceful and sustainable management of natural resources. 
 
Together, these core legal requirements of water security – availability, access, 
adaptability and ambit – require reviewing established paradigms; including some of 
the most fundamental tenets of international law, such as state sovereignty.598 Hence, 
what is desperately needed is a way out of the environment-sovereignty-conundrum. 
At some point, international law may ‘focus on preserving the collective rights of the 
community of states, as co-stewards of our planet.’599 How the path into this future 
solidarity in international water law could look like is addressed in the following 
chapter. 
 
 
5 REGIONAL COMMON CONCERN – THE LEGAL FOUNDATION FOR COMMON WATER 
SECURITY 
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After having established that hydrosolidarity is a useful concept in the attempt to 
improve global water security, but that the lack of normativity is impeding its 
widespread implementation, the question arises how international law can best support 
hydrosolidarity in order to strengthen water security? Detailed consideration of this 
question will have broad implications for other areas of international law, since it 
addresses a fundamental struggle of international governance – the ‘clash between the 
idealistic ambitions of environmentalists and the harsh reality of international 
diplomacy.’600 This challenge, again, sits within the wider debate of how to build a 
fairer world order. An ethical concept, such as the concept of hydrosolidarity, not only 
poses critical questions within the realm of philosophy and politics; it also constantly 
challenges the set system of responsibilities in the international arena. Are the 
frameworks governing the world order still fit for the task of maintaining international 
peace and security?601 Does the new geopolitical landscape with its new emerging 
powers (like China and India) demand that the international legal system be upended? 
With its focus on legal norms and institutions, international law can provide a path for 
the implementation of concepts which address questions of what is right or good and 
shine a light on potential hurdles along the way.602 However, international law needs to 
better reflect the differing cultural norms in providing this framework. 
 
Today, the most significant challenges for states are likely to emerge from 
international or even global threats – like, nuclear proliferation, economic instability, 
diseases, climate change and water security.603 In a world which is shaped by the 
constantly changing forces of globalisation, the face of new transboundary threats and 
complex security challenges highlight the fact that the level of interdependence 
between states causes nations to depend even more on the cooperation of others to 
protect their own national security interests.604 This reality has long been 
acknowledged and brought about the conviction that none of these complex threats can 
be addressed by any one country alone – not even by the most powerful ones. 
Compared to the seriousness of the quest, however, the results in terms of international 
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cooperation with regard to the management of natural resources are surprisingly 
meagre.605 ‘And certainly it will be more difficult at the international level than at 
national levels of decision-making. So locked are we within our tribal units, so 
possessive over national rights, so suspicious of any extension of international 
authority, that we may fail to sense the need for dedicated and committed action over 
the whole field of planetary necessities.’606 
 
It is true that we have witnessed the development of the new major fields of 
international environmental law and policy since the UN Conference on the Human 
Environment in 1972, which has triggered the development of new forms of 
international governance, like the various conferences of parties (COPs) to multilateral 
conventions. Since the early 21st century the politicisation of international 
environmental problems has been complemented by a process of securitisation (see 
Chapter 2), which declared selected global challenges (e.g., climate change) as 
political issues of utmost priority which were deemed to require extraordinary 
measures – including security measures.607 These developments gave rise to ‘global 
environmentalism,’ which has had a persisting impact on international relations.608 
This is evident in the various ways solutions for environmental concerns have been 
woven into the normative fabric of international society.609 Yet, there are indications 
that, despite these efforts, we are approaching our planetary boundaries at an 
increasing pace, jeopardising our natural life support systems.610 This continuing 
negative trend points to the fact that the gap between political talk and cooperative 
action on international environmental issues is immense.611 It becomes obvious that 
both scope and depth of international cooperation have to be intensified to effectively 
address the pressing issues of transboundary, regional and sometimes global 
dimensions. Given the fact that even one of the most powerful and best joined up 
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global institutional system – finance – is struggling to guarantee financial stability,612 it 
seems as if some of the existing international institutions are unfit for the tasks of the 
21st century. Which role can international law play in bringing about the desperately 
needed transformation towards cooperation which fully comprehends the complexities 
of the security challenges ahead?  
 
At the heart of the criticism of the international legal order lies the concept of 
sovereignty. It has often been seen as a hindrance to achieving truly joint management 
of natural resources, rather than a way out of state-centrism. This has been particularly 
true for disciplines other than law.613 However, even international lawyers have been 
rather critical of the concept, as some perceive it as a ‘narrow, ethnocentric way to 
think about the relations of human beings.’614 This makes one of the fundamental 
tenets of international law also one of its highly charged notions. With regard to the 
global water crisis, the concept of ‘hydrosolidarity’ is trying to bring states together to 
effectively tackle their shared challenges in transboundary water resources 
management. In order to be successful, to overcome the self-centred approach in water 
interaction (hydroegoism), the concept needs normative strength. Since state-centrism 
is the water security challenge, the question now arises, how international water law 
can help overcome the prevalent thinking – and acting – in nationalistic terms when it 
comes to transboundary water management? If this endeavour proves to be feasible, 
hydrosolidarity could be more than a mere theoretical construct as it is often perceived 
– it could actually be achieved more widely in practice. 
 
5.1 The Changing Landscape of International Law 
The orthodox understanding of international law is based on the ‘Westphalian’ order, 
which is organised around the concept of the sovereign state as the supreme political 
and legal driver in international affairs.615 Hence, the sovereignty of each state is at the 
core of our current perception of public international law.616 It injects order and 
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stability into international relations, since all nations, regardless of their political 
power or size, are considered to be independent of all other nations and exercise 
sovereign control over their population, their diplomatic affairs and their territory. This 
principle is enshrined within the Charter of the UN which states that the UN ‘[i]s based 
on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its members;’617 and that ‘[a]ll 
members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force 
against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.’618 Further 
elements describing what exactly is meant by sovereign equality were specified in the 
UN Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation among States.619 Accordingly, states are legally equal; enjoy territorial 
integrity and political independence; have a right to determine their own political, 
social, economic and cultural systems; and do not have the right to intervene, directly 
or indirectly, for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs of any other 
state.620 The principle of sovereignty consists of three basic domains: (1) a state is 
‘nationally independent’ to freely decide on its relations with other states; (2) it has the 
‘internal autonomy’ to determine the character of its own governance; (3) each state 
has the ‘territorial integrity’ to control activities within its own territory.621 
 
The perception of sovereignty has always been in flux. In the 16th and 17th centuries it 
was understood as an ‘absolute and perpetual power of a state,’622 limited only by 
divine and natural law. After the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the independence of 
states was limited by higher principles – like the obligation to defend and protect the 
peace between nations – and religion. Later, sovereignty was interpreted as an absolute 
and unlimited supreme right. Here, war was seen as a legitimate tool for the realisation 
of a nation’s own national interest (ius ad bellum) – yet with some limitations during 
war; such as the continuation of diplomatic means (ius in bello).623 Hegel also 
understood sovereignty as absolute independence and freedom; and the relationship 
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between nations as one determined by morals, rather than by law.624 Since the 
establishment of the League of Nations and, later, the United Nations, the principle is 
being interpreted as limited independence which is the result of international law, 
rather than being in opposition to it. In a famous ruling from 1922, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice (PCIJ) stated that ‘[t]he question whether a certain matter 
is or is not solely within the jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it 
depends upon the development of international relations.’625 Thus, it seems reasonable 
to believe that the principle of sovereignty as such is (and to some extent always has 
been) a relative matter which depends on the particular circumstances in each 
particular case. This development becomes apparent when analysing the historical 
impact of international water law on the various allocation theories.626 Being limited 
from above by international law, from the side by the concept of good neighbourliness 
and from below by human rights, it only seems to grow in complexity as the various 
processes of globalisation shape the global legal and political landscape.627 
 
Today, the inequalities between states and their socio-economic and ecological 
interdependences yield critical challenges to contemporary international 
cooperation.628 In the realm of environmental cooperation, for example, this has long 
raised the fear among many that  
‘a world of states, each with its own self-serving rendering of historical 
experience and bolstered by deeply ingrained traditions of sovereignty, 
varying material circumstances, and wildly uneven perceptions of the 
character and seriousness of different types of environmental harm, [is] 
structurally incapable of meeting the ecological challenge.’629  
This view holds that sovereign states seem to be unable to address global 
environmental challenges, as the prevalent behaviour of states reflects the sole pursuit 
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of their own national interests.630 Hence, preservation of the nation-state autonomy 
seems to be of more value than the protection of the global environment. This is even 
more problematic when it comes to shared watercourses, since watercourses ignore 
political boundaries. Therefore, the concept of absolute national sovereignty, which 
attempts to uphold the primacy of sovereignty without regard to the reality of the 
hydrological cycle, is ill-conceived and simply unworkable.631 
 
Yet, while it is true that the world is still facing large scale and detrimental 
environmental challenges, the international community has, at least to some extent, 
shown collective effort in the forms of dialogue, negotiations and legal regimes 
tackling the global environmental crisis.632 What, then, is the relationship between 
sovereignty and cooperation on environmental issues – and how is sovereignty to be 
understood in order to achieve ‘common water security’? Does the model of the state 
system of Westphalia constitute the inescapable limit of how we design any future 
form of international community? 
 
5.1.1 Sovereignty: The Eroding Principle of International Law? 
Many scholars have rehearsed a moral case against sovereignty, since, in their view, it 
is being used to uphold egocentric interests of only few communities against the 
common interests of the world at large,633 providing vast opportunities for internal 
oppression – also referred to as ‘organised hypocrisy.’634 A country claiming that a 
particular issue is merely a matter of its domestic jurisdiction sometimes refers to the 
norm of non-intervention, enshrined in Article 2(7) of the UN Charter, which states 
that ‘[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state 
[…].’635 This tactic is often interpreted as a strategy to hide from vocal, and sometimes 
well-founded, international criticism. However, there is no agreed understanding as to 
what actually falls under ‘matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state.’ 
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The limitations on how the community of states can act in situations of clear breaches 
of international law have long been criticised.636 This is why a revised concept of 
national sovereignty has been proposed; one which gives the international community 
the power to act in situations of state fragility and misconduct. Arguably, the main 
developments with regard to trying to limit the ‘non-intervention’ norm can be 
witnessed in the area of military interventions. One group of scholars suggests that 
sovereignty should depend on a state’s ability to prove its commitment to a set of 
conditions established by an outside authority.637 This notion of ‘contingent 
sovereignty’ promotes a policy of military intervention which is based on a 
predetermined set of criteria – e.g., humanitarian concerns. By arguing that serious 
breaches of human rights justify a military intervention by foreign powers, violations 
of the norms of territorial integrity and non-intervention are being vindicated and the 
supremacy of the principle of sovereignty is being brought into question.638 The 
apparent conflict between the norm of non-intervention and moral considerations still 
divides ‘Western’ nations from those of the South and East. Following the NATO 
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, the then UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, argued 
that the international community needs to ‘forge unity behind the principle that 
massive and systematic violations of human rights – wherever they take place – should 
never be allowed to stand.’639 However, it has to be noted that the concept of 
contingent sovereignty is still in an embryonic state and has not been codified in 
international law. 
 
The doctrine of ‘responsibility to protect’ (R2P) builds, to a large extent, on the ideas 
of contingency as it draws from the understanding that sovereignty not only constitutes 
a right, but also bears a responsibility.640 In 2001, the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) published a report on R2P, which aimed to 
answer the question when (and how) the international community should respond to 
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humanitarian crises and crimes against humanity?641 The report attracted widespread 
attention – mainly for the central proposition that there is indeed a duty of the 
international community to act in cases of serious violations of human rights. In order 
to stress the fact that unilateral action is not advocated, it argues that it is actually a 
duty of the UN to take the appropriate measures.642 In 2005, R2P was adopted by the 
UN General Assembly at the World Summit, stating that  
‘[e]ach individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from 
genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. This 
responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community 
should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise this 
responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning 
capability.’643  
Since then, proponents of the concept have called to apply R2P to justify various 
military interventions – for example, in 2008 in Burma where military force was 
deemed necessary by the foreign minister of France, Bernard Kouchner, to allow 
humanitarian aid into the country.644 In 2011, with the United Nations Security 
Council Resolution 1973, the international community invoked R2P for the first time 
by military means.645 This action taken by the UN Security Council has been 
interpreted by many proponents of the doctrine as a further step towards the demise of 
sovereignty.646 Yet, the debate about the morality, legality and legitimacy of 
humanitarian interventions did not end with the application of R2P in Libya.647 
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Furthermore, drawing conclusions from these developments for the realm of 
international law governing natural resources is rather difficult, as there is reasonable 
doubt whether the scope of R2P extends beyond ‘genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.’648 Should the international community be 
concerned about ‘massacres perpetrated against critically endangered species,’649 for 
instance? Could a state be forced to halt its large scale dam project, which it intends to 
build unilaterally without giving consideration to environmental and social devastation 
caused, on the grounds of R2P? While the legal-philosophical question whether large 
scale mismanagement of transboundary watercourses – or any other natural resources 
for that matter – should be considered against terms such as ‘ecocide’650 might be an 
interesting one; the chances that the international community would recognise it as the 
5th crime against peace, and thus address ecocide in the same way as genocide, are 
rather slim.651 Thus, it is highly questionable to expect that any form of ‘ecocide’ – for 
instance the unilateral development of a shared watercourse which causes detrimental 
impact on the environment and communities downstream – will fall within the scope 
of R2P anytime soon. 
 
In addition to the moral case against some aspects of sovereignty, scholars who foresee 
its demise argue that the notion, as it is being understood today, fails to articulate two 
main developments which have shaped international relations in general and 
transboundary water management in particular: (1) the increasingly complex 
interdependencies between states and (2) the increasingly important role of non-state 
actors. With an orthodox understanding of sovereignty, these shifts of power – mainly 
brought about by globalisation – cannot be understood. Thus, the Westphalian model 
has been deemed obsolete, as it is based on the independence of states. Given that the 
orthodox interpretation of sovereignty is still widespread, we see many scholars 
declaring the principle to be ‘threatened by the increase in global flows, growing 
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economic and political interdependence, and the rise of supranational political entities 
that make delineation of sovereignty more problematic.’652 
 
This seems to be the case as well with regard to the management of the world’s 
freshwater resources. While the particular complex interdependences between states 
(e.g., through the concept of virtual water) have already been addressed in previous 
chapters, a very important question linked to the sovereignty debate is rarely being 
asked: Who are the actual drivers of (international) water law and policy today? 
Despite the fact that transboundary water regimes are largely silent on this, it is more 
and more the non-state actors. Globally, we can witness the phenomenon of relocation 
of ‘authority’ both downwards (to local groups) and upwards (to supranational, 
international organisations).653 The previous chapter discussed the diversity of the 
‘water community’ which shows how varied the actors, as well as their respective 
approaches, are. In many transboundary basins around the world, bilateral donors (e.g., 
German Society for International Cooperation), regional and multilateral development 
banks (e.g., Asian Development Bank, World Bank), nongovernmental organisations 
(e.g., World Wide Fund for Nature), business (e.g., Veolia Environnement, PepsiCo, 
Nestlé) and epistemic communities are getting more and more vocal in their respective 
views of how the global water crisis should be addressed – sometimes with huge 
implications for both soft and hard law.654 The International Law Association (ILA), 
for instance, played a very prominent role in the development of international water 
law with the 1966 Helsinki Rules655 and the 2004 Berlin Rules656 on the management 
of freshwater resources.657 Furthermore, NGOs are pushing for the ratification of the 
UN Watercourses Convention by drafting policy briefs, engaging in workshops and 
providing publications which make international law more accessible for 
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practitioners.658 In addition, multinational companies, like Nestlé, play an increasing 
role in lobbying for water laws and policies through networks like the World 
Economic Forum659 and the 2030 Water Resources Group.660 
 
While these developments are not necessarily negative, since they can provide 
valuable input from a wide range of stakeholders, and thus stir debate, they may point 
towards a slow demise of the state in the arena of international freshwater governance. 
The concept of sovereignty, so it seems, moulders into a merely rhetorical device 
employed by politicians to maximise their national interests.661 Even if states continue 
to be the central players in international law, the role of non-state actors is obviously 
growing in importance. The part non-state actors play in legal processes, however, 
raises pressing questions of legitimacy, which have to be researched in more depth. 
Furthermore, when following the line of argument that state sovereignty is in demise, 
one has to raise the question of which guiding principle could or should come in its 
place? The lack of answers implies that sovereignty is still an integral tenet of 
international law – even if it ‘degenerates more and more into an empty shell.’662 
However, this supposed erosion of sovereignty, which is said to gain speed as the 
impacts of globalisation spread, has not triggered a rethinking of the international legal 
system. International legal scholars seem to unwaveringly resume ‘worship 
sovereignty without reflecting on its continued sense.’663 
 
5.1.2 The Nation State Reborn? 
The reason for this might be that there are others who do not believe that the principle 
of sovereignty is eroding. On the contrary, some scholars argue that we can actually 
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witness the ‘rebirth’ of the nation state.664 Instead of a borderless world, they see a 
future which will bring a reinvigorated concept of state sovereignty. 
 
Several recent developments seem to support such a claim. Employing again the 
example of humanitarian intervention: While various commentators saw the further 
demise of sovereignty with Resolution 1973 on Libya,665 the fact that the UN Security 
Council is taking a very different approach with regard to a (at least to some extent) 
comparable situation in Syria calls this reasoning into question. In contrast to the 
decisive and unified action on Libya, ‘the [Security] Council’s activities with respect 
to Syria have been faltering and divisive.’666 This challenges the claim that Libya was 
indeed a turning point for R2P – and thus for how the international society perceives 
state sovereignty.667 While some individual states may still be guided by the belief in 
their responsibility towards suppressed and ostracised populations, the limits of the 
doctrine have been revealed quite dramatically, as its status is still tenuous in the UN 
Security Council. Another event which has, supposedly, brought back a more 
nationalistic view of sovereignty is the most recent financial crisis which is said to 
have slowed down global and regional integration processes considerably. Even within 
the European Union, where the institutional framework is comparatively strong, 
national interests dominated policymaking during the ‘Euro Crisis.’668 A repercussion 
from the global financial crisis was the populist move by Denmark, party to the 
Schengen agreement which abolished passport and immigration controls at the 
common borders,669 to reintroduce permanent border controls – and thus challenging 
the principle of freedom of movement within the Schengen area by prioritising its own 
national sovereignty.670 David Cameron, the current Prime Minister of the United 
Kingdom, went a step further when he promised a referendum on whether the UK 
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should remain in the European Union, which has long been seen as a success story of 
regionalism,671 as he fears a decline in control over national economic policies.672 
With regard to transboundary and global environmental challenges, we also witness an 
increased reluctance of states to enter into meaningful and effective multilateral 
environmental agreements (MEAs). Governments like Canada pulling out of the Kyoto 
Protocol673 and the UN Convention to Combat Desertification674 point towards a more 
state-centred future of international environmental governance – one where 
sovereignty, again, is based on independence rather than interdependence. 
 
The assumption that states – at least the most powerful amongst them – are ‘free to do 
as they wish’ is shared by many scholars.675 This view has, at least to some extent, 
been confirmed by the Permanent Court of International Justice, which states that 
‘[i]nternational law governs relations between independent States. The rules 
of law binding upon States therefore emanate from their own free will as 
expressed in conventions or by usages generally accepted as expressing 
principles of law and established in order to regulate the relations between 
these co-existing independent communities or with a view to the achievement 
of common aims.’676  
The basis of international legal obligation, then, is the original liberty of states which 
demands treatment recognising them as being free and equal.677 Hence, one could 
argue, there is evidence which indicates that the principle of sovereignty is not in 
demise; quite the contrary: the nation-state actually seems to (re)gain importance in the 
global arena. 
 
5.1.3 The Need for Cooperative Sovereignty 
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The previous sections gave a brief overview of the opposing views as to how the 
cornerstone of international law and international relations, the sovereignty of states, 
should be interpreted in this day and age – or if it still has a role to play at all. What 
became obvious is that none of the extreme positions offered an adequate proposal as 
to how the future challenges – like tackling the global water crisis – can be effectively 
addressed. As Bartelson stated, ‘the attempt to throw the state concept out was futile as 
this concept was invariably replaced with others that were semantically equivalent.’678 
What the often heated debate shows, however, is that state sovereignty can no longer 
be perceived as a clear-cut principle – if it ever has been. According to Dahrendorf, 
‘[n]ation states are welcome; they are important elements of a liberal world order. But 
they have to be open to cooperation and coordination with others.’679 Yet, this 
cooperation and coordination is often lacking; and in many cases this lack of will is 
being blamed on an orthodox understanding of state sovereignty. Hence, the way we 
interpret sovereignty does not merely determine our managerial vocabulary, it defines 
the future path of international cooperation – and thus the future of international law 
itself. 
 
Instead of attempting to determine the exact extent of sovereignty, which is an 
impossible endeavour given the complexity of the concept and the often nebulous 
perceptions it triggers, it is useful to recall that one of the main goals of international 
law is to strengthen international peace and security.680 With the global water crisis in 
mind, the goal should be to overcome state centrism of international water law (see 
previous chapters) in order to achieve common water security. The various discourses 
revolving around sovereignty show that the problematique is much more complex and 
the issues and interests of states much more dynamic than a static understanding of 
sovereignty – or international law in general – allows. While often seen as a hindrance 
to effective international governance (environmental governance in particular), it is 
obvious that the principle of sovereignty will not go away. Hence, in order to move the 
debate forward, the principle as such has to be defended – though certainly not the 
orthodox interpretation of it. If we manage to lead the discussion in a more open way, 
we might be able to ensure that it remains a ‘morally sound response to persistent and 
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profound disagreement within the international community.’681 So, if we don’t witness 
the demise of sovereignty; how should we interpret the bedrock foundation for 
conducting international relations? As Solana, in his capacity as Secretary General of 
NATO, stated: ‘[t]he Westphalian system had its limits. For one, the principle of 
sovereignty it relied on also produced the basis for rivalry, not community of states; 
exclusion, not integration.’682 Yet, many scholars still equate sovereignty with 
independence, and many governments still use this perception to avoid meaningful 
international cooperation.683 What is needed, instead, is a rediscovery of the ethical 
foundations of public international law, and a closer look at the obligation to 
cooperate. The reason for this being that ‘even the sanctity of contract may be 
challenged by claims of ‘unjust enrichment’ and that of treaties (pacta sunt servanda) 
by claims of justice based on ‘impossibility of performance’ or ‘fundamental change of 
circumstance.’’684 International politics is in a state of flux – and international law has 
to provide the tools for maintaining the manoeuvrability of the international 
community. We have to remind ourselves that one of the principal functions of 
international law is ‘to serve as a mechanism by which the domestic politics of 
different states can be linked, in order to construct a formal mechanism of international 
politics.’685 Yet, some nations still seem to be able to use the concept of state 
sovereignty as a cover in order to maximise their own national gains. International law 
is often only applied by states when they consider its implementation to be 
advantageous to their national interests.686 This misuse is being encouraged by a purely 
instrumentalised view of international law. By reducing international law to a 
mechanism for the advancement of functional objectives, it becomes more ‘vulnerable 
to the criticisms raised against thinking about it as an instrument for state policy.’687 
Thus, instead of trying to overcome state-centrism by pronouncing the (slow) death of 
sovereignty, injecting ethics into the international arena seems to be a much more 
promising way forward. 
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What does this suggest for international environmental governance in general – and 
transboundary water management in particular? It implies the need for a move beyond 
the either/or debate on sovereignty and the joint management of natural resources. 
While states, in theory, have now accepted a more nuanced interpretation of 
sovereignty, the debate about how sovereignty over freshwater resources should be 
interpreted today is still of highest significance. After all and critically, the notion of 
sovereignty carries a responsibility to cooperate with it. Article 1 of the UN Charter 
reads: 
‘[t]he purposes of the United Nations are: […] (3) [t]o achieve international 
co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect 
for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as 
to race, sex, language, or religion […].’688 
While the provisions on the duty to cooperate are rather brief, the need for amplifying 
one of the key principles of international law was met with the 1970 Declaration on 
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation 
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.689 The section of 
this Declaration which is dedicated to international cooperation stipulates that  
‘States have the duty to co-operate with one another, irrespective of the 
differences in their political, economic and social systems, in the various 
spheres of international relations, in order to maintain international peace and 
security and to promote international economic stability and progress, the 
general welfare of nations and international co-operation free from 
discrimination based on such differences.’690 
While the Declaration does not constitute binding international law, its universal 
recognition as a standard of conduct and its perception as an elaboration of ‘principles 
of international law’ gives it considerable legal weight. The general obligation to 
cooperate is also at the heart of the MOX case before the International Tribunal for the 
Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Here, Ireland claimed that the UK failed to cooperate as 
demanded by the rules of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
                                                 
688 Art 1(3) of the UN Charter. 
689 UN General Assembly, Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations 
and Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations (24 October 
1970) UNGA Res 2625, 25 UN GAOR Supp 18, UN Doc A/5217 at 121; reprinted in 65 AJIL 243 
(1971). 
690 Ibid. 
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(UNCLOS)691 with regard to matters of communication and the exchange of 
information.692 In its order, the Tribunal endorsed the cooperation between states as a 
general principle of international law.693 According to Judge Wolfrum, the duty to 
cooperate  
‘balances the principle of sovereignty of States and thus ensures that 
community of interests are taken into account vis-à-vis individualistic State 
interests. It is the matter of prudence and caution as well in keeping with the 
overriding nature of the obligation to cooperate that the parties should engage 
therein as prescribed in paragraph 89 of the Order.’694  
Against this background, the Tribunal ordered Ireland and the UK to cooperate and 
enter into consultations.695 
 
It follows from the foregoing that there is ultimately a need to arrive at a stage where 
the concept of state sovereignty is understood as one of ‘cooperative sovereignty.’696 
Implementing the general obligation to cooperate, however, is not a straightforward 
task. This task is easier when the benefits for cooperation are quantifiable and the 
positive impact can already be seen short-term – like, e.g., in global trade.697 Here, a 
very detailed body of international law has evolved over the last decades, which 
brought forth the World Trade Organisation and its highly sophisticated system of 
dispute resolution.698 How far away are we from a perception of ‘cooperative 
sovereignty’ in international environmental law? The UN Conference on the Human 
Environment in 1972 is widely regarded as the first global environmental conference. 
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Here, the delegations from 144 states agreed on the ‘Stockholm Declaration’699 which 
contains 26 principles, several of which have been incorporated into subsequent 
international environmental agreements. Of particular importance for the discussion at 
hand is Principle 21, which affirms that 
‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental policies, and the responsibility 
to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause 
damage to the environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of 
national jurisdiction.’700 
The attempt to strike a balance between national sovereignty and the responsibility to 
prevent transboundary damage is obvious here. As already mentioned earlier, this 
‘delicate balance’ suffered a loss in 1992 at the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro. Here, Principle 2 reads: 
‘States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own 
resources pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, 
and the responsibility to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or 
control do not cause damage to the environment of other States or of areas 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction.’701 
While it is almost an exact copy of Principle 21 of the Stockholm Declaration, the two 
additional words make it clear that the emphasis is, again, on national development, 
rather than cooperating to prevent transboundary harm. Hence, after a period of 
‘greening’ the principle of sovereignty over natural resources, which had originally 
been established within an economic setting, we witnessed one which subordinated 
environmental concerns under national economic ones.702 
 
This constant ‘push and pull’ of environmental cooperation and state sovereignty at the 
political level also brought a certain level of uncertainty amongst international legal 
scholars as to whether the duty to cooperate is indeed a binding legal obligation rather 
                                                 
699 Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (16 June 1972) UN Doc 
A/Conf.48/14/Rev. 1(1973); reprinted in 11 ILM 1416 (1972). 
700 Principle 21 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration. 
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702 Pallemaerts, 'International Environmental Law from Stockholm to Rio: Back to the Future?' at 6. 
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than a mere goal or a guideline for conduct.703 The main question arising here is: Can 
one assert that states must (rather than merely should) cooperate; and if so, can this 
obligation actually be imposed on states and legally enforced?704 It is this debate which 
renders the precise status of the duty to cooperate under international law uncertain. 
While it succeeds in balancing the principle of ‘sovereignty over natural resources’ and 
the ‘no significant harm’ rule, cooperation is too broad to qualify as a rule.705 Its status 
as a general principle of international law, rather than a customary rule, however, does 
not diminish its pivotal role in international law and politics; especially as more and 
more states now realise that cooperating with their neighbours on transboundary issues 
is ultimately in their self-interest. Interestingly, state practice shows that in specific 
contexts,706 nations do not interpret international cooperation as an undue burden on 
their respective state sovereignty.707 
 
In the area of international water law both global instruments, the 1997 UN 
Watercourses Convention708 and the 2008 Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers,709 promote the general obligation to cooperate. Furthermore, regional treaty 
regimes, e.g., the UNECE Helsinki Convention,710 follow the same approach. With 
regard to the UN Watercourses Convention, Article 8(1) provides that ‘[w]atercourse 
                                                 
703 See J Delbrück, 'The International Obligation to Cooperate : An Empty Shell or a Hard Law Principle 
of International Law? A Critical Look at a Much Debated Paradigm of Modern International Law' in 
Hestermeyer HP and others (eds), Coexistence, Cooperation and Solidarity, vol 1 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2012). 
704 Wouters and others, Sharing Transboundary Waters : An Integrated Assessment of Equitable 
Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model at 23. 
705 Rieu-Clarke, Moynihan and Magsig, UN Watercourses Convention : User's Guide at 123. 
706 E.g., with regard to the protection of human rights (traditionally been seen as a purely national 
matter), see the preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states that ‘Member 
States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the promotion 
of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms […];’ UN 
General Assembly, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Resolution 217 A (III) (10 December 
1948) available at <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/index.shtml>.  
707 Delbrück, 'The International Obligation to Cooperate : An Empty Shell or a Hard Law Principle of 
International Law? A Critical Look at a Much Debated Paradigm of Modern International Law' at 4. 
708 Art 8(1) of the UN Watercourses Convention: ‘Watercourse States shall cooperate on the basis of 
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transboundary aquifers or aquifer systems.’ 
710 Art 2 (6) of the UNECE Helsinki Convention: ‘The Riparian Parties shall cooperate on the basis of 
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the protection of the environment of transboundary waters or the environment influenced by such 
waters, including the marine environment.’ Interestingly, the parties to the UNECE Helsinki 
Convention have now opened up the Convention to states outside of UNECE. 
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states shall cooperate on the basis of sovereign equality, territorial integrity, mutual 
benefit and good faith in order to attain optimal utilisation and adequate protection of 
an international watercourse.’711 This general obligation to cooperate contains the 
procedural duties of prior information and of prior consultation,712 which aim to 
‘operationalise’ the rather vague principle.713 While the provisions on cooperation in 
the UN Watercourses Convention surely had a positive impact on the implementation 
of the general principle within the realm of transboundary water interaction,714 it still 
leaves a lot to be desired when it comes to fundamentally changing the way states 
perceive their national sovereignty over freshwater resources. One shortcoming of the 
UN Watercourses Convention is that states still have a good deal of discretion with 
regard to the particular means of cooperation. The setting up of joint institutions, for 
instance, is not explicitly compulsory,715 even though their immense benefit for 
transboundary freshwater management has long been proven.716 Merely 
recommending the establishment of joint river basin organisations was probably as far 
as the Convention could go in order to still receive widespread political support. Yet, a 
high price was paid for this approach when it comes to strengthening the legal basis of 
the obligation to cooperate, as it does not change the perception of state sovereignty. 
The UN Watercourses Convention missed an opportunity to trigger widespread 
implementation of the concept of ‘cooperative sovereignty.’  
 
This shortcoming, however, is not limited to the area of international water law. As a 
general observation, the international system still encourages powerful states to act 
unilaterally, since they have the liberty to argue on the basis of an orthodox 
                                                 
711 Art 8(1) of the UN Watercourses Convention. 
712 Arts 11-19 of the UN Watercourses Convention. 
713 Rieu-Clarke, Moynihan and Magsig, UN Watercourses Convention : User's Guide at 125. 
714 See C Leb, 'The UN Watercourses Convention: The Éminence Grise Behind Cooperation on 
Transboundary Water Resources' (2013) 38 Water International 146. 
715 Art 8(2) of the UN Watercourses Convention reads: ‘In determining the manner of such cooperation, 
watercourse States may consider the establishment of joint mechanisms or commissions, as deemed 
necessary by them, to facilitate cooperation on relevant measures and procedures in the light of 
experience gained through cooperation in existing joint mechanisms and commissions in various 
regions.’ 
716 See R Berardo and AK Gerlak, 'Conflict and Cooperation Along International Rivers: Crafting a 
Model of Institutional Effectiveness' (2012) 12 Global Environmental Politics 101; J Lautze and 
others, 'International River Basin Organizations: Variation, Options and Insights' (2013) 38 Water 
International 30; S Schmeier, Governing International Watercourses : River Basin Organizations 
and the Sustainable Governance of Internationally Shared Rivers and Lakes (Routledge 2013); S 
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understanding of sovereignty.717 The international community seems to be stuck in a 
system which interprets international law as a law of coexistence, rather than one of 
cooperation, despite the general obligation to cooperate. While the phenomenon of 
sovereignty seems to impede the emergence of stronger relations of solidarity, there is 
little doubt that many states understand more and more clearly the necessity to 
cooperate at the international level to put an end to an array of problems whose 
solution simply cannot be found domestically.718 However, what is still missing is the 
urgency to act jointly on more issues which bar unilateral action – like the 
management of transboundary freshwater resources. In order to be able to move closer 
to a perception of cooperative sovereignty, the international legal frameworks 
governing common challenges of transboundary resources management have to be 
developed further; based on the idea of ‘responsible sovereignty.’719 Only then can the 
international community arrive at a stage where cooperation is being interpreted as 
what it actually is – ‘the most important manifestation of sovereignty.’720 Until then, 
cooperative sovereignty remains an aspiration limited to certain areas of international 
(treaty) law, rather than being a widespread reality in world politics based on 
customary international law. 
 
The bottom line of the discourse around state sovereignty is that the principle is far 
from eroding. It is an ever-evolving concept which serves as the basis of international 
relations; and will do so in the future. Hence, we should not fight sovereignty as the 
evil standing between ‘us’ and achieving common water security. We should rather 
focus on how to best make use of the concept, push the debate forward and come up 
with legal frameworks that fully comprehend the constantly changing political, societal 
and environmental settings ‘sovereignty’ is exposed to. This in turn requires 
sovereignty to be understood and treated as the flexible concept it actually is, rather 
than a static given, through which states can address the increasingly interdependent 
challenges they are facing today. This is why the environment/sovereignty debate is 
not only about ‘greening’ international relations. Instead, it illustrates the core issue of 
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international law in addressing contemporary challenges of world politics.721 
Sovereignty will remain an invaluable principle of international law and international 
relations if it is interpreted and applied as comprising the responsibility to cooperate. 
Only then will it cease to be the often blamed roadblock for joint management of 
freshwater resources; and ultimately able to truly promote international peace and 
security. This would also support the development of the concept of water security 
towards one which addresses the common challenges rather than solely the narrow 
self-interests of states. For this to materialise, new legal frameworks for addressing 
common water security on the basis of the progressive development of international 
law and a renewed understanding of cooperative sovereignty have to be developed 
which are more responsive to contemporary challenges than orthodox ones. 
 
5.2 Natural Resources and the Concept of Communality in International Law 
Acknowledging the fact that the only way forward in addressing the global water crisis 
is taking a perspective of common water security, the notion ultimately challenges the 
supremacy of absolute national sovereignty.722 The proposed framework of the ‘4As’ 
(as introduced by this thesis in Chapter 3, including availability, access, adaptability 
and ambit) supports this development by recognising that only a truly common 
strategy can ensure the peaceful management of transboundary freshwater resources. 
Considering the main shortcoming of the current legal regime, the state-centred take on 
the water crisis based on an orthodox understanding of sovereignty, the question 
arises: What should serve as the normative basis for the needed refinement of 
international water law? How can we arrive at an understanding of ‘cooperative 
sovereignty’ which supports attaining common water security? Communality has been 
addressed by international law in different ways. In general, its role is to facilitate both 
the coordination of states’ individual actions regarding a common concern, and the 
institutionalisation of ‘normative communities.’723 The following section will outline 
the various conceptual paths international law has taken on this course, with the aim to 
find the most appropriate one for the future development of international water law. 
 
5.2.1 Common Areas 
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723 Brunnée, 'Common Areas, Common Heritage, and Common Concern' at 555. 
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The concept of ‘common areas’ is limited to areas or resources which are perceived as 
being common while all states have, at least in theory, open access to them. Since not 
many areas fall into that category of being beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, 
the notion is only being applied with regards to the high seas724 and outer space.725 
Since access to common areas or resources is in principle open to anybody, it has to be 
regulated in order to avoid a tragedy of the commons; where states are locked into a 
system which compels them to increase their respective national benefits without limit 
– ‘in a world that is limited.’726 
 
Except for the general duty to cooperate placed upon states (see above), the only 
universally applicable substantive obligation in international environmental law 
limiting these freedoms is the no significant harm rule. This encompasses the 
protection of areas beyond national jurisdiction, and thus, at least this dimension of the 
no significant harm rule can be interpreted as an obligation owed erga omnes.727 
However, despite its international legal standing, the enforcement of the protection of 
common areas solely on the basis of customary law remains questionable.728 While the 
Draft Articles on State Responsibility distinguish between injured states (Art. 42) and 
states that have not been injured (Art. 48);729 in practice, the options available to any 
state would still be limited to demanding a cessation of the internationally wrongful act 
or omission. However, even these meagre options are not that certain, as state practice 
does not support the argument that this right has reached the status of customary 
international law. One example demonstrating the dilemma is the Nuclear Tests Case 
(New Zealand v. France) of 1973, in which New Zealand, demanded France to stop its 
nuclear testing activities in the South Pacific, arguing, inter alia, that France violated 
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the rights of the international community to be free from nuclear contamination of the 
high seas and atmosphere.730 While the ICJ – in consideration of France’s declaration 
that it would terminate testing – never decided the merits of this case, nor of 
Australia’s parallel case, various opinions, both separate and dissenting, revealed the 
strong division of the judges on this important issue. On the one hand, several judges 
remarked that while ‘the existence of a so-called actio popularis in international law is 
a matter of controversy […] the question is one that may be considered as capable of 
rational legal argument and a proper subject of litigation before this Court.’731 On the 
other hand, judges noted that the applicants had ‘no legal title […] to act as spokesman 
for the international community and ask the Court to condemn France’s conduct.’732 
 
Hence, it was deemed necessary to develop frameworks for the protection of areas and 
resources beyond national jurisdictions. Regarding the marine environment, one 
approach was to simply ‘shrink the areas that lie completely beyond individual states’ 
jurisdiction’733 through the gradual extension of states’ sovereign rights to the 200 
nautical miles Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), which gives countries control over the 
exploitation and protection of natural resources.734 For the remaining (common) areas, 
the high seas, UNCLOS provides an important regulatory framework which is based 
upon the general rule to avoid transboundary environmental harm. This led to a 
significant change of the classical freedom of the high seas, since the area now falls 
under several environmental protection requirements of which many have their roots in 
the general provisions of UNCLOS.735 Very similar to the high seas, the outer space is 
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<http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm>. 
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being handled as common property,736 which no country can appropriate and all states 
have, at least in theory, equal access to.737 
 
While the concept of common areas has provided an important legal basis for the 
protection of such territories and the resources located therein, the fact that it solely 
focuses on geographical locations beyond national jurisdictions means that its 
application to international water law is impracticable. 
 
5.2.2 Common Heritage 
Closely linked to the notion of common area is the concept of ‘common heritage.’ It is 
focused on the equitable sharing of benefits from the exploitation of resources beyond 
the limits of national jurisdiction and demands economically powerful states to 
renounce unilateral development for their own national advantage.738 This concept has 
found recognition in the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS),739 the 
Moon Treaty,740 and, to a much lesser degree, in the framework for the protection of 
the Antarctic environment.741 The common heritage principle has been applied 
whenever the distribution of resources outside the boundaries of national jurisdiction 
has been debated. Hence, it is, again, only relevant with regard to areas which are open 
to the exploitation of all nations.742 However, the concept of common heritage adds 
another dimension to the international legal debate, by looking at how to regulate the 
access – which in theory is supposed to be equal, but in practice is determined by each 
state’s technological and financial abilities.743 
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136 
As early as 1966, the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations (ECOSOC) 
had requested the UN Secretary-General ‘to make a survey of the present state of 
knowledge of these resources of the sea, beyond the continental shelf, and of the 
techniques for exploiting these resources […]’ and ‘to attempt to identify those 
resources now considered to be capable of economic exploitation, especially for the 
benefit of developing countries.’744 As a result, the UN Secretary-General declared that 
the underprivileged status of the developing countries demanded a revision of the legal 
framework governing the law of the sea.745 Furthermore, the concept of common 
heritage was included in Resolution 15 of the Geneva World Peace through Law 
Conference in 1967, which reads:  
‘Whereas new technology and oceanography have revealed the possibility of 
exploitation of untold resources of the high seas, and the bed thereof beyond 
the continental shelf; and, more than half of mankind find itself 
underprivileged, underfed and underdeveloped; and, that the high seas are the 
common heritage of all mankind. Resolved, that the World Peace Through 
Law Center: (1) Recommend to the General Assembly of the United Nations 
the issuance of a proclamation declaring that the non-fishery resources of the 
high seas, outside the territorial waters of any State, and the bed of the sea 
beyond the continental shelf, appertain to the United Nations and are subject 
to its jurisdiction and control.’746  
Thus, the emergence of the concept of common heritage must be seen against the 
background of the effort of the newly independent states in the 1960s and 1970s to 
influence the development of international law to better reflect their own priorities and 
concerns.747 This explains that developed nations were initially not in favour of the 
proposal by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta to declare the seabed the common 
heritage of mankind.748 In 1970, the UN General Assembly declared the seabed to be 
common heritage – with 108 (developing) countries voting in favour, and 16 
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(developed) countries abstaining.749 The concept did eventually become the foundation 
for Part XI, Section 2 of UNCLOS on the principles governing the ‘Area,’750 where 
Article 136 reads: ‘The Area and its resources are the common heritage of mankind.’ 
Subsequent articles elaborate on what constitutes the key elements of it: (1) the Area, 
as a commons, is not subject to appropriation by individual states;751 (2) the Area must 
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and activities must be carried out ‘for the 
benefit of mankind as a whole’, which must be equitably shared among all states;752 
and (3) the Area’s non-living resources have to be managed by an international 
authority which regulates their exploitation, ensures the equitable distribution of the 
benefits, and takes measures for environmental protection.753 A comparable approach 
can be found in the Moon Treaty, which states that ‘(1) [t]he moon and its natural 
resources are the common heritage of mankind […]. (2) The moon is not subject to 
national appropriation by any claim of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or 
by any other means. (3) Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the moon, nor any 
part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, 
international intergovernmental or non- governmental organization, national 
organization or non-governmental entity or of any natural person […].’754 
 
With regard to the significance of the common heritage principle for the management 
of seabed activities, it is worth mentioning that attempts were made to even classify it 
as a jus cogens norm.755 However, except for UNCLOS and the Moon Treaty, the 
concept never gained much traction. The main reason for the lack of application 
beyond those two legal regimes might be its underlying motivation – states’ appetite 
for natural resources rather than the general interest of the international community in 
their protection. As Brunnée puts it, ‘[i]ts focus on access to resources and benefits 
gets the concept entangled in and, it appears, sidelined by the competition that these 
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preoccupations entail.’756 Since the concept does little in overcoming the environment 
vs. development conundrum, it has been called ‘a political and rhetorical tool of 
convenience used by both the industrialized and the industrializing worlds whenever it 
suits their respective interests.’757 As a result, this deems it unsuitable for the 
application in the area of common water security, as the theme of common heritage is 
limited to issues of (re)distribution – neglecting other management challenges, like 
environmental protection and conservation.758 
 
5.2.3 Community of Interest 
Another interesting take on communality is the concept of ‘community of interest,’ 
which has actually been applied in international water law. This supranational 
approach takes away all national sovereignty from the basin states with regard to the 
governance of a shared watercourse, while calling for the management of the 
watercourse as a unit.759 Here, the cooperation between states is supposed to reach the 
maximum level, preventing water disputes and guaranteeing the optimal utilisation of 
the resource – for the benefit of all basin states. 
 
The origins of the ‘community of interest’ as a legal notion can be found in the River 
Oder Case decided by the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).760 Here, the 
PCIJ stated that the community of interest of riparian states ‘becomes the basis of a 
common legal right, the essential features of which are perfect equality of all riparian 
states in the use of the whole course of the river and the exclusion of the preferential 
privilege of any riparian state in relation to the others is relevant to the non-
navigational uses.’761 However, since the term ‘community’ only implies that riparians 
should work together on the management of the watercourse, they are not 
automatically required to actually do so.762 This is why, for now, the approach of a 
community of interest is of little use for the pragmatic management of international 
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watercourses, as its legal implications are not clear.763 According to Fitzmaurice and 
Elias, ‘[t]he theory of community of interest should be distinguished from the so-called 
theory of common management. The latter is supported by some state practice, but the 
narrowness of this practice puts in doubt the possibility that the theory of community 
of interest or common management has entered the body of customary law.’764 
 
One of the few cases where the concept was actually implemented is the management 
of the Lake Titicaca.765 In 1957, Bolivia and Peru signed a treaty declaring that ‘[…] 
the two countries have joint, indivisible and exclusive ownership over the waters of 
Lake Titicaca.’766 The step of attributing joint ownership over the freshwater resource 
explains why the concept of ‘community of interest’ has not found wider acceptance 
amongst the international community. For many states it is just too sovereignty 
intrusive. The reason why Bolivia and Peru chose to follow this path might have been 
their relatively good relations and thus the absence of the typical upstream vs. 
downstream conflicts of interests between states we usually find in water ‘hot spots’ 
around the world.767 Hence, even though it can be considered a legal approach which 
has been applied in a few cases,768 the future development of the notion of a 
community of interest with regard to a water security has to be regarded as a cul-de-
sac, since widespread support of the concept is questionable. Rather than achieving 
stronger cooperation between countries sharing freshwater resources, it might cause 
the basin states to turn away, as the concept aims too high by stripping the basin states 
of all national sovereignty concerning the management of the watercourse. 
 
5.2.4 Common Concern 
The UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 
marked a milestone in the development of international environmental law. Here, for 
the first time, a global framework for environmental responsibilities was designed – 
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based on a ‘common concern’ – which constitutes a considerable leap forward when 
compared to the (still) prevalent merely transboundary responsibilities based on the 
concept of good neighbourliness.769 The common concern is based on the 
understanding that harm to the environment (e.g., depletion of the ozone layer 
resources, or the changing climate) has the potential to adversely affect humanity as a 
whole; and thus, cooperation on those issues can only be effective if it is being 
concerted at a global level. This in turn implies both a right and an obligation of the 
international community as a whole to have concern for the global environment.770 
While the Rio Declaration itself does not mention the term ‘common concern,’771 both 
treaties negotiated in Rio – the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC)772 and the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)773 – follow this 
approach. 
 
The Convention on Biological Diversity clearly states that ‘the conservation of 
biological diversity is a common concern of humankind […].’774 While this 
affirmation was initially ranked as a fundamental principle during the drafting process, 
it ultimately got downgraded to the preamble.775 Interestingly, the parties dropped the 
concept of common heritage rather early in the negotiating process. In contrast to 
UNCLOS and the Moon Treaty, which both include reference to the notion of common 
heritage, the developing countries would not have benefited from such an approach in 
CBD. Here, developing countries are dealing with the management of resources within 
their own jurisdictions – rather than resources outside any national jurisdiction. Hence, 
the developing countries were reluctant to relinquish their respective sovereign rights 
over those resources covered by CBD.776 Still, even without strong procedural support, 
the inclusion of ‘common concern’ does ensure that the loss of biodiversity is being 
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acknowledged as a major issue which the international community has to address on a 
common basis. 
 
However, this cannot make up to the shortcomings of the Convention. For a start, the 
provisions on in-situ and ex-situ conservation and sustainable use in Articles 8-10 of 
the Convention are considerably weakened by the caveat ‘as far as possible and 
appropriate.’777 Another major flaw of CBD is that it does not extend state 
responsibility for extra-territorial harm to damage caused to the global commons.778 
Thus, the Convention remains deeply flawed, as it fails to provide a balancing tool for 
the clash between the protection of biological diversity and the national sovereignty to 
exploit natural resources. This is evident in the fact that the target agreed by the 
members to the Convention in 2002 ‘to achieve by 2010 a significant reduction of the 
current rate of biodiversity loss at the global, regional and national level as a 
contribution to poverty alleviation and to the benefit of all life on Earth,’779 has been 
missed considerably.780 The Convention simply does not manage to challenge the 
orthodox perception of sovereignty. To a large extent, the UN Framework Convention 
on Climate Change has to be regarded as a failure as well. Here, just like in CBD, the 
concept of ‘common concern’ can be found in the Preamble, which acknowledges that 
‘change in the Earth’s climate and its adverse effects are a common concern of 
humankind.’781 While it kick-started a process of legal and political engagement 
around the globe, the Convention failed to overcome the state-centrism of the climate 
change negotiations. Ultimately, this led to watered-down obligations in weak 
agreements which were ‘designed to mask the political failure of the international 
community to create a global climate treaty.’782 
 
In this regard, the Draft International Covenant on Environment and Development, a 
collaborative effort by the IUCN Commission on Environmental Law and the 
International Council of Environmental Law, tried to reanimate the concept of 
common concern. The Draft Covenant was designed as a ‘living blueprint’ for an 
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international framework agreement which consolidates and further develops already 
existing legal principles related to environment and development. It was first presented 
at the United Nations Congress on Public International Law in 1995 and has 
subsequently been revised. In its Article 3, the Covenant states that ‘[t]he global 
environment is a common concern of humanity and under the protection of the 
principles of international law, the dictates of the public conscience and the 
fundamental values of humanity.’783 The commentary to this article illustrates that the 
concept should to be interpreted as ‘the basis upon which the international community 
at all levels can and must take joint and separate action to protect the environment.’784 
It aims to clarify that not only single issues, like global climatic changes or the loss of 
biodiversity should be regarded as being of common concern to the international 
community, but the environment as a whole. This closes the circle with the 1992 Rio 
Declaration which tried to establish a common responsibility to the global environment 
(see above); resting upon the scientific reality that harm to the environment in one 
region of the world can have a considerable impact on humanity as a whole. Hence, the 
international community has to accept both the right and the obligation to ‘have 
concern for the global environment.’785 The basic idea here is that the notion of 
common concern entails both spatial and temporal components. While the Draft 
Covenant considers the Earth’s biosphere as a whole, due to the various 
interdependencies, it also extends the temporal element by recognising long-term 
impacts of environmental harm and the responsibility of the international community 
owed to future generations.786 However, either due to its rather vague focus or the lack 
of legitimacy, the Draft Covenant has attracted only little attention amongst 
international legal scholars. This is deeply regrettable, as the document offers a new 
take on the continual struggle to reconcile the need for environmental protection with 
the need for development.  
 
Despite not enjoying enormous popularity and its embryonic stage, the concept of 
common concern is of particular interest to the further development of international 
water law. Although the attention is again on (common) benefits, it regards the benefits 
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from common action rather than those derived from the mere exploitation of a 
resource.787 Furthermore, instead of targeting one area or resource, this concept 
focuses on what renders a concern as being ‘common.’ In so doing, it avoids 
discussions about common property and territorial sovereignty. 
 
5.3 Regional Common Concern as the Legal Foundation of Water Security 
While the approaches of ‘common area’ and ‘common heritage’ are limited to a certain 
geographical area and its resources, and the concept of ‘community of interest’ seems 
to be too sovereignty intrusive, the notion of ‘common concern’ appears to be more 
promising with the definition of water security in mind, as it is a much wider concept. 
Recalling that the definition of water security as developed in Chapter 2 is; 
 
‘[a] community is water secure when it has sustainable access to freshwater of 
sufficient quantity and quality, or to the benefits derived therefrom; and the 
ability to minimise water-related risk and its various repercussions to an 
acceptable level – without compromising the supporting ecosystems.’ 
 
The main advantage of the notion of common concern is that it does not automatically 
connote specific rules and obligations, but rather establishes the fundamental basis for 
the international community to act. This distinguishes it from the concepts of common 
area and common heritage, both of which provide an inadequate legal basis for 
achieving common water security. The notion was developed with the weaknesses of 
the concept of common heritage in mind. The conclusion that some particular 
challenge is being perceived as a matter of common concern results in the appreciation 
that it can no longer be considered as a mere national issue. It also triggers a shift from 
the orthodox reciprocity and material benefit sharing we often find in treaties to joint 
action in the long-term interest of community.788 This is evident in the inclusion of the 
principle inter-generational responsibility.789 
 
However, both UNFCCC and CBD face difficulties in achieving strong legal force 
with regard to the common concern at the level they are intended to have an impact on 
– the global one. First and foremost, this is due to the fact that it is impossible to 
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phrase a global set of values and interests which is independent of the interests of 
individual states.790 While it is relatively easy to agree on including a reference to a 
common concern in the preamble of a framework agreement, as was the case for 
UNFCCC and CBD, actually implementing the desired change of thought, by 
providing it with the necessary political and legal clout, is a completely different 
challenge. Are there any lessons learned for international water law when it comes to 
global governance? Would it be politically feasible to agree, at a global level, on a 
definition of water security as a common concern of humankind? Given the sheer 
scope of the global water crisis, and recalling the detrimental impacts water disputes 
have on communities all over the world, it should not be impossible to construct an 
analogous mindset to the loss of biodiversity or global climate change for 
transboundary freshwater management. Yet, it is still difficult to sufficiently prove 
international consensus on whether water security is indeed of common concern.791 
However, scaling one level down by looking at the regional layer could be a fruitful 
middle road which can sufficiently accommodate the national interests and the global 
challenge. The strategy has to be to seize the idea of common concern while keeping it 
at the more workable – regional – level.792 
 
Not only are the common concerns relating to water interaction more obvious and 
easier to spell out in the regional than in the global arena, it is also this level which acts 
as the connecting link between the global water cycle and local water management.793 
The global level seems to be too removed to have an actual impact on the ground; 
while, at the same time, it often provokes comparisons with imperialism. The regional 
level, by contrast, can utilise the political and economic power and influence of 
regional bodies to push for change – change which is home-grown, since (in general) 
regional bodies are not too far removed from issues on the ground. Furthermore, the 
security dimension as such, which (so far) managed to hide behind the orthodox 
perception of state sovereignty, would also become regional – rather than remaining 
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solely national.794 Finally, framing water security as a regional common concern opens 
up the enormous potential of including actors and interests beyond the basin. This is 
due to the fact that a region is not a narrowly defined geographical area – contrary to a 
basin – but instead can be interpreted in exactly the way a particular community of 
states deems appropriate in order to manage their water challenges in the most 
effective and peaceful manner. This in turn may add a new dimension to international 
freshwater interaction, which is commonly being perceived as a zero-sum game where 
competing interests of riparians regarding their desired uses are being negotiated.795 
Instead, the inclusion of non-riparian interests in the design and performance of 
international water agreements can play a key role in addressing common security 
interests of all involved.796 On these grounds, the notion of a regional common concern 
is the most suitable conceptual vehicle for the endeavour to achieve common water 
security. 
 
Considering water security as a ‘regional common concern’ would certainly strengthen 
international law in this area and equip it with the needed basis for overcoming state-
centrism.797 Fully embracing the notion of ‘ambit,’ which acknowledges the fact that 
security can no longer be considered as a zero-sum game between states, will permit a 
perspective on water security which endorses the argument that ‘ultimate’ – i.e. 
common and sustainable – security can only be achieved with a truly joint strategy for 
the benefit of all riparians. However, simply proclaiming a new paradigm will not 
accomplish these goals alone. It has to be supported by substantive rules and underlaid 
with procedural obligations which help addressing the 4As of the water security 
concept: availability, access, adaptability and ambit.798 This does not necessary involve 
reinventing the wheel of transboundary freshwater interaction. Instead it requires states 
to subscribe to certain basic principles and minimum managing standards as 
cornerstones for their transboundary water relations; and thus triggers a process of 
rethinking focused on the respective regional approach – based on a new 
understanding of water security as a regional common concern. Widely accepted rules 
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of customary international law, like equitable and reasonable utilisation, will not 
become redundant. To the contrary, their implementation will be strengthened by the 
new conceptual underpinning; and thus their contribution towards a more fair and 
peaceful management of transboundary freshwater resources will be significantly 
improved. 
 
The obvious way of implementing the concept of regional common concern seems to 
be through regional treaty regimes, as their role in the development of international 
water law has been of paramount importance in the past.799 Regional framework 
agreements in particular provide for the needed flexibility in order to effectively 
address water security challenges. Here, common visions and guiding principles can 
serve to establish the appropriate institutional settings, while at the same time 
restricting the freedom of the member states to disregard the regional common concern 
by developing their waters unilaterally.800 A framework agreement at this level of 
governance can be customised to a high degree; and thus cater for the regional 
differences in water challenges, political circumstances and legal traditions. Hence, the 
regional focus, accompanied by a growing number of protocols implementing the 
notion, could pave the way for the development of customary international law by 
helping to shape the concept and settle its legal consequences.801 This is vital, since 
until treaties specify the ‘regional common concern’ as erga omnes partes, issues of 
state responsibility will still come up.802 International agreements would also help 
constitute the relevant ‘community’ which shares the regional common concern. 
 
5.4 How to Materialise ‘Regional Common Concern’ 
While the preceding discussion has proposed the fundamental alterations needed in 
order to reorient international law so as to address common water security concerns 
more effectively, the following section will point towards avenues which may be 
useful for transposing the notion of water security as ‘regional common concern’ into 
one which carries legal clout. How can the notion of regional common concern evolve 
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in response to the needed change in perception of state sovereignty – a bedrock norm 
of international relations? 
 
5.4.1 The Disregarded Vigour of Customary International Law 
The question of what constitutes customary international law has always intrigued 
legal scholars – while at the same time it has consistently frustrated governments 
trying to determine whether its planned conduct is in line with its international legal 
obligations.803 Clearly it is one of the three main sources of international law – 
together with treaties and ‘general principles of law recognized by civilized 
nations.’804 Customary rules are state practices which have been recognised by the 
international community as determining legally binding patterns of conduct.805 Thus, 
contrary to the legal codification process; the emergence of new customary rules does 
not depend on the expressed consent of each individual state. Due to the fact that both 
their nature and importance are controversial, the demise of customary international 
rules has long been predicted.806 However, codification processes, the discussions 
within the epistemic community and ICJ case law have contributed to a ‘contemporary 
resurrection of custom.’807 Much of this has not been derived from a particularly 
Western tradition, but rather springs from the mere necessities of regulating the 
interdependencies between states.808 
 
Against the backdrop of the rapidly exacerbating global water crisis, is there a way to 
tap this source of law in order to achieve common water security? International water 
lawyers patiently wait until the ICJ declares that some rule has reached the status of 
customary international law.809 Given the small number of cases brought before the 
ICJ which deal primarily with freshwater resources, and the slow speed in which those 
cases are being decided, the attempt to accelerate the formation of customary 
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international law is alluring. The following example will show how quickly customary 
international law can develop. 
 
After the terror attacks in September 2001, the UN Security Council was presented 
with a moment of ‘simultaneous opportunity and peril.’810 It was this painful event 
which brought forth a global consensus on the necessity for collective action against 
the (perceived) global threat of terrorism. It only took a couple of days until the 
Security Council had unanimously adopted a resolution condemning the attacks by 
referring to them as a ‘threat to international peace and security’ and reaffirming the 
‘inherent right of individual or collective self defence in accordance with the 
Charter.’811 Shortly afterwards, the Security Council adopted another resolution which 
was targeted at combating terrorists and states which ‘support, harbor, provide safe 
haven to, finance, supply weapons to, help recruit, or aid terrorists,’ and required wide-
ranging cooperation of all member states.’812 What followed was the rapid 
establishment of a comprehensive legal framework, backed by its enforcement power 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, for states to effectively tackle international 
terrorism by mutually cooperating and coordinating their respective criminal justice 
systems.813 
 
Only one month later, the United States had started its initiative against the training 
camps of Al-Qaeda as well as military facilities of the Taliban in Afghanistan – all 
under the cover of its ‘inherent right of individual or collective self-defence.’814 This 
so-called ‘Bush Doctrine’ reflected the perception that a state has the right to use 
military force in its ‘self-defence’ against any state which has not implemented 
Resolution 1373.815 This assertion had far-reaching consequences – not only for the 
collective security system of the UN, but also for international law in general. While 
the ‘Bush Doctrine’ obviously encouraged the use of force rather than diplomatic or 
legal measures, it also brought about a new category of states’ preventive anti-terror 
activities into the traditional laws of war.816 
                                                 
810 PG Danchin and H Fischer, 'Introduction: The New Collective Security' in Danchin PG and Fischer 
H (eds), United Nations Reform and the New Collective Security (Cambridge University Press 2010) 
at 3. 
811 UN Security Council Resolution 1368 (12 September 2001). 
812 UN Security Council Resolution 1373 (28 September 2001). 
813 Danchin and Fischer, 'Introduction: The New Collective Security' at 3. 
814 Art 51 of the UN Charter. 
815 Danchin and Fischer, 'Introduction: The New Collective Security' at 4. 
816 Ibid. 
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Without going into detail about the moral grounds on which the ‘coalition of the 
willing’ tried to justify the invasion of Iraq in 2003, the war that followed challenged 
nothing less than the idea of international order and collective security, since it ‘split 
the Security Council, divided the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), and 
prompted the creation of a high-level panel to rethink the very idea of collective 
security.’817 While it caused a long overdue debate about the necessity to reform the 
United Nations and triggered a discourse about how to ‘vanquish war and power 
politics through international law,’818 the case of the ‘Bush Doctrine’ also shows how 
quickly customary law can develop. While this development has met with some 
resistance, less controversial insights with regard to the formation of customary law 
can be drawn from the North Sea Continental Shelf cases.819 Here, the ICJ rejected the 
principle of equidistance, but upheld the idea of ‘equitable principles,’ which refers to 
several cooperative factors. Furthermore, the ICJ also upheld the principle of 
customary international law by using the text of the Geneva Convention and its 
purpose to exclude the mechanism of equidistance.820 
 
Thus, one might ask whether the time has come to grant a legal concept which aims to 
address an even more severe challenge – one which already has a grave impact on 
billions of people around the world – a shortcut for reaching the status of customary 
international law? As noble as this idea might seem, it is rather unrealistic to expect a 
sudden willingness of states to declare water security as a ‘common concern’ of 
mankind and thus provoke a fundamental change of international (water) law. Most 
nations might be wary of opening Pandora’s box with regard to the concept of state 
sovereignty and the management of other natural resources. However the possibility of 
regional forces in changing the understanding of international water law should not be 
discounted, as it is generally accepted that subgroups of states can develop their own 
customary law.821 Eventually, when the time is ripe, one might see the slow formation 
                                                 
817 S Chesterman, 'Reforming the United Nations: Legitimacy, Effectiveness, and Power after Iraq' 
(2006) 10 Singapore Year Book of International Law 59 at 60. 
818 Danchin and Fischer, 'Introduction: The New Collective Security' at 6. 
819 Cases concerning the North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany v. Denmark; 
Federal Republic of Germany v. Netherlands), Judgement of 20 February 1969, ICJ Reports 1969, 3 
at para 37; available at <http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/52/5561.pdf>. 
820 Ibid at para 60. 
821 Lepard, Customary International Law : A New Theory with Practical Applications at 33. For 
instance, the ICJ found that customary law could exist even between just two states; concluded in 
2009 that ‘ﬁshing by the inhabitants of the Costa Rican bank of the San Juan River for subsistence 
purposes from that bank is to be respected by Nicaragua as a customary right.’ ICJ, Dispute 
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of a customary rule concerning water security as a common concern – maybe even at 
the global level. 
 
5.4.2 The Overlooked Strength of Soft Law 
There has long been a rift between two camps of international legal scholars regarding 
the issue of ‘soft law.’ While some perceive it as a threat to ‘international law proper’ 
or the ‘normative continuum,’822 others acknowledge the legal potential it entails.823 
While there is no generally accepted definition of soft law, it is usually refers to any 
written instrument, other than a treaty, which contains general principles, specific 
norms, or any other provisions determining expected behaviour.824 Its goal is the 
achievement of functional cooperation between states in order to reach common 
international goals. The concept of soft law is closely linked the international relations 
theory of ‘soft power’825 and thus puts forward a structure of normative constraints on 
actors which does not depend on the coercive characteristics of hard law. Hence, in 
general, soft law does not have the objective of creating rights and obligations under 
international law.826 
 
The sheer amount of non-legal instruments in the area of transboundary water 
management which intend to shape states’ behaviour seems to justify a (renewed) 
reflection on the possibilities soft law can have in promoting the concept of regional 
common concern.827 Due to the fact that many non-binding instruments are drafted like 
binding international law – providing a basis for legal arguments and disputes – and 
are having a significant impact on the issues they address, it has been argued that soft 
law does not really differ from binding international law – except for the fact that it is 
                                                                                                                                             
regarding Navigational and Related Rights Case (Costa Rica v Nicaragua), Judgement (13 July 
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Editors' Introductory Remarks' (2012) 25 Leiden Journal of International Law 309 at 309. 
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Rights of Indigenous Peoples' (2009) 58 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 957. 
824 D Shelton, 'Soft Law' in Armstrong D (ed), Routledge Handbook of International Law (Routledge 
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825 Zeitoun, Mirumachi and Warner, 'Transboundary Water Interaction II: The Influence of 'Soft' Power' 
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826 See, e.g., J Ellis, 'Shades of Grey: Soft Law and the Validity of Public International Law' (2012) 25 
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Law: A Self-Serving Quest for New Legal Materials' (2008) 19 European Journal of International 
Law 1075. 
827 For a discussion on the various approaches within the global water community, see Chapter 4. 
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officially ‘non-binding.’828 One cannot limit the concept of soft law to those 
instruments that interact with binding legal norms.829 Rather, the dynamic character of 
many soft law instruments has to be acknowledged. While some of its instruments 
represent a first step in a process which may lead from soft to hard law; some soft law 
instruments are actually drafted with the intention to remain soft, and thus more easily 
amendable. Understanding this requires recognising soft law as a ‘functional 
equivalent’ to binding international law.830 
 
There are several reasons for states to enter into non-treaty arrangements – e.g., need 
for mutual confidence-building; desire to create a preliminary, rather flexible regime; 
concern that potential failure of a hard treaty could burden international relations; 
usually speedier finalisation; and parties which do not have the legal standing to 
conclude treaties under international law – like non-state actors (NSAs) – can be 
included in the process.831 Yet, legal positivism still does not consider soft law as 
international law proper. ‘Just as physicists view dark matter only through its interplay 
with visible matter, modern legal positivists grasp soft law purely through its interplay 
with hard law.’832 In merely treating soft law as an indicator for the emergence or 
development of customary law, some of its important functions are being missed out. 
 
While the role of NSAs on the creation and implementation of (soft) law is increasing, 
there are several examples where non-basin states’ engagement in hydro-diplomacy 
has made real impacts on the ground. While this is nothing new, the efforts of NSAs 
have recently gained momentum, as water security is being seen as an important issue 
of world politics. Two recent examples are the US Water Partnership833 and Scotland’s 
‘Hydro Nation Programme.’ The Scottish initiative is of particular interest, as it not 
only involves demonstrating ‘leadership in meeting the challenges and opportunities 
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that the water industry presents across the world,’834 but it may also provide a channel 
of (hydro-)diplomacy for the nation which is part of the United Kingdom; and as such, 
the UK Parliament retains power over certain ‘reserved’ matters – including 
international relations.835 Other examples of states engaged in active hydro-diplomacy 
around the world are France,836 Germany,837 Japan,838 the Netherlands839 and 
Sweden.840 
 
It follows from the discussion above that legal scholars should not shy away from 
including soft law in their research, as it has already played an important role in both 
norm creation and norm formation within international water law and more broadly. If 
anything, more emphasis should be given to the analysis of the potential of this legal 
avenue in changing the current legal system governing the world’s transboundary 
freshwater resources. The fact that international (hard) law does not operate detached 
from (soft) political and societal processes has to be reflected in future international 
legal research. 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
International water law does not merely constitute a niche product of the international 
system. Due to the unique characteristics of the global water crisis and the 
conglomerate challenges they pose to the international community, international water 
law can – and should – affect the very substance of general international law.841 Not 
only is international water law a rather new field of international law, it can also 
introduce new methods and new ways of thinking into the wider sphere of legal 
research. The challenges we are facing regarding the peaceful management of our 
shared freshwater resources are bigger than states – bigger than basins. In an 
increasingly water insecure world, a ‘react-and-correct’ approach is no longer 
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adequate. What is needed, instead, is one of ’foresee-and-prevent.’842 This, however, 
can only be possible if we overcome the prevailing state-centrism in international 
water law. Doing so requires fundamental changes to the interpretation of the 
established paradigms of international law – above all, the principle of state 
sovereignty. 
 
The community of states has manoeuvred itself to the tipping point of global water 
insecurity, by ignoring the growing interdependences with regard to their shared water 
resources and clinging to the orthodox state-centred approach in fear of losing 
sovereignty. Recalling the obligation of the global community ‘to maintain 
international peace and security,’843 the lack of collective political will to address the 
widespread water insecurity with the utmost effort seems astonishing. The looming 
water crisis, together with the recognition that the fair sharing of transboundary water 
resources is gaining significance, sets the course for future transboundary freshwater 
management. Applying the 4A legal analytical framework as a template for analysing 
the key issues related to water security in the context of water interaction can serve as 
a point of departure for the refinement of international (water) law. It is our 
responsibility to make the case that as long as states keep focusing on their own 
respective interests, pursuing their own benefits; the international community will fail 
in achieving ‘ultimate security.’ While the notion of common water security is still in 
its infancy, it nevertheless provides a novel mindset – one which may, if backed by the 
normative concept of ‘regional common concern,’ ultimately be capable of 
overcoming state-centrism. Joint efforts of governments, the epistemic community and 
the public are of key importance for pushing the concept forward beyond a vague 
political ideal.844 Only when based on such combined efforts can the new mindset 
acquire necessary legal validity. The previous sections have shown how this normative 
foundation can be guided out of its embryonic stage, materialise in international law 
and ultimately base international freshwater interaction on a more common ground. 
Following in the next chapter is an analysis as to how likely this change of course is in 
the region of the Himalayas; and how far along the road the Asian hydro-hegemons, 
China and India, are in overcoming state-centrism. 
 
                                                 
842 Timoshenko, 'Ecological Security: Response to Global Challenges'. 
843 Art 1(1) of the UN Charter. 
844 Tolba, 'The Implications of the 'Common Concern of Mankind' Concept on Global Environmental 
Issues' at 246. 
154 
 
6 WATER SECURITY IN HIMALAYAN ASIA 
The previous chapters have proposed a working definition of water security and how 
this evolving concept should be underpinned ethically (hydrosolidarity) and legally 
(regional common concern). The following sections examine the current state of affairs 
in Himalayan Asia, and how the novel understanding of common water security and its 
legal foundations could help achieving hydrosolidarity. The region serves as a useful 
area of study, since several of the global challenges which put pressure on 
transboundary water management can be found here – i.e., climate change, population 
growth, urbanisation and economic development. In addition, political tensions 
between several of the states depending on the runoff of the ‘Third Pole’ hamper 
regional cooperation – e.g., the conflicts in the volatile parts of Kashmir and Tibet. 
Contrary to other studies that investigate the water issues of Himalayan Asia,845 this 
chapter will maintain an objective focus by basing the analysis on the 4A analytical 
framework of water security (see Chapter 3). It is true that this problem-oriented 
approach to choosing a region is not without its shortcomings. Analysing a region 
which already applies an institutional framework based on a well advanced 
environment of mutual trust and cooperation, like the European Union, might have 
shown more obvious links to an understanding of water security developed in this 
thesis. However, the further development of the concept, as well as international water 
law, will benefit more by studying a challenging environment which highlights some 
hurdles regarding its implementation. If it can be demonstrated that even in such a 
complex and volatile region, looking at international water law through the lens of 
common water security could help to break with the prevalence of zero-sum games, 
and thus lead to hydrosolidarity, it may serve as an inspiring model for other regions. 
 
6.1 The Particularities of the Region 
Himalayan Asia is especially interesting for studies on water security. This is mainly 
due to the water challenges it faces – but also because of its political setting. While 
some of these challenges are very particular to the region, others are being observed all 
around the world; although with different intensities. Since ‘Himalayan Asia’ is a 
variously defined area, it is important to point out that this chapter looks at the 
transboundary freshwater interaction between Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
Burma, Cambodia, China, India, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand and Vietnam – who 
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are all, at least to some extent, dependent on river systems that originate in the 
Himalayas.846 
 
The speed of economic development in the region is remarkable. Looking at China and 
India, the average growth in GDP over the last five years was 9.3 percent and 7.2 
percent respectively – in a time of global economic crisis.847 Not only the speed, but 
also the nature of economic development throughout the region triggers difficult 
environmental and social challenges. In Cambodia and Laos, for example, the 
aftermath of conflict and the transition from centrally-planned towards (more) market-
oriented economies has resulted in increased foreign investment in resource 
extraction.848 One of the results is an increase in large scale commercial logging which 
threatens the unique biodiversity of the region as well as sustainable water 
management, since it damages wetlands, including those protected under the Ramsar 
Convention,849 and thus compromises the vital ecosystem services they provide.850 In 
some countries, the major source of direct foreign investment is in hydropower 
developments – for instance along the Mekong river – trying to quench the nations’ 
increasing thirst for energy.851 Already, the region is home to around 45 percent of the 
world’s population,852 while more than 1.5 billion people (22 percent of the global 
population) are directly dependent on the rivers originating in the Himalayas.853 
Although the birth rate in some countries of the region is rather stable (e.g., in China 
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with 0.5 percent per year),854 other nations will grow rapidly. The population of 
Afghanistan, for example, is projected to more than double by the middle of the 
century – increasing from today’s 32 to around 76 million.855 Due to the 
aforementioned factors, most countries in the region have seen their renewable 
freshwater resources and water availability drop continuously over the last decades.856  
  
Climate change is acting as a constantly intensifying threat multiplier around the 
world, since it ‘poses a major conceptual challenge to water managers, water resource 
users (e.g., agriculture, industry), as well as to policy makers in general, as it is no 
longer appropriate to assume that past climatic and hydrological conditions will 
continue into the future.’857 In Himalayan Asia, the challenges posed by global 
warming are of particular severity and complexity. The increased rainfall variability 
will adversely affect both surface and groundwater reliability and quality by making 
floods, droughts and other extreme events more likely; and rising sea levels will cause 
a degradation of coastal aquifers through salinity intrusion.858 Furthermore, the rise in 
global mean temperatures has already resulted in the acceleration of glacier melt. 
While the exact speed of this process is still being debated,859 the noticeable decline in 
Asian mountain glacial cover is widely acknowledged.860 However, due to diverse 
hydrological characteristics of the Himalayas, the impact of the melting glaciers is 
being felt very differently in the various river basins. The basins highly dependent on 
the glacial meltwater are the Indus (44.8 percent),861 the Ganges (29 percent) and the 
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Yangtze (19 percent); while others, e.g., the Yellow (1.3 percent), are much less reliant 
on this source.862 When looking at seasonal variations, the complexity of the link 
between glaciers and river basin becomes even more apparent. While snow and ice 
pack melt contribute to 29 percent of the annual flow of the Ganges, in summer the 
river runoff is said to be 70 percent dependent on glacier melt.863 Yet, these numbers 
have to be treated with caution rather than accepted as accurate figures. Furthermore, a 
significant amount of freshwater reserves are being stored in the ground as 
permafrost.864 The projected decline in areas covered by permafrost could have a 
significant impact on groundwater storage and recharge patterns in the region.865 
However, the glaciers of the Himalayas have not yet been extensively mapped – and 
thus, a lot more research needs to be done in order to better understand the different 
rates of glacial retreat and the consequential effects on the various river basins. 
Nonetheless, even if the downstream impact of reduced snow and ice cover cannot be 
determined precisely, the general trend of a temporary increase and a long-term 
decrease in river runoff holds true.866 Another consequence of global climate change is 
the shift in monsoon patterns. This development is of serious concern for various river 
basins in the region, as it causes freshwater supplies to be less predictable, and thus 
makes water management less reliable.867 Due to the fact that the Himalayan region as 
a whole is highly sensitive to global climatic changes, these impacts will have a 
detrimental effect on the socio-economic development of states in Himalayan Asia. 
The repercussions of global warming for Pakistan, for instance, will cost its national 
economy around 14 billion USD (almost 5 percent of GDP) each year.868 
 
                                                 
862 Strategic Foresight Group, The Himalayan Challenge: Water Security in Emerging Asia (Strategic 
Foresight Group, 2010) at 10. See also, SP Singh, V Singh and M Skutsch, 'Rapid Warming in the 
Himalayas: Ecosystem Responses and Development Options' (2010) 2 Climate and Development 
221 at 224. 
863 Strategic Foresight Group, The Himalayan Challenge: Water Security in Emerging Asia at 10. 
864 X Li and others, 'Distribution and Changes of Glacier, Snow and Permafrost in China' in Braun LN 
and others (eds), Assessment of Snow, Glacier and Water Resources in Asia, vol 8 (International 
Hydrological Programme of UNESCO; German IHP/HWRP National Committee 2009) at 122. 
865 C Andermann and others, 'Impact of Transient Groundwater Storage on the Discharge of Himalayan 
Rivers' (forthcoming) Nature Geoscience; B Bookhagen, 'Hydrology: Himalayan Groundwater' 
(forthcoming) Nature Geoscience. 
866 Humanitarian Futures Programme, The Waters of the Third Pole: Sources of Threat, Sources of 
Survival (2010) at 9. 
867 F Biermann, '‘Earth System Governance’ as a Crosscutting Theme of Global Change Research' 
(2007) 17 Global Environmental Change 326 at 330; BP Kaltenborn, C Nellemann and II Vistnes 
(eds), High Mountain Glaciers and Climate Change : Challenges to Human Livelihoods and 
Adaptation (UNEP, GRID-Arendal 2010) at 20. 
868 The News International, 'Climate Change to Cost Pakistan $14 Billion Annually' (24 March 2012) 
<http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-2-99268-Climate-change-to-cost-Pakistan-$14-billion-
annually>. 
158 
Yet, while Asia is hit hard by global environmental change, migration patterns seem to 
make things even worse. Against common belief, people are as likely to move towards 
areas of environmental risk (e.g., floodplains, low-lying coastal zones) as they are to 
move away from them. This phenomenon might cause the number of people living in 
floodplains of urban areas in South-Eastern Asia to rise from around 7 million in 2000 
to 30-49 million by 2060.869 Another significant population group is simply too poor to 
be able to migrate, despite increasing environmental hardship. This shows that the 
profound changes in environmental conditions (like too much or too little freshwater) 
will affect human migration patterns in a very complex way. While previous studies 
have mainly focused on groups leaving vulnerable areas, future research has to analyse 
how to address the issues of migrating towards environmental risk and how to better 
help the millions of people that will be ‘trapped’ in vulnerable regions.870 
 
These pressures not only affect the states in their national development and policies. It 
is the feature of water to transform these domestic challenges into regional ones. The 
glaciers of the Tibetan Plateau, also referred to as the ‘Third Pole,’ feed the headwaters 
of the mighty rivers Yellow, Yangtze, Mekong, Salween, Irrawaddy, Ganges-
Brahmaputra and Indus. Around 1.5 billion people downstream directly depend upon 
these waters – not to mention the (hidden) global implications of the ‘virtual water’ 
trade. Since the outlook for this region is especially worrisome, one can expect that 
governments will increasingly look beyond their borders to secure freshwater 
resources – leading to even more geopolitical tensions.871 In light of the predicted 
freshwater shortages in the long run, glacial waters are only gaining in value, which in 
turn adds political significance to the regions in which these waters are stored. While 
this is true for various regions of the world (e.g., in the Andes),872 this applies 
especially to the geopolitical relevance of the Tibetan Plateau.873 In few other places 
has the prospect of conflicts over water resources been more seriously anticipated than 
in Himalayan Asia, where some of the world’s greatest river systems crisscross 
international boundaries of several of the world’s most densely-populated and hostile 
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nations – including Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan.874 While the two dominant 
powers in the region – China and India – try to maintain an understanding of water 
security as being of supreme national importance, their downstream neighbours are 
pushing more and more for a new understanding of common water security. 
 
The recently published Asian Water Development Outlook provides a first 
comprehensive analysis of water security on a country by country basis in Asia.875 
While, as is so often the case, the study does not move beyond a state-centred 
perception of water security,876 the national results are nonetheless very important in 
understanding the pressing water issues in the region. The overall conclusion of the 
exercise is that the 37 of the 49 states which had been assessed are either facing a 
‘hazardous’ level of water security (e.g., India) or have barely begun to engage in 
tackling water security issues (e.g., China).877 While the study acknowledges the fact 
that ‘water security impacts often transcend national boundaries,’878 it remains largely 
silent on how to improve transboundary freshwater management.879 However, it 
highlights two realities which also have a heavy impact on international hydropolitics: 
(1) rapidly increasing inequality in access to water and sanitation; and (2) the 
deteriorating environmental state of the river basins.880 Furthermore, the fact that the 
region’s great hydropower potential, particularly in Bhutan, Burma, China, India, Laos 
and Thailand, is still mainly untapped has not gone unnoticed.881 Against the backdrop 
of an energy-hungry Asia the development of this source of electricity will have far 
reaching implications way beyond the national boundaries of these states. 
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This brief overview of water security issues in Himalayan Asia shows quite blatantly 
that the cumulative effects of the various challenges are already reshaping the region’s 
international relations. Asia’s freshwater resource challenge is exceptionally complex, 
encompassing a blend of political, economic, social and environmental dimensions. 
The increasingly water-focused rivalries between nations, some of which are nuclear 
armed (China, India and Pakistan) has caused great anxiety amongst international 
security experts.882 This disquiet is mainly due to the fact that states still tend to voice 
their water needs in terms of national interests.883 Here, a new understanding of 
common water security could help changing the path the nations pursue in their 
transboundary water interaction – from independence to interdependence. 
 
6.2 The Rise of Two Global Powerhouses 
What China does regarding its water management affects ten countries downstream: 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, Burma, Cambodia, India, Laos, Nepal, Pakistan, Thailand and 
Vietnam; while India's riparian policies heavily affect four countries: Bangladesh, 
Bhutan, Nepal and Pakistan.884 The importance of China is stressed even more when 
one realises that the headwaters of all the transboundary rivers flowing through these 
countries, except the main Ganges River, rise in the Tibetan Plateau. Thus, all of the 
aforementioned mighty basins depend – at least to some degree – on China, which 
explains the crucial geopolitical feature of Tibet.885 All those social and environmental 
pressures seem even more daunting, when looking at them in light of the political 
setting of the region. 
 
China’s and India’s emerging role in a new world order is more evident than ever. One 
example is the fact that some politicians in Europe are now looking to China for a way 
out of the European debt crisis.886 Both states are also trying to manifest their positions 
with the traditional approach of military security. While this is of course highly 
significant for the security and stability of South/South-East Asia, the repercussions of 
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the power struggles within the highly critical region can be felt far beyond its 
boundaries. A recent study showed that while India was the world’s largest importer of 
arms in the period between 2007 and 2011 (accounting for 10 percent of global 
imports), Pakistan was the third largest (with 5 percent of global imports).887 The only 
reason why China fell ‘behind’ from being the largest to the fourth largest importer is 
due to its dramatic increase in production back home, making it less dependent on 
imports.888 These worrisome developments within the three nuclear armed countries, 
coupled with the economic rise and environmental degradation, have accorded the 
region renewed international attention. 
 
For the elite leaders of the two regional powerhouses, sustaining economic growth 
seems to take precedence over all other social and environmental challenges they face. 
Some scholars argue that setting the priority on the economy is the only way for the 
Chinese Communist Party to secure its legitimacy,889 and that India’s only chance to 
not let its regional position of power diminish is to not let China romp away in the race 
for economic growth. The demand for various natural resources (including water, 
minerals and fossil fuels) in the two economies is already outstripping domestic 
supplies.890 China in particular has now changed its foreign policy in order to be able 
to quench its resource thirst. It is more and more willing to go abroad; forging 
relationships with countries in Africa, the Middle East and South America it would 
prefer not to (i.e. states which are considered unreliable, unsavoury or ruled by 
dictatorships). While this is nothing new in the international arena – most western 
nations have gone through this development – it shows that China, which has always 
been trying to portray itself as a developing country rather than an imperial power (like 
western nations), is now also trapped in the ‘reverse resource curse’ of major 
importing countries.891 This means that China is ensnared in inconvenient relationships 
in order to keep its economy growing and its own citizens tame. The ventures to secure 
precious resources far from home have even pushed China to engage in the already 
                                                 
887 P Holtom and others, Trends in International Arms Transfers, 2011 (Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute 2012) at 6. 
888 Ibid at 5. 
889 Listen to M Klare’s interview with Le Monde Diplomatique on China’s resource hunger at 
<http://mondediplo.com/2012/09/06podcast>. 
890 UBS, The Rush for Resources Challenges Emerging Markets (UBS 2010) at 28. 
891 M Klare for Le Monde Diplomatique, 'China’s Imperial Predicament' (September 2012) 
<http://mondediplo.com/2012/09/06imperial>. 
162 
heated race over the natural wealth of the Arctic Sea by defining itself as a ‘near-arctic 
state.’892 
 
The rapid economic expansion of China and India also results in an increased use of 
water and hydropower. Both countries have plans to step up inter-basin water transfers 
and have accelerated their dam construction programmes, in order to meet their ever 
growing freshwater demands.893 In addition to this obvious link to their own 
transboundary freshwater management at home, both China and India are among the 
top ‘land grabbers’ engaged in foreign investment in farmland in order to feed their 
citizens at home. These large-scale leases or purchases of agricultural areas are not 
only likely to have a huge impact on the environment, but also on the livelihoods of 
communities in the target countries, as they often meddle with local water 
management.894 Together with Brazil, China and India are involved with around 24 
percent of the total number of hectares leased or sold worldwide.895 The World Bank 
released a report in 2010 which, while highlighting the undeniable need for more yield 
output in Africa, raises concerns about the potential these investments have in 
undermining land rights and marginalising small scale producers in the host states.896 
 
These developments show that the two powerhouses do not shy away from a more 
aggressive path of satisfying their resource needs – be it for minerals, food or water. 
The undeniable fact that China and India overshadow their smaller downstream 
riparians both economically and politically, poses some serious questions on how the 
future of transboundary freshwater interaction in the region will look like. How do 
China and India perceive their emerging roles in a new world order? And more 
importantly for this study: How will this affect transboundary water management in 
the region? How can international water law help prevent confrontations from 
escalating and instead foster transboundary cooperation? Before analysing the legal 
framework for water security in the region, the following sections highlight the two 
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(hydro)hegemons’ water issues and demonstrate the current legal response based on 
applying the 4A framework to the regimes governing the Indus and the Mekong. 
 
6.2.1 China 
6.2.1.1 The water challenge 
While some commentators are in animated discussions about whether China’s power 
has already peaked,897 the impact of its rapid rise already left a mark on its 
environment which will have a long-term impact for society – even if its economic 
growth will slow down in the future. Protecting its environment during times of rapid 
change has been identified as a serious dilemma by its officials. In 2011, Minister of 
the Environment, Zhou Shengxian, stated in an essay published in his ministry’s 
official newspaper that ‘[i]n China’s thousands of years of civilization, the conflict 
between humanity and nature has never been as serious as it is today.’898 Water plays a 
key role in this struggle, as its diminishing supplies are putting an enormous amount of 
pressure on the Chinese people and on the country’s ability to continue its global 
economic rise.899 While some of the impacts are solely felt at the local level inside 
China, many of the countermeasures prove to have far reaching spillover effects. 
 
This conflict is most visible in the many mega-cities which mushroomed in recent 
decades. In the period from 1990-2005, China’s urban population more than doubled 
from 254 million people to 572 million people.900 By 2025, China’s 15 largest cities 
could well have a combined population greater than the entire United States.901 While 
rapid urbanisation will contribute to China’s economic growth, it carries social and 
environmental challenges with it which urgently need to be addressed – water 
management in particular, as two-thirds of China’s 660 cities are affected by water 
scarcity.902 Despite the rapid urbanisation, more than 700 million people are still living 
in rural areas. The tension caused by the increasing wealth gap between urban regions 
and the countryside has, so far, caused the government to accelerate the urbanisation 
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process even more, in order to create more jobs for the unemployed rural 
population.903 At the national average, the per capita natural freshwater resources 
amounted to 2,156 m3 in 2007, and are expected to decrease to 1,875 m3 when China’s 
population is projected to peak around 2033.904 In the north of China, the situation is 
already a lot more serious. The Hai river basin, for example, can only provide for 
around 300 m3 of freshwater per person – with 120 million inhabitants, including the 
cities of Beijing and Tianjin.905 Based on the standard definitions, North China is 
already a water-scarce region; while China as a whole will soon be a water stressed 
country.906 The challenge is getting more complex when considering that many of the 
driest areas of the country are not only densely populated, but also industrial centres, 
like the provinces of Hebei, Shandong and Shanxi.907 
 
Already, the grave concerns about China’s water supply have called into question the 
country’s energy ambitions. By 2030, China plans to produce an additional 1.2 TWh of 
power; which is almost six times the total installed capacity of India.908 While this 
amount seems incredibly high, it will ‘merely’ bring its per capita installed capacity in 
line with the current Group of 20 (G20) average.909 According to its 12th Five-Year 
Plan (5YP) for 2011-2015, China wants to achieve this goal mainly by building new 
thermal power plants fired by coal and nuclear, as well as by increasing its hydropower 
capacity.910 All of these new sources need huge amounts of water – for driving the 
steam turbines, cooling purposes, as well as in the process of extracting the fossil fuels. 
Considering the available water resources, it also seems highly unlikely that China will 
achieve its goal to become a global player in the production of shale gas. While the 
development of this source seems to be an important part of China’s strategy to quench 
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its thirst for energy,911 the unconventional process of drilling for shale gas faces its 
own challenges, as it uses large amounts of water to extract natural gas (shale gas) 
from the ground – with a high potential for contamination of linked freshwater 
systems.912 In addition, some of China’s largest untapped deposits of shale gas are, as 
with coal, in parched regions of the country, setting the stage for conflict over use 
scenarios among different water users. Thus, hydraulic fracturing will certainly not be 
able to fill the gap in energy supply – even without considering its environmental 
drawbacks.913 According to a recent study, 97 percent of power generated in China is 
reliant on water.914 Even with a change in fuel mix through China’s big renewables 
drive, it will only manage to reduce this number to 87 percent by 2030.915 Hence, 
China’s leadership is facing a difficult dilemma. With 45 percent of its GDP being 
produced in water scarce provinces which highly depend on electricity produced by 
coal (80 percent), it ultimately has to decouple economic development from water 
consumption without leaving its path of economic growth.916 However, since it is 
running far behind in terms of water efficiency – requiring about 4 times the amount of 
water per USD of GDP created when compared to the other members of the G20 – it is 
obvious that this challenge is of epic dimensions.917 Conservative lower-bound figures 
estimate that China’s water crisis is already costing the country 2.3 percent of its GDP 
– 1.3 percent can be attributed to water scarcity and 1.0 percent to direct impacts of the 
widespread water pollution.918 These numbers, however, do not include ecological 
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impacts linked to eutrophication and the drying up of wetlands, rivers and lakes; 
making the real cost of the crisis considerably higher.919 
 
Over the last three years, the Chinese Ministry of Water Resources conducted the first 
National Water Census. The outcome was, even for Chinese standards, rather 
surprising, as the number of rivers with a catchment area larger than 100 km2 has 
dropped by more than 50 percent compared to the 1950s.920 While officials blamed the 
‘disappearance’ of around 28,000 rivers largely on inaccurate previous estimates and 
climate change, others fear that prioritising rapid economic development over the 
sustainable management of the environment is having even graver consequences on 
China’s freshwater resources than initially imagined.921 Not only does the nation face 
serious water scarcity issues, it is also exposed to a freshwater quality crisis of massive 
scale – which, of course, is being intensified by existing water shortages. It has been 
estimated that almost 90 percent of Chinese cities suffers from water pollution and 
more than 500 million of the rural population do not have access to safe drinking 
water.922 The onslaught of bad news reached the climax recently with 16,000 pig 
carcasses found in tributaries of the Huangpu river which supplies the city of Shanghai 
with drinking water.923 Issues of groundwater quality are being mainly ignored, as the 
dumping of untreated or only partially treated wastewater is a widespread practice.924 
Official figures show that more than half of the major watercourses and around one 
third of China’s groundwater resources are unfit for human consumption.925 The 
widespread water pollution is affecting the health of 190 million people along all 
China’s major rivers annually; with cases of diarrhoeal diseases and cancer increasing 
at a dramatic rate.926 
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China’s water crisis, together with the decline of arable land (mainly due to pressures 
of population growth, urbanisation and rapid economic development),927 is also 
heavily affecting the nation’s food security. Groundwater levels in the North China 
Plains – one of the world’s breadbaskets – have been declining dramatically 
recently.928 While China experienced a grain deficit of 27 million tons in 2000, this 
gap could grow to 88 million tons in the year 2030 – under medium scenarios for 
population growth and irrigation area development.929 
 
6.2.1.2 Domestic responses 
China has long recognised its particular water management challenge. Since the crisis 
has worsened in recent decades – and is now threatening to slow down economic 
growth, weaken political stability, driving up costs of public health care – there is 
growing internal dissent and conflict over issues of water quality and its (re)allocation, 
adding pressure on both the central and regional governments to address China’s water 
problems more effectively.930 In his report to the National Congress of the Communist 
Party of China in 2007, former President Hu Jintao pushed for more ‘scientific 
development’ that should focus on major water issues including ‘securing more clean 
drinking water, improving water conservation, water pollution prevention, restricting 
excessive water resources exploitation and cutting water waste.’931 This is why, over 
the next 10 years, the Central Committee of the Communist Party plans to invest 4 
trillion Yuan (almost 650 billion USD) in the water sector; half of which will be spent 
during the current Five-Year-Plan period.932 Last year, China set performance targets 
for industry, irrigation and water quality, supported by measures which are supposed to 
promote ‘water security’ as a key feature for a sustainable economy.933 Closely linked 
to water management issues are various other policy responses, like the restriction on 
arable land conversion and the program to convert marginal agricultural lands to 
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forests and grasslands.934 While many of these initiatives are very laudable steps, their 
implementation leaves a lot to be desired, as they seem to have only little impact on 
China’s food and water security.935 One prime example here is the project to protect 
the Miyun reservoir and watershed, Beijing’s most important source of freshwater.936 
The Chinese government introduced stricter rules on land and forest management 
(including a ban on logging) and, over decades, invested heavily in ambitious 
reforestation efforts.937 However, much of this exercise was a waste of resources, since 
the newly planted young trees only have a minimal positive effect on soil and water 
quality, as they have not been managed appropriately.938 The laudable first steps of 
reforestation could have had a much bigger impact on the capital’s water quality had 
they been supported by truly integrated management of the entire catchment area.939 
 
Furthermore, China’s water problems are hampered by the race for the rapid economic 
growth between the provinces and local governments – all trying to protect local 
industries and jobs – which is heavily affected by corruption and the ‘crippling 
weakness’ of the State Environmental Protection Administration (SEPA).940 At the 
same time, the challenges associated with the political system in China have boosted 
public concern and attempts to induce change. Grassroots environmental initiatives 
have grown in China and become more and more successful at raising awareness and 
demanding action, although NGOs remain under strict surveillance by officials.941 
Adding to the challenges are water laws which are either outdated, weak or both, 
lacking strong enforcement mechanisms. Many of the rules addressing water quality 
were put in place several decades ago and lack necessary enforcement mechanisms, as 
minimal fines and ‘vague civil liabilities’ do not effectively change actors’ 
behaviour.942 Traditionally, the regulatory frameworks in China have also limited the 
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power of national environmental agencies, e.g., SEPA, to the benefit of local control, 
leading to a whole range of differing standards for industries and various degrees of 
enforcement.943 Interestingly, while China is often perceived to be dominated by a 
strong centralised single party system, the country manages its water resources with a 
complex set of agencies at all levels of government, from national down to the local. 
Hence, competing and conflicting competences among a multitude of institutions are 
adding more pressure to the water woes.944 
 
In order to overcome these governance related struggles, China is investing heavily in 
large infrastructure projects in the form of dams, reservoirs and diversion schemes. 
The north-western province of Xinjiang alone is building 59 reservoirs to store the 
meltwater from the shrinking glaciers of the Himalayas.945 Considering the costs for 
this project alone, in a rather poor part of China, of 30m USD per year over the next 10 
years, it becomes obvious that the economic implications of adapting to the future 
water challenges are immense.946 By far the grandest scheme in recent history of 
freshwater management, first proposed by Mao Zedong in 1952, is the South-North 
Water Transfer Project (SNWTP) which is due to be completed in 2050. Aimed at 
ensuring continuous economic growth in the dry north, around 45 billion cubic meters 
of freshwater will eventually be diverted annually from the south of the country, where 
it is available in relative abundance.947 This mammoth undertaking is separated into 
three segments: 948 (1) The Western Route diverts water from upper Yangtze tributaries 
in the Sichuan and Qinghai mountains by taking water from a reservoir on the Yalong 
river via a 170 km tunnel to the upper Yellow river. (2) The Central Route, which 
starts at the Danjiangkou reservoir on the Han river, a tributary of the Yangtze, will 
eventually – after 1,230 km – end in Beijing and include a 7.2 km tunnel underneath 
the Yellow river. (3) The Eastern Route, which, again, diverts water from the Yangtze 
includes an upgrade of the Grand Canal (originally built for navigational purposes) and 
supply reservoirs near the city of Tianjin. China’s bet on solving its water crises by 
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‘replumbing’ the country has been met with fierce criticism. 949 By building dams and 
canals which alter the hydrology and natural landscape at an unprecedented scale, the 
water is said to bypass farmers and mainly benefit the industry and urban centres in the 
north. As a result, the farmers, who are supposed to help achieve China’s goal of food 
self-sufficiency, are forced to dig deeper and deeper groundwater wells to grow their 
wheat.950 This again highlights the government’s focus on economic growth – leaving 
little room for environmental or social concerns. It has been argued that water quality 
in the Yangtze is already at such a poor stage that the amount of treatment plants 
needed to clean the diverted water will add costs to the already expensive project 
which could make it uneconomical.951 During the National People’s Congress in 2006, 
former Premier Wen Jiabao tried to reassure the public by stating that the government 
attaches great importance to ‘the prevention and treatment of pollution at the sources 
and along the routes of the South-to-North Water Diversion Project.’952 This promise, 
however, did little to silence the critics. The Central Route of the SNWTP alone will 
require the resettlement of more than 300,000 people; adding the risks of cultural and 
economic conflicts to the externalities of the project.953 
 
Resettlement is also an important issue for the numerous other dam projects in China. 
The most prominent case might be the Three Gorges Dam where not only around 2 
million people had to leave their homes as more than 100 towns submerged in the 
process of filling up the reservoir,954 but also cultural heritage was lost.955 The massive 
project, at a cost of 41.3 billion USD, has been plagued by silting, pollution and 
ecological deterioration; even forcing China’s cabinet, the State Council, to admit that 
the dam had ‘urgent problems.’956 However, the Three Gorges Dam is no isolated case 
when it comes to the disregard of social and environmental risks. It has been estimated 
that in all Chinese dam building projects combined, more than 23 million people have 
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been resettled; often with long-term social impacts for these displaced communities.957 
Already the world’s largest producer of hydropower, the Chinese government plans to 
triple its capacity by the year 2020.958 One part of the reason for this ambitious goal is 
the announcement of the Chinese government at the climate summit in Copenhagen in 
2009 to reduce its carbon emissions by at least 40 percent by 2020.959 Most of the 
increased production of hydropower, however, will come from conventional large 
scale dams at a rate which is equivalent to building one Three Gorges Dam each year 
for five years.960 However, this dam building spree not only carries socio-economic 
and environmental risks,961 it may also be ill-suited for the actual aims of mitigating 
and adapting to climate change at the same time. First, traditional dam planning has 
been based on the assumption of constant stream-flow patterns in the future; which, 
due to climate change, is no longer valid. According to an official climate change 
assessment published in 2012, the concentration of rain during summer and autumn 
will increase, overwhelming rivers in the south, while long dry winters will increase 
and be especially crippling for those living in parched north-western provinces.962 
Second, the notion that hydropower dams are a source of ‘clean’ energy has come 
under scrutiny, since almost all resulting reservoirs emit one of the most potent 
greenhouse gases – methane.963 Third, healthy and free flowing river systems play an 
important role in trapping carbon, with scientists predicting that damming high flow 
rivers in regions with warm ocean temperatures will reduce the ability to mitigate 
global climate change.964 Furthermore, many of the proposed dams, canals and tunnels 
are located in areas of high natural seismicity; adding a whole new layer of security 
concerns.965 Recent research even suggests that reservoirs are not only exposed to 
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seismic activity, they can also trigger it – a phenomenon known as Reservoir-Induced 
Seismicity.966 For instance, the national tragedy of the 2008 earthquake in Sichuan, 
which killed an estimated 90,000 people, is said to have been at least hastened, if not 
caused, by the Zipingpu Dam.967 Driven by the pressure to reduce carbon emissions, 
China may therefore be expanding its hydropower capacity at the expense of large 
parts of its society and the environment. In order to reduce risks and increase its 
resilience, it has to better adapt its hydropower design to be able to deal with future 
climate variability and the impacts of dams on critical ecosystem services, while also 
adjusting hydropower tariffs to reflect the true social and environmental costs of 
dams.968 
 
Given its focus on big infrastructure projects, it is evident that China is trying to build 
itself out of the water crisis. It is highly questionable that this will be a sustainable 
approach for a country which is already hit hard by other environmental pressures. 
While some Chinese researchers believe that the followed path is the only way out of a 
future restricted by climate change and population growth,969 it has to be questioned 
whether it will be enough to effectively alleviate the water crisis in the long run. What 
use, other than short-term economic growth, is an initiative to build thousands of new 
wastewater treatment plants, when half of them are operating improperly or not at 
all?970 The trends in surface water quality indicate a worsening in the main river 
systems in the north, while southern China is only experiencing slight 
improvements.971 This is why more and more experts, even inside the country, are 
proposing alternatives to the large infrastructure solutions. In the face of these 
challenges, new ideas of improving the supply and demand side of water resource 
management are being developed, among them market-based tools of environmental 
policy under the umbrella of ‘smart economics.’972 One example here is the relatively 
new field of ‘eco-compensation,’ which not only comprises payments for ecosystem 
services, but also includes fiscal transfer schemes between provincial governments in 
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order to reallocate funding for environmental tasks and clarify responsibilities 
regarding the watershed services.973 Another promising initiative is increasing the 
amount of rainwater being harvested in Beijing. Not only can urban rainwater 
utilisation save a huge amount of freshwater, it also minimises the risk of urban 
flooding, groundwater depletion and the pollution of stormwater runoff.974 While these 
are important moves away from an approach solely reliant on large scale infrastructure 
projects towards management practices focused on conservation and small scale 
management of water resources, they are in their early stages and need to be supported 
by a greater effort of inter-agency collaboration and genuine participation and 
monitoring by the civil society in order to provide long-term sustainable solutions. 
 
Even though China has acknowledged its water crisis, its policy responses have so far 
fallen short, as they fail to bring about the radical changes needed. Furthermore, the 
lack of access to comprehensive data and information on water quality and quantity 
make it difficult to assess the effectiveness of the various initiatives. This situation will 
cause domestic pressures to increase even further; and concerns of its downstream 
neighbours to grow even bigger. 
 
6.2.2 India 
6.2.2.1 The water challenge 
As in the case of China, the rapid economic development of India has heavily affected 
its environment and transformed its society. Freshwater management is one of the key 
tasks for the government if it wants to achieve a more sustainable path of development; 
however, this paramount challenge seems to be insurmountable, given the sheer size of 
the country and the diversity of natural resource related issues surfacing. India is 
highly dependent on the monsoon system, with around 50 percent of its yearly rainfall 
occurring in just half a month.975 As the country’s mostly rainfed agriculture 
contributes to 15 percent of the GDP and hundreds of millions of Indians are highly 
dependent on it, the importance of the monsoon season becomes blatantly clear. 
Compared to the basins of the Colorado (US) and Murray-Darling (Australia) with 
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about 900 days of storage capacity, India is lagging far behind with about 30 days of 
storage capacity in most of its basins.976 While the average annual precipitation is 
around 1,200 mm, it varies widely across the country – from 150 mm in the desert of 
Rajasthan to more than 10 meters in the Khasi Hills.977 This erratic distribution of 
rainfall often leads to floods and droughts in various areas. These hydrological 
circumstances do not make it easier to provide for an effective system of sanitation, 
which, with economic losses estimated at 6.4 percent of India’s GDP in 2006, is one of 
the biggest social challenges India faces.978 
 
While water resources vary widely by region and season, per capita freshwater 
availability in India has fallen by almost 70 percent since 1950 – now just slightly 
above the threshold of 1,700 m3 which indicates water stress and very likely to decline 
even further to around 1,100 m3 by 2050.979 This is mainly due to increased demand 
driven by economic and population growth.980 In addition to the inefficiency in water 
usage, the widespread water scarcity has triggered unregulated groundwater extraction 
in many regions of India. People are able to ignore the poorly operating public systems 
and become self-sufficient in terms of their water supplies.981 Being the largest 
groundwater user in the world, India uses more than a quarter of the global total. With 
65 percent of irrigated agriculture and 85 percent of drinking water supplies dependent 
on it, groundwater is a vital resource for rural areas in India.982 By subsidising farmers’ 
electricity costs of pumping, the government set a process in motion which is very 
difficult to change. The problem now is that the perceived endless supply of 
groundwater is now approaching its limit as a large number of aquifers across the 
country have reached the status of ‘peak water.’ If current practices continue, 60 
percent of groundwater sources in India will be in a critical state within the next twenty 
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years.983 Given the reliance on this source of freshwater for a huge part of society, the 
potential social and economic consequences are serious. 
 
The generally poor water quality is another concern for India’s water managers, as 
pollution has reached alarming levels and affects human, environmental and economic 
security. While agriculture still ranks the highest in terms of overall impact on water 
quality, 43 out of 88 industrial clusters in India are already ‘critically polluted.’984 The 
poor state of India’s water quality is also putting enormous pressure on the health 
system, since water and sanitation related diseases are responsible for 60 percent of the 
environmental health burden.985 Another serious issue for India is the loss of arable 
land and its ramifications on the country’s food security, as it severely decreases 
agricultural productivity.986 Several tracts of land along the Brahmaputra are prone to 
soil erosion, which is being aggravated by frequent floods.987 This often has a direct 
socio-economic impact of national significance, as the important tea-growing areas in 
the Assam region are hit the hardest. 
 
All these challenges and struggles in the management of its water resources have led to 
an intensification of internal water disputes on various levels – i.e., between 
municipalities, between districts and between states. One example is the 
Mahbubnagar-Kurnool water conflict which started as a disagreement between the two 
cities in Andhra Pradesh about utilisation of the Tungabhadra river and now involves 
the upstream state Karnataka, as politicians from Mahabubnagar claimed that 
Karnataka has to release more water in order to avoid a drinking water crisis in the 
downstream state.988 In another conflict between Karnataka and its downstream 
neighbour on the Cauvery river, Tamil Nadu, protests turned violent after India’s 
Supreme Court ruled in favour of the latter.989 This quarrel over freshwater allocation 
from the Cauvery river smouldered for decades until it intensified last year during 
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times of drought. Thousands of protesters, mainly farmers, tried to assume control over 
two dams and stop the demanded releases of freshwater downstream.990 The ruling of 
the Supreme Court, that Karnataka would have to comply with water delivery 
obligations to its riparian despite the fact that Karnataka was struggling with one of the 
most severe droughts in decades, affirmed a previous decision on the matter by the 
Cauvery River Authority. Even though the Supreme Court hereby strengthened the 
position of the basin organisation, its decision infuriated many farmers, as they 
perceived it to be unfair. This example shows that despite having a democratic system 
in place which, in principle, guarantees the implementation of the rule of law, issues of 
adaptability driven by changing demands and climatic changes aggravate the 
sustainable and peaceful management of freshwater in India. 
 
6.2.2.2 Domestic responses 
Surprisingly, in spite of the high socio-economic costs of droughts and floods, India 
has (so far) failed to adequately react with improvements of its water infrastructure, in 
order to ensure reliable and climate-proof water supplies.991 In order to address this 
challenge, large scale dams have been built for the production of hydropower and for 
irrigation, and yet water storage infrastructure in India remains one of the lowest in the 
world.992 One of the world’s largest water infrastructure projects, the Narmada Dam 
Project, consists of 165 medium to large size dams and 3,000 minor ones on the 
Narmada river and its tributaries. Given the fact that an estimated one million people 
had to be relocated, it – like most large scale infrastructure projects – faced strong 
opposition and protests from local communities.993 However, it is not only the 
government which is the target of criticism. The involvement of the World Bank in 
this and various other water projects in India has also caused grievance, as it 
supposedly failed to alleviate poverty and step up environmental protection in the 
process.994 
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By far the most ambitious plan of the Indian government is to add more freshwater 
storage capacity and convey water across the vast country through the gigantic River 
Linking Project. The gigantic 200 billion USD scheme, again partly supported by the 
World Bank, will eventually interlink 37 major rivers in order to divert their flow to 
rather dry south and southwest India, and is thus seen as key to India’s future path of 
development.995 The sheer size of the projects becomes apparent when realising that 
even the lowest estimated cost equals around one quarter of India’s annual GDP and 
12 billion USD more than its total outstanding external debt.996 
 
While the project was announced by former Prime Minister Vajpayee in 2002, it was 
not implemented until India’s Supreme Court ordered the government to finally do so, 
since the delay was causing costs to increase steadily.997 Recently, the National Water 
Development Agency has started its surveying work for a section of the scheme – the 
diversion of water from the Brahmaputra through a 457 km long canal to the 
Ganges.998 The problem with large water infrastructure in India is fourfold: (1) little 
effort is put into the assessment of whether existing storage capacity can be used more 
effectively in order to provide the services desired; (2) only limited effort is being 
made to stop the deterioration of existing storage capacity – mainly caused by siltation; 
(3) there is minimal interstate coordination and cooperation regarding interstate river 
basins, which is vital should the storage facilities produce the maximum benefits; and 
(4) in cases where additional storage capacity is nonetheless needed, options of 
providing decentralised surface and underground capacities or increasing the soil’s 
capacity to better hold moisture are rarely explored.999 
 
This is why, in addition to the large scale infrastructure projects, India is also 
constantly trying to improve its water policies and regulations. In 1987, the 
government formulated a comprehensive National Water Policy (NWP), which was 
revised in 2002.1000 The legal framework for managing freshwater in India is 
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considered as complex, overlapping and often contradictory. It includes the 
constitution, federal and state laws, common law, human rights principles which have 
been recognised by courts and various unwritten local customary rules.1001 While the 
federal government controls the development and regulation of interstate rivers, state 
governments control all remaining water sources and infrastructure – including 
irrigation and drainage systems, canals, freshwater storage and hydropower.1002 Last 
year, a new NWP was drafted and put forward for discussion, which aims to change 
the overall direction of the policy towards decreasing the involvement of the 
government while giving the market more space to operate.1003 This draft was heavily 
criticised due to the absence of a commitment towards the right to water, even though 
India voted in favour of the 2010 UNGA resolution on the human right to water and 
sanitation,1004 and for failing to recognise that the growing inequity in access to water 
is the main driving force behind the current water crisis, rather than absolute water 
scarcity. Thus, in order to better tackle India’s water crisis, the government needs to 
address these issue of fragmentation, which seems to make things worse, as the rights 
to make use of water resources are unclear and vary in each state. Additionally, the 
agreement must tackle the fundamental challenge of breaking with the existing practice 
of determining access to water based on gender or belonging to a certain class or 
caste.1005 
 
6.2.3 Will Transboundary Impacts Turn Water into Asia’s New ‘Battleground’? 
Regardless of whether China’s and India’s emphasis on technological solutions is the 
most sensible option for their own socio-economic and environmental future, it already 
has a huge impact on states downstream within their shared river basins. The 
governments’ ambitious plans to step up hydropower capacity and realise inter basin 
water transfers will certainly increase the geopolitical risks of international freshwater 
interaction in Himalayan Asia, since the actions of the two hegemons either directly or 
indirectly affect the whole region. 
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China has made its stance on exploiting the Brahmaputra (Yarlung Tsangpo in China) 
clear by saying it will definitely utilise its water resources. China’s plans to build three 
hydropower plants on the middle reaches of the river in order to fulfil its 12th 5YP 
caused concern in both downstream countries, India and Bangladesh. China’s foreign 
ministry spokesman, Hong Lei, was quoted saying that ‘the Chinese side always takes 
a responsible attitude towards the exploitation of cross-border rivers and every new 
project will be planned and reasoned in a scientific way before being started.’1006 
Given the lack of information on the planned projects, this lip service did little to calm 
fears downstream. This, however, makes the recent developments regarding the hydro-
diplomacy on the Brahmaputra even more interesting. In 2010, Bangladesh and China 
signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the management of freshwater 
resources of the river.1007 The MoU stated that both parties would cooperate with each 
other on three topics: (1) to carry out sustainable cooperation on hydrological data 
sharing and flood control of the Brahmaputra river in view of its necessity to the 
disaster reduction in Bangladesh; (2) to strengthen cooperation on water resources 
management, hydrological data sharing, disaster reduction, based on the exchange of 
letters between the two ministries of water resources of the two countries in 2005; and 
(3) to provide assistance for dredging of riverbeds and capacity building through 
training personnel. While the Chinese adhered to their obligation by providing 
hydrological data, which is supposed to help in flood and drought forecasting, 
Bangladesh has, so far, not taken any steps regarding the implementation of the MoU. 
The main reason why Bangladesh might forfeit the chance for closer cooperation with 
China is actually the second hegemon in the region – India. The current Bangladeshi 
government fears that working more closely with China on transboundary water issues 
could be interpreted negatively by India, which, being midstream on the Brahmaputra, 
also has a strong interest in the water resources of the river.1008 However, given 
Bangladesh’s dependence on the international watercourse – meeting almost 70 
percent of the country’s demand – this move has to be regarded as severely damaging 
to the country’s water security. 
 
Recently, the Teesta, a tributary of the Brahmaputra, caused diplomatic tensions 
between Bangladesh and India, when Bangladeshi Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina 
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urged the Indian government to accelerate the process of reaching a deal on water 
sharing. In 2011, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh surprised many by backing 
out of signing the treaty at the last minute during his visit to Dhaka.1009 This delay has 
caused several politicians in Bangladesh to call for halting all trade relations with India 
and denying India transit permission through Bangladesh if the Indian government 
does not agree to allow Bangladesh its fair share of Teesta’s water resources.1010 While 
India and Bangladesh share 54 transboundary rivers, the two states have only entered 
into one agreement for the Ganges.1011 
 
India’s River Linking Project will certainly affect its neighbours’ water security.1012 
The recent beginning of actual work to implement the grand scheme has raised serious 
concerns downstream in Bangladesh, which is heavily dependent on the Brahmaputra, 
arguing that ‘India seems to be quite indifferent to the havoc the project will wreak on 
agriculture, environment, and ecology of the neighbouring countries, especially 
Bangladesh.’1013 There is a high probability that the negative transboundary social and 
environmental impacts the scheme carries will trigger intra- and inter-state unrest, as 
the resulting movements of internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Bangladesh may 
eventually spill over into India.1014 This is why the management of the Ganges-
Brahmaputra has to be considered of common concern to both nations.1015 
 
Another large scale project which causes serious objections is the 3.6 billion USD 
Myitsone dam on the Irrawaddy river in Burma, which is being planned and financed 
by the China Power Investment Corporation. The area in which the dam is supposed to 
be built is home to a strong separatist movement, and thus experiences frequent armed 
clashes between Burmese military and the Kachin Independence Army.1016 Myitsone is 
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religiously highly significant for the Kachin, who worship the area as the birthplace of 
their culture. This is why, in case the dam will actually be built, it will be perceived as 
a symbol of ‘China’s lack of cultural sensibilities and disregard for local minority 
groups.’1017 The fact that the environmental issues surrounding the Myitsone dam are 
not at all straightforward and that water security issues are closely linked to energy 
security becomes evident when realising that after the government officially ordered 
that work should be halted on the hydropower project, owing to environmental 
concerns, investment immediately picked up on various other hydropower and coal-
powered plants, as well as on oil and gas exploration in the country.1018 Furthermore, 
recently leaked documents show that the controversial dam was never in fact halted, as 
background preparations were ongoing and Chinese Power Investment is ‘planning to 
restart’ the project shortly.1019 Furthermore, the future of the Mekong river will also 
clearly depend upon the actions of China, since its dam projects on the river could 
substantially affect Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam – while the most 
prominent water dispute in the region is between India and Pakistan over the Indus. 
Those two basins, however, will be discussed in more depth later. 
 
This selection of projects affecting transboundary watercourses in Himalayan Asia has 
shown that water is already a matter high on the agenda of international relations in the 
region. The unilateral development of these contested projects without involving the 
respective riparian countries in some form will most certainly impair the already tense 
relations over water sharing.1020 Given the sheer size of the modifications of rivers in 
China and India, it is apparent that they will have impacts on neighbouring countries – 
who are also experiencing difficult water management challenges.1021 The distinction 
between national and transboundary waters becomes more and more obsolete when 
realising that bad ‘national’ water management often has a direct impact on 
international (water) relations. It has become obvious that transboundary freshwater 
management in Himalayan Asia will face testing times in the near future. While it is 
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expected that by 2025 around 50 percent of the world’s population will live in water 
scarce countries, the majority of them will be in China and India.1022 It is also 
becoming more and more clear that other crosscutting national issues – like the race 
for energy security in the examples of China and India – often have a transboundary or 
even regional impact within and beyond the water box. The recent assessment 
conducted by the US intelligence agencies claims (with high confidence) that in Asia, 
‘water in shared basins will increasingly be used as [political] leverage; the use of 
water as a weapon or to further terrorist objectives also will become more likely’ in the 
near future.1023 As water scarcity and quality issues intensify, the peaceful 
management of the river basins in Himalayan Asia is getting increasingly critical with 
ramifications affecting the natural environment, social stability and economic 
development of the whole region. More tragically, nationalism and narrow minded 
technical approaches to the complex management challenges aggravate the 
situation.1024 In terms of impact on international relations, the Asian water crisis can be 
compared with the melting of the Arctic – which is set to redraw the global 
geopolitical map1025 – yet, the former poses a much more imminent threat to people’s 
livelihoods and various other national and international securities. The bleak prospects 
for peaceful and sustainable transboundary freshwater interaction caused by the 
multifarious issues directly or indirectly linked to water resources management seems 
to play into the hands of security hawks and the media who increasingly talk about 
‘water wars’ in Asia.1026 
 
Indeed, there seems to be much reason for despair, given the division between the two 
states determining regional politics – China and India. The intensity of the constant 
struggle for economic and political supremacy in Himalayan Asia is evident in several 
recent developments. The frictions surrounding China’s refusal to approve an Asian 
Development Bank’s loan of 2.9 billion USD for India is a rather mild example.1027 
Far more worrying was the recent standoff between military patrols in the disputed 
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border areas between China and India – an issue over which the two states fought a 
war in 1962.1028 While it is true that the region is a highly critical one regarding global 
politics, the two hegemons, China and India, have more in common than what divides 
them. One could witness the ability of both countries to join forces and present a 
coordinated position between the two during recent climate change negotiations, when 
both where persistent in refusing legal obligations to curb their emissions of GHGs.1029 
It is not in the least suggested that China’s and India’s common position in the global 
climate change negotiations is positive for global cooperative efforts to tackle climate 
change. However, it shows that both regional powers share a great deal of interests. 
While this circumstance has already been exploited to their (apparent) advantages in 
some areas of international relations, it has yet to be utilised in their regional water 
interactions. 
 
The problem here is that neither country seems to realise that the time for a joint 
approach to freshwater management in Himalayan Asia is ripe. While it is highly 
unlikely that war will be fought over water, the short-term benefits of unilateral 
development of watercourses is being weighted higher than the long-term benefits of a 
regional approach. The management of freshwater resources in Himalayan Asia will 
certainly be one of the decisive factors in foreign policy and shape the region’s 
international relations and security in the future. The question is whether China and 
India want to continue on the path of short-sighted and self-centred water 
development, or whether they are finally willing to accept that water security is of 
common concern in Himalayan Asia. Due to the complexity of transboundary water 
interaction in the region, a peaceful management of the resource can only be 
guaranteed if the frameworks governing water resources fully support the 
contemporary notion of common water security. 
 
6.3 International Water Law and Himalayan Water Security 
In order to judge to what extent the legal frameworks in Himalayan Asia are catering 
for a contemporary understanding of common water security, the following section 
will provide a brief analysis of two of the biggest river basins of the region – the 
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Mekong and the Indus – based on the 4A analytical framework developed in Chapter 
3. 
 
Interesting conclusions on how countries in Himalayan Asia perceive international 
water law can be drawn by looking at the negotiation and ratification process of the 
UN Watercourses Convention. One of this region’s countries – China – voted against 
the adoption of the Convention, five of them – Afghanistan, Bhutan, Burma, India and 
Pakistan – abstained or were absent, and six of them – Bangladesh, Cambodia, Laos, 
Nepal, Thailand and Vietnam – voted in favour. However, none of the latter states has 
so far ratified the Convention. Of particular interest here is China’s statement on the 
Convention:1030 
‘The Chinese Government appreciates the efforts made by the International 
Law Commission over the years to draft the articles on the non-navigational 
uses of international watercourses, and it believes that the draft articles have 
laid a fairly good foundation for the formulation of an international 
convention. However, there are obvious drawbacks to some major clauses of 
the draft Convention, which was hastily adopted by the Working Group of the 
Whole in April 1997. First, the draft Convention fails to represent or reflect 
general agreement by all countries. Quite a number of countries have 
reservations on its major clauses. […] Secondly, territorial sovereignty is a 
basic principle of international law. A watercourse State enjoys indisputable 
territorial sovereignty over those parts of international watercourses that flow 
through its territory. It is incomprehensible and regrettable that the draft 
Convention does not affirm this principle. […] Fourthly, Article 33 of the 
United Nations Charter lays down that States may seek a peaceful solution to 
a dispute by means of their own choice. The compulsory fact-finding dictated 
by the draft Convention goes against the provisions of the Charter. The 
Chinese Government favours the settlement of all disputes by peaceful means, 
through consultations. […] On the basis of those considerations, the Chinese 
delegation will be obliged to vote against the draft resolution […] The 
Chinese Government reserves the right to address the question of the non-
navigational uses of international watercourses with its neighbours in a fair 
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and reasonable manner and in accordance with relevant international practice 
and with bilateral watercourse agreements.’ 
 
Reading these statements, one wonders how the legal regimes in the region address 
water security. In recalling the definition of water security proposed in this thesis that 
‘[a] community is water secure when it has sustainable access to freshwater of 
sufficient quantity and quality, or to the benefits derived therefrom; and the 
ability to minimise water-related risk and its various repercussions to an 
acceptable level – without compromising the supporting ecosystems,’1031 
the following section investigates whether international water law in Himalayan Asia 
is reflecting, at least to some extent, this contemporary understanding of water security 
which is based on the concept of regional common concern (see Chapter 5). While 
certainly all river systems originating in the Himalayas have their particular 
challenges, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to consider them all. Thus, the 
following analysis will focus on two of the major rivers – the Indus and the Mekong – 
which both provide for the required institutional and legal frameworks in order to be 
able to utilise the 4A water security framework for analysis and study the regional 
water security from an international law perspective. 
 
6.3.1 The Mekong River 
The Mekong river basin is the largest in Himalayan Asia and is shared by six countries 
– Burma, Cambodia, China, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. Growing demand for its 
water has led to more intense use of freshwater resources, leading to political stress 
among the riparians. The resulting regional security implications of dam construction – 
mainly for the production of hydropower – have been considered to be a point of 
contestation between all six basin states.1032 One of the mayor security threats of the 
river is flooding, affecting up to eight million people and causing damages of 100 to 
400 million USD every year.1033 Interestingly, in addition to providing socio-economic 
benefits, infrastructure for flood mitigation and hydropower production also has a 
strong political impact, as it helps authorities to gain or maintain their political 
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legitimacy.1034 Of particular importance in the basin, for social-economic development 
and the environment, is the Tonle Sap Great Lake system in Cambodia. Here, the 
annual floods cause the Tonle Sap river to reverse the direction of its flow and fill the 
Great Lake – which swells from 1.5 billion m3 to 70 billion m3 during the wet 
season.1035 This yearly occurrence underpins one of the world’s most productive 
aquatic ecosystems. 
 
The Mekong River Commission (MRC) is the pre-eminent organisation entrusted with 
transboundary management of water in the basin. Its creation can be seen as the 
pinnacle of the continuous attempt to manage the basin’s water resources more 
cooperatively – a process which already started in 1957 when the UN founded the 
Mekong Committee.1036 The MRC finds its legal basis in the 1995 Mekong 
Agreement, which, in the Preamble, sets the goal to ‘cooperate and promote in a 
constructive and mutually beneficial manner in the sustainable development, 
utilisation, conservation and management of the Mekong River Basin water and related 
resources for navigational and non-navigational purposes, for social and economic 
development and the well-being of all riparian States.’1037 However, its membership 
does not include China, which controls the upper reaches of the catchments; or Burma, 
which only contributes 2 percent to the annual flow of the river.1038 
 
The question now is whether the legal framework can successfully defuse the 
increasingly tense relationship between the Mekong basin states? The Mekong is 
increasingly coming under pressure, since the combination of multiple upstream dams 
and several dam proposals downstream will most likely bring about dramatic change to 
the ecosystems and human livelihoods.1039 The new momentum for this development 
is being enabled by the major drivers (demographics, economic development and 
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climate change) and new dam financiers (which involves a move away from the World 
Bank towards China). 
 
6.3.1.1 Availability 
The Mekong Agreement contains several provisions that deal with issues of freshwater 
quantity and quality – its availability. The maintenance of flows on the mainstream, for 
example, is addressed in Article 6, which states that the parties agree to ‘cooperate in 
the maintenance of the flows on the mainstream from diversions, storage releases, or 
other actions of a permanent nature; except in the cases of historically severe droughts 
and/or floods.’1040 Furthermore, situations in the event of substantial damage to one or 
more riparians caused by harmful effects from the use of and/or discharge to waters of 
the Mekong River by any riparian State,1041 or in the event of emergency that requires 
an immediate response,1042 are also being addressed. Interestingly, the obligation ‘[t]o 
make every effort to avoid, minimize and mitigate harmful effects that might occur to 
the environment, especially the water quantity and quality, the aquatic (eco-system) 
conditions, and ecological balance of the river system from the development and use of 
the Mekong River Basin water resources or discharge of wastes and return flows 
[…]’1043 does not explicitly mention that the resulting harmful effects have to be 
transboundary.1044 Rather, the general obligation to protect the environment is 
supported by Article 3 of the Mekong Agreement, which stipulates that the parties 
agree to ‘protect the environment, natural resources, aquatic life and conditions, and 
ecological balance of the Mekong River Basin from pollution or other harmful effects 
resulting from any development plans and uses of water and related resources in the 
Basin.’1045 This points towards comprehensive regulations for the protection of the 
environment; and thus water quality and quantity. However, environmental impact 
assessments, for example, often solely focus on the country that carries them out; thus 
neglecting upstream and downstream impacts as well as ecological and social 
factors.1046 
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6.3.1.2 Access 
Regarding the access to freshwater in the basin, i.e. issues revolving around the 
(re)allocation of the resource, the Mekong Agreement applies the customary rule of 
equitable and reasonable utilisation, as the parties agreed ‘to utilize the waters of the 
Mekong River system in a reasonable and equitable manner […] pursuant to all 
relevant factors and circumstances,’1047 Article 5(A)(B), deals with intra-basin uses 
and inter-basin diversion on tributaries and the mainstream of the Mekong. 
Mechanisms for dispute settlement have also been included in the Mekong Agreement. 
Articles 34 and 35 provide that disputes (or differences) are to be resolved, first by the 
Mekong River Commission,1048 failing which the matter is referred to the governments 
for negotiation, possible mediation, or eventual settlement ‘according to the principles 
of international law.’1049 It is noteworthy, however, that the agreement contains no 
reference to any form of compulsory third party participation in the resolution of 
disputes. 
 
6.3.1.3 Adaptability 
The Mekong basin faces huge challenges of adaptability, since it is affected by 
climatic changes and the development of large infrastructure projects. The capacity of 
the MRC to quickly adapt to new circumstances is strengthened by several institutional 
design factors. For instance, it benefits from being a multi-issue river basin 
organisation, since it allows for including all relevant issues in the basin and opens the 
door for new issues which may emerge over time.1050 Furthermore, the MRC does 
have a well-developed data and information sharing mechanism in place, even though 
there certainly is still room for improvement regarding the quality of data being 
shared.1051 With regard to climate change adaptation, the MRC is developing an 
adaptation planning process through projects under the Climate Change Adaptation 
Initiative to assess climate change impacts and to improve planning and 
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implementation within the Mekong basin.1052 Yet, the biggest impediment to improve 
the adaptability of the MRC is the lack of strong linkages to national and regional 
governance levels.1053 
 
6.3.1.4 Ambit 
In terms of the ambit of the Mekong Agreement, several challenging issues manifest 
themselves. The fact that China is not a party to the legal regime is being seen as one 
of the treaty’s major shortcomings.1054 Its approach of unilateral development of large 
scale infrastructure on the Mekong has created tensions between and among China and 
its lower riparians; causing serious environmental degradation, compromising food 
security and even endangering regional stability.1055 Yet, even if one could leave the 
challenge of including China in the legal framework governing the Mekong aside, the 
controversies among the lower riparians would be enough to mire the sustainable and 
peaceful management of the river basin. One example which shows this quite vividly 
is the 3.5 billion USD Xayaburi Dam, one of 12 hydropower projects planned on the 
Mekong mainstream. 95 percent of the 1,285 MW produced by the hydropower plant 
will be exported to Thailand.1056 
 
The impacts of dams on the mainstream are understood to be far more severe than 
infrastructure projects on the tributaries, since they will directly affect millions of 
people who rely on migratory fish as a source of nutrition and income; although 
cumulative impacts from dams on smaller tributaries can also have a significant 
impact.1057 The MRC Procedures for Notification, Prior Consultation and Agreement 
demand that countries planning to build dams on the mainstream of the Mekong must 
first conduct detailed impact studies to evaluate the potential transboundary impact of 
such a project.1058 The EIA which had been conducted in the case at hand, however, 
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has been criticised as being flawed, as it only studied the potential impacts within a 
rather limited area (the actual site of the dam, the area to be flooded by the reservoir 
and ten kilometres downstream dam) and did not comprise a proper process of prior 
consultation.1059 
 
Nevertheless, preparations for the dam began in April 2011, when the Thai developer 
(CH Karnchang) started with preparatory earth works. Immediately, Vietnam, which 
will benefit least from the dam, called for a 10-year moratorium on mainstream 
hydropower development. Interestingly, Thai officials have also failed to endorse 
Xayaburi, requesting that further research be carried out on the expected 
environmental impacts.1060 This led to the decision of the Lao government to delay the 
project in July 2012 – pending further impact studies.1061 A consensus among MRC 
member states on the future of the Xayaburi Dam seems illusive, as current 
developments are rather obscure. While work on the Xayaburi Dam itself had indeed 
been suspended, construction on the dam’s access road and camp for workers was still 
going ahead at a rapid pace.1062 On 7 November 2012, Laos held an official ground-
breaking ceremony after claiming that Cambodia and Vietnam now support the 
construction of the Xayaburi Dam.1063 At the recent MRC’s Council meeting, 
however, Cambodia, Vietnam and the MRC’s donor governments continued to raise 
their concerns about the Dam and the prior consultation procedures.1064 Hence, the 
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events/speeches/statementby-mr-chaiporn-siripornpibul-19th-meeting-of-the-mrc-council>. MRC 
partners asked the Mekong basin states to strengthen the notification and consultation procedures; 
MRC, 'Joint Development Partner Statement – 19th Meeting of the MRC Council' (17 January 2013) 
<http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/speeches/jointdevelopment-partner-statement-19th-
mrc-council-meeting-17-january-2013>. 
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highly sensitive issue remains unresolved at present. This highlights the fact that even 
if procedural rules are in place (like conducting EIAs), it will not lead to stronger 
regional water cooperation if there is no common understanding of how to perceive 
regional water security. 
 
It becomes obvious that the MRC is still struggling to be accepted as an institutional 
framework for assessing and managing the freshwater resources, and as a political 
forum for deciding on water related issues.1065 The most likely reason for this is the 
reluctance of the member states to fully delegate certain powers to the MRC – in fear 
of cutting back their own national sovereignty. Hence, the MRC can formulate policies 
and recommendations, but their implementation still lies in the hands of the national 
governments.1066 As the controversies surrounding the Xayaburi dam show, 
hydropolitics in the Mekong basin are heavily influenced by the hydro-hegemon, 
China, side-lining the Mekong Agreement. The problem here is that we do not have 
the tools to fully understand why transboundary water management in the Mekong 
basin is working the way it is, as the main focus of analysis is always the 1995 treaty – 
but many important decisions are actually being made outside of it by actors not 
involved in hard law negotiations. This underlines the importance of socio-legal 
research in the basin.1067 The shortcomings regarding the ambit of the current 
framework cause the future of the Mekong river to be primarily dependent upon the 
outcomes of two interlinked power struggles – (1) between China and the countries 
downstream; and (2) among the member states of the MRC themselves. 
 
A positive development can be witnessed in the Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) 
which has been set up between all six basin states and involves the implementation of 
wide-ranging series of regional projects covering transport, energy, 
telecommunications, environmental management, tourism, and agriculture.1068 It has 
been acknowledged that GMS ‘enhanced cross-border trade while reducing poverty 
levels and creating shared interests in economic stability and peace.’1069 This is a 
                                                 
1065 Affeltranger, 'Sustainability of Environmental Regimes: The Mekong River Commission' at 593. 
1066 Rieu-Clarke and Gooch, 'Governing the Tributaries of the Mekong : The Contribution of 
International Law and Institutions to Enhancing Equitable Cooperation over the Sesan' at 217. 
1067 See FE Johns  and others, 'Law and the Mekong River Basin: A Social-Legal Research Agenda on 
the Role of Hard and Soft Law in Regulating Transboundary Water Resources' (2010) 11 Melbourne 
Journal of International Law 154. 
1068 For more information, see Asian Development Bank, 'Greater Mekong Subregion' (2013) 
<http://www.adb.org/countries/gms/main>. 
1069 World Bank, World Development Report 2011 : Conflict, Security, and Development at 43. 
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prime example for the creation of a strong regional bond between nations which is 
bound together by a watercourse while also allowing for discussions of various non-
water related issues – even though the focus of the GMS still mainly lies on economic 
development. 
 
6.3.2 The Indus River 
India, as riparian country of the river basins of Brahmaputra, Ganga and Indus has 
been in disagreement over freshwater sharing with several of its neighbours 
recently.1070 The most prominent dispute, however, is between India and Pakistan over 
the Indus, which is the bloodstream of Pakistan’s economic (textile industry) and food 
security.1071 Relations between the two neighbours have always been highly tense. So 
it might not come as a surprise to hear even more of the ‘water wars’ propaganda 
here.1072 What makes a potential military conflict between the two states even more 
frightening is the fact that both India and Pakistan are nuclear nations.1073 It has been 
argued that the general perception that India is threatening the survival of Pakistan 
simply by ‘cutting off’ the waters of the Indus raise the potential of Pakistan using 
nuclear weapons as a last resort.1074 Yet, scholars often celebrate the longstanding 
1960 Indus Waters Treaty1075 as a success, since it survived three wars (1965, 1971 
and 1999) between the two hostile neighbours.1076 Throughout the times of military 
conflict, the water kept flowing. The conflict over the water resources of the Indus 
became international with the partition of British India, as the newly formed states 
were in disagreement over how to share and manage the previously unitary network of 
irrigation infrastructure. While the Indus river basin is shared between Pakistan (47 
percent), India (39 percent), China (8 percent) and Afghanistan (6 percent), the treaty 
                                                 
1070 Taenzler and others, Water, Crisis and Climate Change in India: A Policy Brief at 12. 
1071 W Wheeler for the National Geographic, 'India and Pakistan at Odds Over Shrinking Indus River' 
(12 October 2011) <http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2011/10/111012-india-pakistan-indus-
river-water/>. 
1072 See, e.g., The Guardian, 'War over Water : It Could Happen With India and Pakistan' (3 June 2002) 
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2002/jun/03/kashmir.india1>; N Mandhanda for Time Magazine, 
'Water Wars: Why India and Pakistan Are Squaring Off Over Their Rivers' (16 April 2012) 
<http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2111601,00.html>. 
1073 J Daly for OilPrice, 'Pakistani Editorial Says Nuclear War with India ‘Inevitable’ as Water Dispute 
Continues' (9 December 2011) <http://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/International/Pakistani-Editorial-
Says-Nuclear-War-with-India-Inevitable-as-Water-Dispute-Continues.html>. 
1074 Brennan, 'The China-India-Pakistan Water Crisis: Prospects for Interstate Conflict at 40. 
1075 Treaty between India and Pakistan Regarding the Use of the Waters of the Indus (19 September 
1960; entered into force 1 April 1960) 419 UNTS 125 (1960) [hereinafter Indus Waters Treaty]. 
1076 See, e.g., Khalid, 'The Interlinking of Rivers Project in India and International Water Law: An 
Overview' at 557. 
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does not involve the latter two nations.1077 It is the power asymmetry between the two 
contracting parties which has been identified as the main reason for the delayed 
completion of the agreement.1078 Here, the involvement of a third party, the World 
Bank, played a key role in continuously pushing negotiations forward.1079 The next 
section will analyse whether the Indus Treaty is indeed successful in strengthening 
transboundary freshwater cooperation in the basin – based on the understanding of 
common water security. 
 
6.3.2.1 Availability 
In terms of availability, the Indus Waters Treaty does not contain effective binding 
provisions addressing water quality or pollution. From the beginning of the negotiation 
process, the whole framework was focused on issues of quantity, apportioning the 
tributaries among the two nations. India’s plan was to get all of the Eastern rivers and 
7 percent of the Western rivers; while Pakistan demanded 70 percent of the Eastern 
rivers and all of the Western rivers.1080 Ultimately, the parties agreed to allocate the 
tributaries with India receiving three tributaries – Sutlej, Beas and Ravi (Eastern rivers) 
– while Pakistan received the main Indus, Jhelum and Chenab (Western rivers).1081 
However, the Indus Waters Treaty also allows India to tap the hydropower potential of 
the Jhelum and Chenab rivers before they enter Pakistan.1082 
 
6.3.2.2 Access 
The approach to resolving issues of access to water found in the Indus Waters Treaty is 
rather complex. Here, the principal institutional mechanism of the agreement, the 
permanent Indus Commission, plays a significant role in the settlement of disputes, 
serving ‘as the regular channel of communication on all matters relating to the 
implementation of the Treaty.’1083 Under the agreement, issues that cannot be resolved 
by the Commission will be deemed ‘differences,’ which may, depending upon their 
classification, be heard by a ‘neutral expert’ (‘qualified engineer’) at the request of 
                                                 
1077 AQUASTAT of FAO, 'Indus River Basin' (2011) 
<http://www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/basins/indus/index.stm>. 
1078 Center for Policy and Human Development, Afghanistan Human Development Report 2011. The 
Forgotten Front: Water Security and the Crisis in the Sanitation at 65. 
1079 See AK Biswas, 'Indus Water Treaty: The Negotiating Process' (1992) 17 Water International 201. 
1080 Ibid at 206. 
1081 Arts II & III of the Indus Waters Treaty. 
1082 Art III(2) of the Indus Waters Treaty. 
1083 Art VIII of the Indus Waters Treaty, ‘Permanent Indus Commission.’ 
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either commissioner.1084 The difference will be considered to be a ‘dispute’ if the 
matter falls outside those issues listed in Annex F. Disputes are to be resolved through 
negotiation and, failing any successful outcome, are subject to arbitration. This 
mechanism has been triggered for the first time in the forty-five-year history of the 
treaty with a neutral expert providing a determination of the difference regarding the 
Baglihar hydropower plant in February 2007.1085 While some rightly argue that the 
differences were handled in a ‘transparent and fair manner’ and acknowledge that the 
decision was accepted by the two parties,1086 the process did not manage to completely 
calm freshwater interactions between India and Pakistan, nor did it give it a farsighted 
direction.1087 This becomes obvious when analysing the outcome of the most recent 
legal dispute – the Kishenganga Arbitration.1088 This was the first time a dispute under 
the Indus Waters Treaty was referred to a Court of Arbitration.1089 Pakistan, requesting 
the arbitration, identified two questions: (1) whether India’s proposed diversion of the 
river Kishenganga for the run-of-the-river hydroelectric project into another tributary 
breaches India’s legal obligations under Article III(2) of the Indus Waters Treaty; and 
(2) whether the agreement allowed India to deplete or bring the reservoir level of a 
run-of-river storage plant below the ‘Dead Storage Level’ in circumstances other than 
unforeseen emergencies.1090 On 18 February 2013, the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
rendered its Partial Award.1091 The award allows India to proceed with the construction 
of the Kishenganga Hydro-Electric Project, subject to ensuring a minimum 
downstream flow to be determined in the Final Award. Further, it prohibits India from 
using drawdown flushing for sediment control at the Kishenganga project and any 
future run-of-river plant on the Western rivers. While the decision ‘serves as a useful 
                                                 
1084 Art IX of the Indus Waters Treaty. 
1085 In 2005, Pakistan contacted the World Bank stating that a ‘difference’ has arisen with India under 
the Indus Water Treaty, relating to the Baglihar hydropower plant, being constructed by India on the 
Chenab River in breach of the provisions under paragraph 8 of Annex D to the treaty. The bank 
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two parties. See Expert Determination on Points of Difference Referred by the Government of 
Pakistan under the Provisions of the Indus Water Treaty, Executive Summary (12 February 2007) 
available at <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/SOUTHASIAEXT/Resources/223546–
1171996340255/BagliharSummary.pdf>; see also SMA Salman, 'The Baglihar Difference and Its 
Resolution Process : A Triumph for the Indus Waters Treaty?' (2008) 10 Water Policy 105. 
1086 Ibid. 
1087 See also, UK Sinha, 'Water a Pre-Eminent Political Issue between India and Pakistan' (2010) 34 
Strategic Analysis 482 at 485. 
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provisions of the treaty, see Rieu-Clarke, Moynihan and Magsig, UN Watercourses Convention : 
User's Guide at 247. 
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1090 Rieu-Clarke, Moynihan and Magsig, UN Watercourses Convention : User's Guide at 247. 
1091 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Partial Award in the Matter of the Indus Waters Kishenganga 
Arbitration (Pakistan v. India) (18 February 2013) <http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showfile.asp?fil_id=2101>. 
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reminder of the potential of pacific dispute settlement in resolving complex disputes in 
tense settings,’1092 it contradicts the outcome of the Baglihar difference. While the 
Baglihar judgment allowed India to draw down water below the dead storage level 
under certain conditions and apply a technique called drawdown flushing in order to 
protect the hydropower plan from siltation, the Permanent Court of Arbitration, of 
course, did not treat the Baglihar findings and outcome as a precedent.1093 To the 
contrary, it decided that from now on, this technique shall be prohibited. Thus, it seems 
there is no end in sight for disputes revolving around the same issues, as a clear 
direction of how to manage the Indus river basin is missing. 
 
6.3.2.3 Adaptability 
Due to climatic changes and pressures of population growth, the Indus basin faces 
huge challenges in terms of the adaptability of the regime. The whole Treaty resembles 
something of a divorce settlement, rather than a future-proof agreement for the 
sustainable management of a river basin. Since the Indus Waters Treaty fails to 
accommodate flexible mechanisms, it has been argued that the Treaty should be 
amended to better cope with climate change uncertainty.1094 
 
6.3.2.4 Ambit 
While the majority of scholars still view the Indus Waters Treaty as a success,1095 
when looking at the actual ambit of the agreement, this author agrees with the minority 
view that on the whole it can only be perceived as a failure. The reason for the 
dramatically diverging views on the quality of the Treaty might originate from asking a 
completely different question. While most commentators seem to be satisfied with the 
‘survival’ of the Treaty during times of war, should one not be able to demand more 
from a treaty governing a shared watercourse – a vital resource for both countries? Is it 
too bold to ask why the Indus Waters Treaty did not prevent three wars? In claiming 
that ‘[t]he Indus Waters Treaty, which is the most successful India-Pakistan agreement 
to date, has held up for 46 years largely because the Treaty does not require daily 
                                                 
1092 S Kumar, 'The Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India)' (2013) 17 ASIL Insights 1 
at 5. 
1093 See also AK Biswas for 'The Indian Express, Straining at the Floodgates' (4 March 2013) 
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Resources, University of Texas 2011) at 97. Calling the Indus Waters Treaty ‘one of the most 
successful settlements of a transboundary water basin conﬂict.’ 
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interaction and joint decision making by those two estranged governments,’1096 do we 
imply that we consider treaties which do not require adequate cooperation to be a 
success? International legal scholarship would certainly damage itself if it followed 
such an absurd understanding of international law. 
 
Following a contemporary understanding of common water security, ethically based 
on the notion of hydrosolidarity, a freshwater treaty should not merely be able to 
muddle through difficult bilateral times. It should provide an impetus for the riparian 
countries to develop relations outside the water box – and ultimately lead to more 
peaceful relations. In this regard, as well as concerning the vital issues of water quality 
and adaptability, the Indus Waters Treaty has missed an important opportunity. While 
it has been argued before that renegotiations are inevitable;1097 the examination 
through the contemporary security lens has made it even more obvious that the 
agreement between India and Pakistan in its current form has no future, as it does not 
contribute to the water security of the region. 
 
6.4 A Regional Legal Framework for Water Security? 
Given the fact that neither the Mekong Agreement nor the Indus Waters Treaty support 
the understanding of water security which is necessary for regional peace and security, 
the question now arises: How can international law help avoiding water conflicts in 
Himalayan Asia? Or more precisely: Are there any signs which can be interpreted as 
potential pathways towards a new approach based on regional common concern? 
While the previous sections have shown that both the Indus Waters Treaty and the 
Mekong Agreement have their respective weaknesses, one should not underestimate 
the impact these legal frameworks have on the transboundary water interaction in the 
region. The negotiation of treaties, their signatures and, ultimately, the implementation 
of their obligations depend to a large extent on issues outside the actual water box. 
Often, the right timing is perceived as more important than the actual legal content, as, 
arguably, a non-perfect treaty might be better than none.1098 If the time is ripe for a 
regional framework in Himalayan Asia, how could it emerge and develop in a climate 
                                                 
1096 TC Schaffer, 'Putting the Kashmiris into the Kashmir Issue' (2007) 3 Asia Policy 192 at 195. 
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where the political willingness among the various riparian countries might not be 
strong enough to actually change course? The following section highlights some of the 
potential pathways – including hard and soft law and policy pathways – the actors in 
the region should pursue in order to generate the political will needed in order to arrive 
at a point where the challenges of freshwater management are being seen as of regional 
common concern. 
 
While there has been some research on cross-border governance in Asia,1099 only a few 
scholars have looked into the development of a regional regime.1100 In terms of 
governance of transboundary freshwater resources in Asia, there is only one 
comprehensive study which proposes a comprehensive regional framework. The work 
of the Strategic Foresight Group provides an in-depth analysis of the manifold 
challenges connected to the water crisis of four countries in Himalayan Asia 
(Bangladesh, China, India and Nepal), before it looks at best practice case studies from 
around the world regarding integrated water resources management.1101 Regrettably, 
the authors spend only the last few pages elaborating on how they envision a sub-
regional regime governing the river systems of the Ganges and Brahmaputra.1102 
However, some of their ideas are nonetheless thought provoking. The organisational 
setup proposed here is a series of multi-layered ‘mini-commissions,’ each with a 
specific focus area (glaciers, agriculture, desertification, economic activities and 
emergency responses), under the umbrella of an overarching legally constituted 
Himalayan Rivers Commission (HRC) with some binding authority.1103 The HRC also 
serves as a framework in which the two river basin organisations of the Brahmaputra 
and the Ganges operate on more basin specific issues.1104 A rather novel approach is 
being proposed when it comes to incorporating the two Chinese national basins 
originating in the Himalayas – Yangtze and Yellow – under the umbrella of the HRC. 
While the authors rightly argue that an inclusion of national watercourses will benefit 
all parties due to the increased knowledge exchange between the various basins facing 
similar challenges, the claim that such a setup would also increase the incentive for 
                                                 
1099 See, e.g., GS Cheema, CA McNally and V Popovski (eds), Cross-Border Governance in Asia : 
Regional Issues and Mechanisms (United Nations University Press 2011). 
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China to be involved in the HRC is rather doubtful.1105 The most important feature of 
the suggested framework, however, is the inherent flexibility through its modular 
structure and the frequent meetings on various levels of water governance. This type of 
governance framework would seem to include a range of hard and soft legal and policy 
instruments. 
 
Whether such a framework in its entirety will ever be agreed on among the four 
countries, let alone all states in Himalayan Asia, is highly unlikely. However, a more 
gradual development towards closer regional cooperation on freshwater issues is by no 
means impossible. In order to avoid regional water security to deteriorate, international 
water law has to provide a framework which is capable in accommodating the much 
needed changes in transboundary water interaction while respecting the regional 
particularities – both hydrological and political. While such a regional framework for 
water security seems highly ambitious and proceeds well beyond previous proposals to 
tackle Himalayan Asia’s water crisis, the severity of the situation has also shown that 
the time is ripe for a fundamental change in how the region is managing its 
transboundary watercourses; and several initiatives in the region are already working 
towards this.1106 If politicians in Himalayan Asia can be convinced that a ‘best fit’ 
strategy which accommodates their specific needs in the regional contexts is actually 
possible, the whole venture becomes more feasible. 
 
What this region desperately needs in order to move towards a truly regional approach 
to water security is engendering deeper trust between the conflicting parties. This is 
particularly relevant for the rather tense relationship between India and Pakistan, 
which is hampered by a sense of negative engagement and a media which misuses 
bilateral dialogues around water for sensationalism, feeding mistrust between the two 
nations.1107 This can be achieved by encouraging communication, sharing data and 
conducting joint research projects. Such tools to increase cooperation could be created 
utilising a mix of policy, soft and hard legal instruments. Here, the new initiative 
between India and China to cooperate over Himalayan glaciers seems promising. In 
order to better understand the state of the glaciers, research bodies on both sides of the 
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mountain range are sharing information.1108 Furthermore, research networks are 
another promising tool for fostering cooperation, as they strengthen existing 
collaborative efforts and bring in new programs. Recently released research on this 
topic by the British Council found that for many Asian universities, this is nothing 
unusual. Across the disciplines, the international research collaboration rates are 
already high.1109 Here new impetus has to be given for joint research on issues related 
to freshwater management. 
 
Another tool for improving transboundary relations in the Himalayas could be setting 
up peace parks along the contested borders between China, India and Pakistan. The 
idea of turning these areas into connected parks which enjoy environmental protection 
would have a direct impact on the management of the watercourses originating there, 
while opening new doors for negotiating other water related issues among the 
parties.1110 While it is unrealistic to expect India and Pakistan to make peace based on 
a commitment to shared conservation alone, it becomes much more likely if a peace 
park agreement is being tied on a greater plan to manage the freshwaters rising from 
the Himalayas jointly.1111 The recent tragedies on the Siachen glaciers brought the idea 
of the use of peace parks as a way to demilitarise the contentious border between India 
and Pakistan back to the table.1112 While China and India are also in disagreement over 
their shared border,1113 recent efforts to calm down the politically charged issue might 
eventually open up the possibility of a Sino-Indian peace park.1114 
 
While these examples are all valid steps towards a more regional approach to 
freshwater interaction, they need to be tied into one institutional mechanism in order to 
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be of long-term value. Here, regional organisations can play an important role, since 
they allow for gradual strengthening and deepening of relations on a whole range of 
different topics. This is of particular importance given that both China and India have a 
long history in committing to address conflicts through bilateral talks, rather than 
allowing third party states to interfere or even supporting a regional solution.1115 In 
order to be able to arrive at a framework which overcomes this prejudice towards 
regional approaches, one has to find a starting point which already provides at least 
some of the necessary features. In this regard, it might be worth taking a closer look at 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This geopolitical and economic 
organisation was founded in 1967 by Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore 
and Thailand and now includes Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam. Among 
its main goals are 
‘to accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development 
in the region […]; to promote regional peace and stability through abiding 
respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries of 
the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter; […] 
to promote active collaboration and mutual assistance on matters of common 
interest in the economic, social, cultural, technical, scientific and 
administrative fields; […] to maintain close and beneficial cooperation with 
existing international and regional organizations with similar aims and 
purposes, and explore all avenues for even closer cooperation among 
themselves.’ 
The reason for choosing the framework of ASEAN as a potential avenue for promoting 
the concept of water security as being one of common concern to all states of 
Himalayan Asia is that it possesses the necessary political clout to involve both China 
and India – and thus become the core of Asian efforts towards regionalism.1116 While 
neither of the two hydro-hegemons of Himalayan Asia are members of ASEAN, they 
are nonetheless actively involved; mainly through the ASEAN+3 (China, Japan, and 
South Korea) and ASEAN+6 (Australia, New Zealand, China, India, South Korea and 
Japan) initiatives which have been established to create an integrated market in the 
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Asia-Pacific region.1117 The cooperation amongst ASEAN countries has continually 
broadened and deepened to also include subjects other than economics. 
 
In 1976, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, a peace treaty among 
Southeast Asian countries, was signed by the founding members of ASEAN and 
adopted fundamental principles of their relations with one another, which have been 
coined ‘the ASEAN way’: (1) mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, 
equality, territorial integrity, and national identity of all nations; (2) the right of every 
state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion or 
coercion; (3) non-interference in internal affairs; (4) settlement of differences or 
disputes in a peaceful manner; (5) renunciation of the threat or use of force; and (6) 
effective regional cooperation.1118 Interestingly, China and India were the first nations 
outside ASEAN to sign the Treaty in 2003. While some would argue that the ‘ASEAN 
way’ – the region’s method of multilateralism – might constitute a stumbling block for 
overcoming the prevailing focus on national interests and arriving at a truly regional 
understanding of water security, there are several initiatives within the framework of 
ASEAN which paint a more hopeful picture. 
 
For instance, the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Environment (AMME) was 
established in 1981 with the aim to discuss environmental issues affecting the group of 
states. In 2002, AMME agreed to further synergise the regional environmental 
cooperation by focusing on ten areas – freshwater resources being one of them.1119 In 
1983, the ASEAN Group on Nature Conservation proposed a set of principles and 
objectives for the selection, establishment and management of protected areas in the 
ASEAN region and ultimately issued the Declaration on Heritage Parks and Reserves 
which established the ﬁrst group of heritage sites. The establishment of such parks 
stresses the fact that the member states share a common natural heritage – and thus 
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Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1987, the Second Protocol amending the Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 1998 and the Third Protocol amending the Treaty of 
Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, 2010 (24 February 1976) available at 
<http://www.official-documents.gov.uk/document/cm84/8472/8472.pdf>. 
1119 ‘The Ministers also noted that the newly established ASEAN Working Group on Water Resources 
Management to be chaired by Thailand would further strengthen cooperation among member 
countries in research, conservation and information exchange on integrated water resources 
management;’ see ASEAN, 'Press Release: 7th Informal ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on the 
Environment' (21 November 2002) 
<http://haze.asean.org/news/1038197275/back=media/1038197275/PRESS+RELEASE%3A+7th+In
formal+ASEAN+Ministerial+Meeting+on+the+Environment>. 
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should cooperate in their efforts to protect the biodiversity which supports the lives of 
their own citizens, as well as those living beyond their borders. According to the 
ASEAN Declaration on Heritage Parks of 2003, member states agreed that ‘common 
cooperation is necessary to conserve and manage the ASEAN Heritage Parks for the 
development and implementation of regional conservation and management action 
plans as well as regional mechanisms complementary to and supportive of national 
efforts to implement conservation measures.’1120 In 1985, several member states 
signed the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural 
Resources.1121 For example, it stipulates that ‘Contracting Parties shall especially co-
operate together and, where appropriate, shall endeavour to co-operate with other 
Contracting Parties, with a view to: (a) the conservation and management of (1) border 
or contiguous protected areas; (2) shared habitats of species listed in Appendix 1; (3) 
shared habitats of any other species of common concern […].’1122 While the Treaty 
text might suggest close cooperation between ASEAN countries in the area of nature 
conservation, it has not entered into force, since only three of the six signatory member 
states (Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand) have ratified it so far. Other 
agreements and initiatives on environmental cooperation under the umbrella of 
ASEAN include the 1995 Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution,1123 the 2002 
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution,1124 the ASEAN Wildlife Enforcement 
Network launched in 20051125 and the 2007 ASEAN Declaration on Environmental 
Sustainability.1126  
 
Since 2005, the East Asian Summit (EAS) has been held annually just after the 
ASEAN leaders’ meetings. With regard to regional security, the summit in 2007 was 
of particular importance, as it brought forth the Cebu Declaration on East Asian 
Energy Security, in which the states agreed to promote energy security and find energy 
                                                 
1120 2003 ASEAN Declaration on Heritage Parks (18 December 2003) available at 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2003%20ASEAN%20Declaration%20on%20Heritage%20Parks-pdf.pdf 
>. 
1121 1985 ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources (9 July 1985; not 
entered into force) available at <http://www.jus.uio.no/english/services/library/treaties/06/6-
01/asean-conservation-nature.xml>. 
1122 Art 19(3)(a) of the ASEAN Agreement on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources. 
1123 1995 ASEAN Cooperation Plan on Transboundary Pollution; reprinted in 12 ASEAN Economic 
Bulletin 89. 
1124 2002 ASEAN Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution; available at 
<http://haze.asean.org/docs/1128506236/ASEANAgreementonTransboundaryHazePollution.pdf/vie
w>. 
1125 For more information, see <http://asean-wen.org/>. 
1126 ASEAN Declaration on Environmental Sustainability (20 November 2007) available at 
<http://environment.asean.org/index.php?page=agreements:aseandeclarationenvsus>. 
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alternatives to conventional fuels with the aim to provide ‘reliable, adequate and 
affordable energy supplies.’1127 It was signed by the 10 ASEAN members (Brunei, 
Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and 
Vietnam), as well as Australia, China, India, Japan, New Zealand and South Korea. 
This was followed by the Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the 
Environment at the third EAS in 2008.1128 With regard to freshwater resources, the 
environmental ministers of ASEAN adopted the 2003 ASEAN Strategic Plan on Water 
Resources Management, which is aimed at promoting the vision for water in Southeast 
Asia by 2050: ‘The attainment of sustainability of water resources to ensure sufficient 
water quantity of acceptable quality to meet the needs of the people of Southeast Asia 
in terms of health, food security, economy and environment.’1129 In the most recent 
meeting of AMME, the ministers agreed to ‘enhance existing transboundary water 
cooperation within ASEAN which aims to reduce poverty, protect natural resources, 
prevent crisis and resolve conflicts between countries.’1130 However, these initiatives 
to strengthen cooperation have not been implemented yet, as the current struggles for 
the regions freshwater resources shows.  
 
Hence, when it comes to transboundary freshwater management in Himalayan Asia, 
selective partnerships are still the norm. The reasons for this are twofold: (1) at the 
international level, states still see transboundary water interaction as a zero-sum game, 
as it is the limiting factor of their respective economic growth; (2) at the various 
national levels, the power interplay is preventing a joint approach, due to the prevailing 
fragmentation caused by bureaucratic competition.1131 Within the sub-region of the 
Lower Mekong, for instance, this competition and resulting fragmentation can be 
witnessed in the way each state’s department of irrigation is, of course, interested in 
utilising infrastructure such as dams to regulate the freshwater flow for agriculture; 
while the energy sector’s main goal, obviously, is generating hydropower; and the 
                                                 
1127 2007 Cebu Declaration on East Asian Energy Security (15 January 2007) available at 
<http://www.enecho.meti.go.jp/policy/international-affairs/data/CEBU%20DECLARATION.pdf>. 
1128 2007 Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment (21 November 2007) 
available at <http://www.asean.org/asean/external-relations/east-asia-summit-eas/item/singapore-
declaration-on-climate-change-energy-and-the-environment>. 
1129 ASEAN Strategic Plan on Water Resources Management (18 December 2003) available at 
<http://cil.nus.edu.sg/rp/pdf/2003%20ASEAN%20Strategic%20Plan%20on%20Water%20Resource
%20Management-pdf.pdf>.  
1130 Bangkok Resolution on ASEAN Environmental Cooperation (26 September 2012) available at 
<http://www.asean.org/images/2012/news/documents/Agenda%2016%20-
%20ADOPTED%20Bangkok_Resolution_12AMME%20-%2026Sep.pdf>. 
1131 D Suhardiman, M Giordano and F Molle, 'Scalar Disconnect : The Logic of Transboundary Water 
Governance in the Mekong' (2012) 25 Society & Natural Resources 572 at 573. 
204 
agencies responsible for fisheries perceive these structures as impediments to fish 
migration.1132 There is, however, a shimmer of hope for a more coherent and regional 
stance on freshwater management. The recently held 2nd Asia-Pacific Water Summit 
on the topic of ‘Water Security and Water-related Disaster Challenges: Leadership and 
Commitment’ was organised by the Royal Thai Government in collaboration with the 
Asia-Pacific Water Forum and supporting international and regional NGOs.1133 While 
Thailand’s Prime Minister, Yingluck Shinawatra, believes that ‘there could be a fight 
over resources’ unless countries enter into water sharing agreements, she stressed the 
importance of regional forums to resolve water conflicts peacefully, since ‘[n]o 
country in this region can handle these challenges alone.’1134 In the outcome document 
of the summit, the Chiang Mai Declaration, the heads of state and government 
declared, among other things, to ‘enhance regional and international cooperation on 
sharing, exchange and dissemination of scientific and technical knowledge, as well as 
best practices, related to integrated water resources management.’1135 It further invites 
the Asia-Pacific Water Forum to mobilise initiatives to support the recommendations 
and to consider establishing an Asian Water Information System.1136 
 
Yet, it seems like the potential for states dependent on the rivers rising in the 
Himalayas agreeing on a truly regional framework for governing their transboundary 
water resources seems rather elusive at present. While there already are various 
promising initiatives in place which promote a more regional approach to 
environmental issues in the region through a mix of hard and soft law and policy 
instruments, the task now is to build on those and strengthen them. Given China’s and 
India’s growing responsibility in the international arena, there might be a chance for 
making the case for a moral obligation of the two hydro-hegemons to move into the 
direction of regional common concern. Are China and India responsible international 
players who can promote the concept of water security in Himalayan Asia as a regional 
common concern? No doubt, the two regional hydro-hegemons are the rising powers 
in world politics – but do they also accept new responsibilities? So far, China’s 
participation in global governance has been rather disappointing, and there is ‘little 
                                                 
1132 Ibid. 
1133 International Institute for Sustainable Development, 'Second Asia-Pacific Water Summit' (23 May 
2013) <http://www.iisd.ca/water/apws/2013/html/crsvol211num1e.html>. 
1134 AFP, 'Asia-Pacific Leaders Warn of Water Conflict Threat' (20 May 2013) 
<http://www.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Asia/Story/A1Story20130520-424064.html>. 
1135 The Second Asia-Pacific Water Summit, Chiang Mai Declaration (20 May 2013) available at 
<http://apws2013.files.wordpress.com/2013/05/chiang-mai-declaration.pdf>. 
1136 Ibid. 
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evidence that it will seek international leadership.’1137 With regard to his foreign 
policy, the new leader of the Chinese Communist Party, Xi Jinping, has made it clear 
that his nation will continue to ‘never compromise its core interests’ or swallow the 
‘bitter fruit’ of accepting harm to its sovereignty, security and development.1138 India’s 
strategy to claim its status as a ‘great power’ seems even less clear, as its hands are tied 
by domestic constraints.1139 
 
The contemporary concept of water security, as it has been developed in this study, 
attempts to persuade states that a regional approach to water security not only serves 
the region as a whole, but ultimately also constitutes the best option for the respective 
national security interests when taking a long-term view. More research is needed with 
regard to how Chinese and Indian positions on international challenges evolve as they 
gain more influence in the international arena. While both nations seem to prefer a 
stable Himalayan Asia which will allow them to sustain their economic growth, they 
still perceive threats to their security differently, and thus employ different 
strategies.1140 Although it is of tremendous importance that the water security strategy 
for Himalayan Asia is being developed from within, the role of external powers in the 
process should not be underestimated. Not only do international NGOs already 
influence the transboundary water interaction in the region; freshwater is also high on 
the foreign policy agenda of the EU and US – both having a deep interest in the social 
stability of the region. However, the international community as a whole is not only 
part of the solution; it also carries a huge responsibility: avoiding ‘environmental 
colonialism’ at all cost and not to play off one state against the other(s).1141 The 
concept of ‘regional common concern’ can only unfold properly if understood at a 
regional level by all relevant stakeholders. The international community, then, has to 
encourage and enable both China and India to play a more prominent role in providing 
water security in Himalayan Asia. 
 
                                                 
1137 H Wang and E French, 'China's Participation in Global Governance from a Comparative Perspective' 
(2013) 15 Asia Policy 89 at 89. 
1138 Economist Intelligence Unit, 'China: New Leader Hints at Tough Foreign Policy' (2013) 
<http://country.eiu.com.proxy1.athensams.net/article.aspx?articleid=60102990&Country=China&to
pic=Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations&u=1&pid=1510105735&oid
=1510105735&uid=1>. 
1139 A Narlikar, 'India Rising: Responsible to Whom?' (2013) 89 International Affairs 595 at 613. 
1140 See AJ Tellis and S Mirski (eds), Crux of Asia : China, India, and the Emerging Global Order 
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2013). 
1141 See, e.g., A Agarwal and S Narain, Global Warming in an Unequal World : A Case of 
Environmental Colonialism (Centre for Science and Environment 1991). 
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This chapter has outlined the water crisis in Himalayan Asia and analysed two of the 
important legal frameworks governing transboundary watercourses. While there is 
evidence that the current approach towards common water security is rather weak, the 
last section tried to give an outlook into the future as to how the two hydro-hegemons 
might work towards a more ‘common’ understanding of the crisis. The reason for 
selecting Himalayan Asia, as well as the Indus and Mekong river basins, as ‘test cases’ 
was not to show that applying the concept of water security developed in this thesis 
will immediately provide a fertile ground for deepening cooperation on transboundary 
water issues. The chapter did, however, point towards the particular challenges of the 
concept of water security in general, as well as the specific political obstacles in 
Himalayan Asia. Given the embryonic stage of ‘water security,’ the lessons learned 
here might inform the further development of the concept. 
 
 
7 CONCLUSION 
7.1 The Contribution of the 4A Operational Methodology 
The availability of, and access to, freshwater resources is one of the most challenging 
global security concerns of the twenty-first century. Only a small number of issues 
have the potential to create as much friction between states as the management of 
freshwater resources which cross international boundaries. Water, the gossamer linking 
various other security concerns – environment, food and energy – has gradually 
acquired an independent status within the security discourse.1142 However, this 
recently gained prominence has done little in strengthening the concept’s substance 
and actual impact on transboundary freshwater management. The reason for the gap 
between apparent omnipresence and actual influence lies in the fact that water security 
has different dimensions – individual, local, national, regional and global – and is 
being debated in the realms of various disciplines – political science, international 
relations, economics and law – which are influenced by countless players trying to 
shape the discussion for the benefit of their own agenda. This makes the concept of 
water security hard to grasp and utilise for triggering the desperately needed change in 
how we manage our freshwater resources. For that reason, the international legal 
                                                 
1142 See the emerging literature on the topic, e.g., J Briscoe, 'Water Security: Why It Matters and What to 
Do About It' (2009) 4 Innovations: Technology, Governance, Globalization 3; C Cook and K 
Bakker, 'Water Security: Debating an Emerging Paradigm' (2012) 22 Global Environmental Change 
94; UK Sinha, 'The Why and What of Water Security' (2009) 33 Strategic Analysis 470; S Thapliyal, 
'Water Security or Security of Water? A Conceptual Analysis' (2011) 67 India Quarterly: A Journal 
of International Affairs 19. 
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scholarship has included water security thinking only hesitantly in its research. The 
few scholars who have taken this step have done so in an incomplete manner which 
has often lacked the rigorous theoretical depth and analysis required to fully establish 
the way international law needs to be refined in order to better address water 
security.1143 The prevalent approach of squeezing the complex notion of water security 
into the rigid frames of established and familiar tools and concepts, however, has 
prevented an understanding of water security which reflects current international 
developments; and thus, it has prohibited the shaping of new ideas which could help 
the evolution of the notion in the international legal sphere. This is why the need to 
dramatically re-think the framework of water security, where the ‘contribution of 
(water) law is more dynamically considered and integrated,’ has been 
acknowledged.1144 
 
In order to move this debate forward, water security has been conceptualised in 
Chapter 2 by reviewing existing perspectives and viewpoints from a range of 
disciplines on the concept. The definition of water security has been developed with 
the improvement of the accessibility of the concept within international legal 
scholarship in mind: 
 
A community is water secure when it has sustainable access to freshwater of 
sufficient quantity and quality, or to the benefits derived therefrom; and the 
ability to minimise water-related risk and its various repercussions to an 
acceptable level – without compromising the supporting ecosystems. 
 
In drawing from the widening and deepening process of the general security debate 
and acknowledging the complexity of the water crisis, the definition has several 
advantages over previous ones which are constrained by orthodox thinking. Its 
scalability ensures that it can address water security at the local, national, international 
or even global level, while it does justice to the fact that several of these levels overlap 
in practice. In addition, by including the benefits derived from the access to water and 
the repercussions of water-related risks, the true complexity of the water crisis comes 
into play. The (re)allocation is rarely an end in itself, since the opportunities and issues 
linked (directly or indirectly) to it are the actual crunch points. This opens the door for 
                                                 
1143 See, e.g., Wouters, 'Water Security: What Role for International Water Law?'. 
1144 Tarlock and Wouters, 'Reframing the Water Security Dialogue' at 60. 
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discussions of concepts and challenges like virtual water, water footprint, land grabs, 
rapid urbanisation or changing migration patterns. Furthermore, the definition also 
offers the needed flexibility through its undetermined parameters of ‘sufficient 
quantity and quality of freshwater’ and ‘acceptable level of water-related risk and 
repercussions.’ This is needed to accommodate the specific requirements depending on 
the hydrological, political and social background of the respective community – which 
is subjected to constant change.1145 This renders water security as a concept which is 
not set in stone. Rather, it should be understood as a platform for debating the 
constantly evolving challenges. 
 
Following a contemporary path of security, rather than applying the orthodox state-
centred and military-focused approach is the only way to overcome the concerns about 
securitising water. Since it is no longer perceived as necessary for there to be a violent 
conflict over resources to affect the security and development of nations, the 
perception of the concept has changed dramatically as well.1146 However, in order to 
function, this new perception has to be supported by a system of values which leads 
societies. Here, international law has to play a central role in supporting those values, 
establishing the substantive and procedural ‘rules of the game’ and thus, fulfilling its 
one of its core functions – the promotion of peaceful relations between states.1147 Only 
through international law can ‘water security’ move beyond its status as political 
rhetoric and obtain normative impact. 
 
The calls of opponents to ‘de-securitise’ water, due to fears that discussions of water 
security allow freshwater interaction to be detached from any legal process trying to 
level the playing field, can be counteracted, as this study has shown. International law, 
pushed by the securitisation process, can be developed further in order to fully 
comprehend the advanced perception of common security. It has been recognised that 
‘the integrated and interdependent nature of the new challenges and issues 
contrasts sharply with the nature of the institutions that exist today. These 
institutions tend to be independent, fragmented, and working to relatively 
narrow mandates with closed decision processes. […] The real world of 
                                                 
1145 Grey and Sadoff, Water Resources, Growth and Development : A Working Paper for Discussion at 
7. 
1146 Brauch, 'Introduction: Globalization and Environmental Challenges: Reconceptualizing Security in 
the 21st Century' at 27; Ullman, 'Redefining Security' at 129. 
1147 Cosgrove, Water Security and Peace: A Synthesis of Studies Prepared under the PCCP-Water for 
Peace Process at 25. 
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interlocked economic and ecological systems will not change; the policies and 
institutions concerned must.’1148  
While some states are reluctant to change their stance and keep defining water security 
as a national security issue, international law can counter this mulish behaviour. In 
order to do so, however, international law has to appropriately address water security’s 
four core elements: (1) availability, (2) access, (3) adaptability and (4) ambit.1149 
‘Availability’ relates to issues of water quantity and quality; and deals with the actual 
management (including its control and protection) of the resource as such. ‘Access’ 
describes the right to actually make use of the shared resource. The element of 
‘adaptability’ does justice to the fact that in many cases, the most important variable to 
the successful sharing of freshwater resources is the resilience of the legal and policy 
frameworks (including institutions) that govern water management, rather than 
absolute water scarcity.1150 Thus, a future-proof framework for transboundary 
watercourses has to include a fair amount of flexibility. Finally, ‘ambit’ delimits the 
scope of water security – i.e., the sphere of influence of the notion.1151 In addition to 
the orthodox concept of ‘scope,’1152 the approach here is to better echo the common 
character of the global water crisis by linking the diverse influencing factors in an 
encompassing fashion. Only with the support of an underlying framework which can 
bring about a more equitable way of transboundary water resources management, can 
the concept of water security play the important role of the long yearned for change 
agent. 
 
The newly developed operational methodology for identifying the four core elements 
of water security which have to be addressed by international law revealed the 
challenges and shortcomings of the current legal framework governing transboundary 
freshwater resources. The first challenge is the (legal) tension between the task to 
provide for ‘security of expectations’ (status quo) and the innovation needed to meet 
fluctuating demands and supplies, i.e., the ability to respond to change. The second 
challenge is the (environmental / political) tension between the ecological unity of the 
                                                 
1148 World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future at 310. 
1149 See Chapter 3. 
1150 Eckstein, 'Water Scarcity, Conflict, and Security in a Climate Change World: Challenges and 
Opportunities for International Law and Policy'; Wolf, 'Troubled Waters: Conflict and Cooperation 
over Shared Rivers' at 5. 
1151 Magsig, 'Introducing an Analytical Framework for Water Security: A Platform for the Refinement of 
International Water Law' at 67. 
1152 See Wouters and others, Sharing Transboundary Waters : An Integrated Assessment of Equitable 
Entitlement: The Legal Assessment Model at 19. 
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water resource and the diverging sovereign interests of states. This in turn leads to 
friction between the aims of maximising the overall benefit of sustainable aquatic 
ecosystems and maximising the relative benefit of states. While the analysis has shown 
that international water law does – at least to some extent – provide guidance on the 
elements of availability, access, adaptability and ambit, it lacks the ability to overcome 
state-centrism and truly level the playing field of transboundary water interaction. 
Hydropolitics based on power still determine the rules of the game in many basins 
around the world. Furthermore, the intertwinement of water security issues with other 
crises (i.e. food, energy and environment) is changing the dynamics of international 
relations on a global scale at a pace which international law seems to be unable to keep 
up with. The reason for this lies in the perceived threat of losing national sovereignty, 
which increases the political costs of implementing flexible mechanisms.1153 The 
prevailing focus on short-term gains has to be addressed by raising the awareness of 
policy makers that freshwater agreements have to be seen as a long-term process of 
involving stakeholders in water resources management, rather than an ultimate 
outcome.1154 This in turn would also help moving from the dominant ‘react-and-
correct’ approach of international water law to the much more adequate one of 
’foresee-and-prevent.’1155 Furthermore, such a new take would fully comprehend the 
concept of ‘common’ water security, which is inherently preventative compared to the 
conservative understanding of security as a reactive control paradigm. Hence, 
international water law has to be developed further based on a more ‘common’ and 
‘regional’ normative basis – and ‘water security’ serves as a perfect concept to study 
the progressive development of the legal framework.  
 
The birth of the concept of water security did not come unexpectedly, but has to be 
seen as the confluence of already existing streams of thought – whose roots still shape 
the debate around it. The 4A operational methodology, then, works like a lens giving 
those subsisting schools of thought the necessary force to initiate and influence the 
global and regional negotiations on transboundary freshwater management. Ultimately, 
if it is being followed through properly, it puts international water law on a new track – 
one which strengthens regionalism and fosters cooperation; and thus gives the 
principle of equitable and reasonable utilisation more weight. Hence, a newly proposed 
                                                 
1153 Fischhendler, 'Legal and Institutional Adaptation to Climate Uncertainty: A Study of International 
Rivers' at 298. 
1154 Ibid. 
1155 Timoshenko, 'Ecological Security: Response to Global Challenges'. 
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conceptualisation of water security with a deeper connection to international water law 
can open up new pathways towards closer regional cooperation. 
 
7.2 Water Security and the Future of International Law 
The important question, however, is: How should this path look like – and how does it 
have to be prepared in order to effectively implement the novel water security thinking 
in international law? In any case, it has to challenge the orthodox understanding of 
water security as being solely of national concern. While this will most likely be an 
arduous path to take, it is without alternative if transboundary water cooperation is to 
be prevented from failing. In case the debate on water security does not trigger any 
transformative reforms of international law, it will produce nothing more than old wine 
in new bottles. In order to prevent such a standstill and to achieve a truly joint 
management of transboundary waters, a legal framework is needed which is 
fundamentally different to current approaches of international water law.1156 The future 
direction of the legal regime, however, will not change by merely developing 
procedural rules further. Certainly, the continuous proceduralisation of international 
water law is already contributing towards the same goal;1157 but the revealed 
shortcomings of the legal framework are too grave to be potently counteracted by an 
incremental change which often only scratches the surface of international law. While 
some scholars have long realised that  
‘[i]n international law it is today of both theoretical and practical importance 
to distinguish between the international law of ‘coexistence,’ governing 
essentially diplomatic inter-state relations, and the law of co-operation, 
expressed in the growing structure of international organization and the 
pursuit of common human interests;’1158  
little has been done to actually level the playing field of international freshwater 
interaction and ensure a more cooperative legal framework.1159 
 
The concept of solidarity has already been integrated into various norms of 
international law – e.g., in development law, international humanitarian law and 
refugee law.1160 Some argue that since the principle of solidarity is operating across 
                                                 
1156 See analysis of the current legal framework governing transboundary watercourses in Chapter 3. 
1157 See O McIntyre, 'The Proceduralisation and Growing Maturity of International Water Law' (2010) 
22 Journal of Environmental Law 475. 
1158 Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law at xiii. 
1159 See Chapter 3. 
1160 See Chapter 4. 
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several fields of international law and strives to protect fundamental values of the 
international community by penetrating both primary and secondary rules, it can even 
be claimed to have reached ‘constitutional status;’1161 but even without going so far, its 
influence on various fields of law cannot be denied. In the realm of international 
environmental law, it is the concept of common but differentiated responsibilities 
which has tried to prove itself as a powerful tool towards the clarification and future 
development of the principle of solidarity. Yet, as the analysis in Chapter 4 has shown, 
it falls short on various grounds. With regard to international water law, it has been 
proposed to base transboundary freshwater management on the concept of 
hydrosolidarity. The main goal of the notion is to inject a common understanding, 
based on the ideas of collective action, shared responsibility, interdependence and 
ethics, into (international) water interaction.1162 Ultimately, following an approach of 
solidarity in transboundary water interaction implies that reconciliation of conflicts 
over water have to be based on the solidarity among all water users – doing justice to 
the ‘ambit’ of water security, as it would bring together a community of states and 
ensure a truly joint management of shared water resources. This desperately needed 
ethical underpinning for water security can help frame the negotiations between 
riparians of a transboundary watercourse and challenge inequity in the form of abusive 
hydro-hegemony. Yet, if hydroegoism continues to define hydropolitics in a particular 
region, the idea of hydrosolidarity might be a noble one – but one without any 
meaningful effect. The moral principle of (hydro)solidarity can only facilitate the 
required change, and thus challenge the self-interests of states, by allowing 
international law to play a more prominent role. As Chapter 4 has shown, several 
examples in international law exist where solidarity already influences actions of states 
pursuant to a common interest. Thus, international law is able to induce the orderly 
change that international society needs to address the world water crisis more 
effectively – and ultimately sustain peace and security.  
 
This, however, infers that in order to do so, international water law itself needs to 
undergo a process of refinement, as addressing the core characteristics of water 
security – availability, access, adaptability and ambit – requires reviewing established 
paradigms in order to find a way out of the environment-sovereignty-conundrum. Up 
to now, orthodox interpretations of international water law have not managed to 
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provide such a transition. Chapter 5 did elaborate on the legal foundation needed to 
support the concept of hydrosolidarity, since the conceptualisation of water security, 
which inevitably has a normative dimension, raises questions about international law 
in general. It became obvious that in order to be able to implement hydrosolidarity for 
the benefit of common water security, one of the most fundamental tenets of 
international law – state sovereignty – had to be reinterpreted in a light which truly 
reflects the realities of the global water crisis. Considering the main shortcoming of the 
current legal regime, the state-centred approach to the water crisis based on an 
orthodox understanding of sovereignty, the question arises: How can we arrive at an 
understanding of ‘cooperative sovereignty’ which supports attaining common water 
security? 
 
Here, the concept of considering water security as a matter of ‘regional common 
concern’ was introduced as a promising way forward in striving for true regional water 
management – and thus, for allowing international law to play a more prominent role 
in addressing the challenges of global water insecurity. It attempts to do this without 
abandoning acknowledged principles of international water law – e.g., equitable and 
reasonable utilisation – but rather by providing the necessary space for developing 
novel interpretations of tenets of international law. While the approaches of ‘common 
area’ and ‘common heritage’ are limited to a certain geographical area and its 
resources, and the concept of ‘community of interest’ seems to be too sovereignty 
intrusive, the notion of ‘common concern’ appears to be more promising for the 
progressive development of international law and a renewed understanding of 
cooperative sovereignty. In agreeing that a particular challenge is being perceived as a 
matter of common concern results in the appreciation that it can no longer be 
considered as mere national issue. It also triggers a shift from the orthodox reciprocity 
and material benefit sharing we often find in treaties to joint action in the long-term 
interest of community.1163 However, is it politically feasible to consider water security 
as a common concern of humankind? Given the sheer scope and impact of the global 
water crisis, as discussed in Chapter 2, it might be possible to construct an analogous 
mindset to the loss of biodiversity or global climate change for transboundary 
freshwater management. Even so, it is still difficult to sufficiently prove international 
                                                 
1163 IUCN Commission on Environmental Law and International Council of Environmental Law, Draft 
International Covenant on Environment and Development at 40. 
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consensus on whether water security is indeed of common concern.1164 Yet, scaling 
one level down by looking at the regional layer could be a fruitful middle road which 
can sufficiently accommodate the national interests within the global challenge.1165 
Hence, applying the ‘4A’ operational methodology for the analysis of the key issues 
related to water security can serve as a point of departure for the refinement of 
international (water) law. While the notion of common water security is still in its 
infancy, it nonetheless provides a promising novel mindset – one which may, if backed 
by the normative concept of ‘regional common concern,’ ultimately be capable of 
overcoming state-centrism. However, the notion could also face the same destiny as 
other concepts before, if it does not manage to bridge the gap between interesting 
theory and practice. Therefore, it is important to know what the chances of this notion 
are to actually influence real hydropolitics on the ground. 
 
This is the debate on which Chapter 6 is built – by analysing how likely a change of 
transboundary water interaction is in Himalayan Asia. Are there are signs which can be 
interpreted as potential pathways towards a new approach based on regional common 
concern? While neither of the two regimes examined, the Mekong Agreement and the 
Indus Waters Treaty, support the understanding of water security which is necessary 
for regional peace and security, there is nonetheless evidence which allows for hope 
regarding a change in attitude from bilateralism to regionalism. Few delicate tendrils 
exist which indicate the potential for a move away from state-centred approach 
towards closer cooperation between India and China on a regional basis. They do, 
however, need constant support from all actors involved – for instance, regional 
organisations like ASEAN and international legal scholars and hydro-diplomats – in 
order to truly overcome the still prevailing nationalism in Himalayan Asian 
hydropolitics. 
 
Throughout this study, it has become clear that international water law does not merely 
constitute a niche product of the international system. Due to the unique characteristics 
of the global water crisis and the conglomerate challenges they pose to the 
international community, international water law can – and should – affect the very 
                                                 
1164 On the idea of a global water law, see Dellapenna and Gupta, 'The Evolution of Global Water Law'. 
1165 See Brunnée and Toope, 'Environmental Security and Freshwater Resources: A Case for 
International Ecosystem Law' at 74. 
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substance of general international law.1166 Its status as a relatively young field of 
international law allows it to introduce new methods and new ways of thinking into the 
wider sphere of legal research – like common water security. Here, one intrinsic 
feature of the notion, the process of securitisation, can be hugely beneficial, since it 
considers the time for ‘politics as usual’ as being over. As Wolfrum rightly stated: 
‘[t]he development of general concepts like the freedom of the high seas or the 
common heritage principle reflects the spirit of a given historic period (Zeitgeist).’1167 
The growing global water insecurity brings about a new ‘Zeitgeist’ which demands 
from the international legal framework nothing less than a self-reinvention. If it attains 
success in doing so by regarding water security as being of regional common concern, 
it will not only help to address the global water crisis, it will also avert a further demise 
of international law in the domain of transboundary freshwater interaction – and 
potentially in other areas as well.1168 
 
7.3 A Research Agenda for International Water Security 
The lack of water security will be a defining reality for international relations and 
global policy in the decades to come. By looking at the concept of water security 
through a legal lens, a forum has been created which can serve as a foundation for 
future scholarship on the role of international law in matters of security. In order to 
allow this notion to mature, new tracks for further research have to push this school of 
thought further. Here, several catalytic paths are useful for better understanding and 
influencing transboundary freshwater interaction to that effect. 
 
It has been argued that studies on the global political and legal governance framework 
‘remain preoccupied either with sovereign states that are presumed to be isolated from 
other states or with modern individual subjects caught between desires for autonomy 
and desires for collectivity.’1169 Thus, it seems like today’s international system is still 
locked up in a conceptual prison. In order to break gaol, more research is needed in 
areas which have traditionally been neglected by the international legal scholarship. 
We desperately need to introduce ‘our moral responsibility to the legal dimension. A 
                                                 
1166 For a discussion on how global environmental concerns affect international law see French, 'A 
Reappraisal of Sovereignty in the Light of Global Environmental Concerns' at 377. 
1167 Wolfrum, 'The Principle of the Common Heritage of Mankind' at 312. 
1168 On the role of international law in addressing other global crises, see C Kaufmann, 'International 
Law in Recession? The Role of International Law When Crisis Hits: Food, Finance, and Climate 
Change' in Fastenrath U and others (eds), From Bilateralism to Community Interest : Essays in 
Honour of Bruno Simma (Oxford University Press 2011) at 1189.  
1169 RBJ Walker, After the Globe, before the World (Routledge 2010) at 10. 
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pure interstate approach in our thinking is consciously or unconsciously deemed 
insufficient to resolve the problems we are facing today.’1170 This humanisation 
process of international law – in principle, the establishment of international law to 
ensure the very survival of mankind1171 – prompts questions of the role of ethics in 
international law.1172 These questions get even more complex when realising the 
interlacement of water security with other securities (e.g., environmental, food or 
energy) at the various levels of governance.1173 Do countries have moral obligations 
towards their riparians – or even nations beyond the basin – to manage their national 
water resources more effectively? International legal scholars have often shown deep 
interest in other disciplines – for instance, international relations, economics or even 
history. The field of ethics, as vast as it is, does not have to represent any greater 
challenge.1174 
 
Since the future international water law will have to be more dynamic – as it has to 
keep up with, and control, the complex fluxes of the global water cycle it tries to help 
manage peacefully – the question arises how international norms change over time, 
and whether there are ways to speed up this complex process? How is it possible that 
practices which were perceived as normal (e.g., slavery) are now prohibited by 
international law? While international lawyers and international relations scholars 
acknowledge norm change, we do not fully understand how and why international 
rules develop in the ways and with the speed they do.1175 Here, two developments are 
of particular interest: (1) the role of non-state actors in international law; and (2) the 
value of soft law in the process of norm formation. Neither has been studied with the 
necessary rigour or breadth as to its effect on the refinement and implementation 
international water law. How can NGOs or epistemic communities influence 
                                                 
1170 See the discussion following the presentation by L Boisson de Chazournes, 'Responsibility to 
Protect: Reflecting Solidarity?' in Wolfrum R and Kojima C (eds), Solidarity: A Structural Principle 
of International Law (Springer 2010) at 119. 
1171 See C Tomuschat, 'International Law : Ensuring the Survival of Mankind on the Eve of a New 
Century : General Course on Public International Law' in Hague Academy of International Law (ed), 
Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 281, vol 281 (Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers 2001) at 9. 
1172 A Gillespie, International Environmental Law, Policy and Ethics (Oxford University Press 2000); R 
Higgins, 'Ethics and International Law' (2010) 23 Leiden Journal of International Law 277; M 
Koskenniemi, The Turn to Ethics in International Law (2002); AP Rubin, Ethics and Authority in 
International Law (Cambridge University Press 1997). 
1173 E Lopez-Gunn, L De Stefano and MR Llamas, 'The Role of Ethics in Water and Food Security: 
Balancing Utilitarian and Intangible Values' (2012) 14 Water Policy 89. 
1174 Ratner, 'Ethics and International Law: Integrating the Global Justice Project(S)' at 34. 
1175 W Sandholtz and KW Stiles, International Norms and Cycles of Change (Oxford University Press 
2008). 
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transboundary freshwater interaction without negatively affecting the legitimacy of the 
legal framework?1176 International law has to break new ground if it wants to go 
beyond symbolism, like proclaiming 2013 the UN International Year of Water 
Cooperation,1177 and trigger real change. 
 
The abovementioned strands of research can support the novel approach in 
international law which has been portrayed in this study in putting hydro-diplomacy on 
a new track towards hydrosolidarity. Due to the particularities and complexities of the 
crisis, freshwater is the medium which can actually bring about change to some of the 
tenets of international law. Hence, by changing the way we address transboundary 
water issues – through the water security lens – we might even change general 
international law, as it demands for the further development of public international law 
with the cross-cutting challenges in mind. In doing so, we not only ensure a more 
peaceful management of shared freshwater resources; we can also demonstrate how 
other insecurities (e.g., food, environment and energy) can be mitigated. By inventing 
new concepts, we reconstruct the ways of our thinking – and ultimately, we reconstruct 
our world as such.1178 This is because fact and value become interwoven in the 
process; and only by adding value – legal implications – to it, will this process take a 
positive course. The changing expectations of the international community produce a 
demand for additional functions of international law – beyond the rules of conduct in 
international diplomacy.1179 In order to design future-proof international legal 
frameworks, the question of how the international issues we see today, and the ones we 
have not yet identified as international, will develop, needs to be addressed.1180 Those 
future challenges will then trigger different requirements – both normative and 
structural – for international cooperation. With the help of international law, the notion 
of water security can create a space which transcends national boundaries – real and 
imaginary. However, in order to be able to do so, international law has to accept the 
challenge posed by the concept of common water security. Here, the momentum 
created by the securitisation of water is vital for driving international legal research 
forward. By considering securitisation as a reflexive ‘rule altering’ process, it can even 
                                                 
1176 See PF Diehl and C Ku, The Dynamics of International Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) at 
108. 
1177 See UN Water, '2013: United Nations International Year of Water Cooperation' (2013) 
<http://www.unwater.org/watercooperation2013.html>. 
1178 See the discussion following the presentation by Boisson de Chazournes, 'Responsibility to Protect: 
Reflecting Solidarity?' at 119. 
1179 Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law at 5. 
1180 Trachtman, The Future of International Law : Global Government at 4. 
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provide relevant insights into the transformation and development of international 
law.1181 Securitisation of water kick-starts a process which otherwise would not exist – 
one looking beyond water and beyond nation states. 
  
                                                 
1181 See also Kettemann, 'The Conceptual Debate on Human Security and Its Relevance for the 
Development of International Law'. 
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